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Preface 
Whilst reading the introduction to the Phd theses of 
two former colleagues, David Wilson and Suzanna Rodrigues, 
in search of ideas to introduce this one, it was apparent 
that for all of us, accident leavened by deliberate design 
played a role in the definition and generation of each of 
our respective research problems. 
The inspiration and stimulus for this thesis are fairly 
obscure as indeed are many of the ideas which finally 
crystalize into any project design. This design process 
being the outcome of background reading and odd 
conversations at odd times and indeed in odd places (my odd 
places include a fellside in North Yorkshire and 39000 ft. 
over Wyoming as well as-the inevitable pubs and bars the 
world over which offer solace to distraught academics) with 
odd people from different disciplines. However certain 
events in the process are identifiable and can be described. 
The first recognizable occurrence in my particular 
sequence came during my final year as an undergraduate at 
1% 
the University of Bradford Management Centre when thanks to 
the efforts of David Hickson, Peter Clark and Richard Butler 
I became 'hooked' on organization studies, as nothing else I 
had studied until that time began to explain the very real 
Problems experienced whilst I was working as a systems 
analyst in the Management Services department of a large 
engineering company. 
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Once hooked, another shot of study was clearly 
indicated and I began the M. A course in Organization 
Studies, now unfortunately no longer offered, in the 
Department of Management Studies at the University of Leeds. 
The time spent with Galvin Whitaker, John Hayes, Doug 
Duckworth and Terry Morton served to deepen my knowledge of 
and develop my thinking about organizations in a very 
challenging environment. 
The following year spent searching for a job in related 
fields such as personnel, training and O. D. coupled with 
doing time in a local textile mill as a warehouseman came to 
an end when a chance visit to the main campus building of 
the University of Bradford led to the chance perusal of the 
university newsletter which contained notification of a 
vacant Research Assistantship in the Organizational Analysis 
Research Unit at the Management Centre. 
I applied immediately, and David Hickson contacted me 
almost by return to say that my application was, of course, 
late and someone else had been appointed. However they had 
failed to show up on the due date and if it transpired, as 
indeed it eventually did, that they were really not going to 
come then would I attend for interview? To abbreviate the 
narrative I was, in the words of a former colleague, "hired 
out to do the interviewing" on the power and decision making 
project funded in those pre Sir Keith Joseph days by the 
SSRC, and the university's own Short Term Academic 
Commitment fund. 
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Thus began a long term research career based on short 
term, and at times nonexistent, funding as that initial 
appointment was extended twice, became a research fellowship 
(twice) a temporary lecturship (twice) and a Visiting 
fellowship (twice). It is therefore hardly surprising that 
the major intellectual antecedents of this current project 
are firmly rooted in the ideas, methods and mores of the now 
scattered members of the research team who worked at various 
times on the project. 
It is to these people both individually and 
collectively that I owe an enormous debt, one that can never 
be repaid especially by a mention here, but I must 
acknowledge however clumsily both their comradeship and 
assistance. 
Graham Astley firmly rooted my theoretical base on 
decision making in particular with many suggestions and 
discussions. David Wilson, then another research assistant 
and near to obtaining his own Phd, became both a long term 
friend and colleague providing beer, sympathy and advice in 
appropriate quantities when the going got tough. David Cray 
and I established a relationship that has survived across 
the years and oceans to the extent that we are now 
Colleagues and close friends at Carleton. It was he who 
urged me to start and who has continued to provide both 
intellectual and morale support. It would take at least 
another 10 sides to fully express my appreciation for his 
contribution alone, but I must mention others from Bradford 
I, 
who helped in different ways. Richard Butler's ability to 
prompt me with the right question at the right time; John 
Sharp for his skilled methodological advice; Peter Wright's 
critique of the questionnaire; Chris Higgins, Director of 
the Management Centre for his support of the team in general 
and myself in particular, when times were hard financially. 
All these contributions facilited my development and the 
production of this thesis. Above all these, however, stands 
David Hickson's contribution, through his thorough and 
patient supervision, to his teaching of the researchers 
craft in coping with the realities of research, mere words 
cannot express my gratitude. 
Others on both sides of the Atlantic deserve an 
appreciative mention. Peter Divers for dragging me out to 
run on cold evenings and check coding for me, Tony Bailetti, 
Director at Carleton, for holding off my share of the 
administrative burden for a year. Barbara in Bradford for 
typing the Appendices, Kathy Sawa at Carleton for the tables 
and Wojtek Michalowski at Carleton for help with the micro 
and the figures. 
Finally to Ros for love, patience, inspiration, 
motivation, typing and almost everything else except the 
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words on the page. Thanks a lot. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction and Stimulus for Research. 
The activities of managers have become a topic of 
public concern and debate. Books about management styles 
(Ouchi 1981), the management of successful organizations 
(Peters and Waterman 1982) and the task of management 
(Blanchard and Johnson 1983) have become bestsellers not 
just among managers but among the general public. The 
notion that the competent management of industrial and 
government organizations has a serious impact on the social 
good has become commonplace. 
One of the issues raised in all three of these popular 
books, especially that of Blanchard and Johnson, is the use 
of managerial time. Like their more academically oriented 
colleagues, for example Mintzberg (1973), these authors see 
managers as being beset with demands for attention and 
action. To be a successful manager implies the correct 
allocation of time to these various problems, events and 
opportunities. Those that are the most important should, 
presumably, use the most time. Yet there is little evidence 
in either the popular or academic literature, that deals 
with the factors that influence the managerial use of time. 
The study on which this thesis is based was designed to 
investigate the factors that shape one of the most important 
uses of managerial time, that spent in making important, in 
this case strategic, decisions. 
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In this thesis two general questions about the use of 
time will be addressed. First, why do strategic decisions 
take such a long time to make? Second, why do managers, who 
are apparently pressed for time, invest so much time in 
these activities? These questions have been raised in the 
decision making literature but few answers and even less 
evidence have been offered. Aside from the academic 
interest in decision making processes, there are many 
practical concerns. Fast and accurate decision making is 
thought to be an indicator of managerial efficiency and may 
be an important weapon for managers to cope successfully 
with dynamic environments. If the factors which affect the 
speed or duration of the decision making process could be 
identified then not only would answers be developed towards 
an unanswered research problem but also managerial time and 
therefore cost might be saved by decisions being made more 
effectively. 
Before beginning to discuss the above aspects in 
greater depth two issues raised by the preceding paragraphs 
need some further examination; why is the study of decision 
making and in particular strategic decision making 
important? 
1.1 Why Decision Making? 
Decision making - choosing one course of action rather 
than another - finding the appropriate solution to a new 
problem imposed by an ever changing world - "is commonly 
asserted to be the heart of executive activity in business" 
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(Cyert, Simon and Trow 1956). If this is so, they continue, 
*ta realistic description and theory of decision making 
process are of central importance to business administration 
and organization" (p. 237). 
The passage of time has not altered the importance of 
these comments. Research from many different perspectives 
is still being undertaken (Pennings et al 1985) into this 
critical managerial activity. 
1.2 What Decisions? 
This thesis focuses on strategic rather than 
operational decisions as these are the important decisions 
that shape the organization's, and the manager's destiny 
(Mintzberg et al, 1976). They are often high risk choices 
(Hage 1980), the ones when, in the words of IBM's Chief 
Executive Officer, "You bet your company" (Wise, 1966). 
These decisions may shift the balance of power amongst the 
dominant coalition responsible for policy and direction 
(Child, 1972, Hage, 1980), or set the parameters within 
which future decision making takes place (Mallory and Cray, 
1982). In short, strategic decisions are those involving 
top management who make major commitments about present and 
future patterns of activity for their organization. 
1.3 Decision making Research. 
Cyert Simon and Trow's (1956) plea, recently reiterated 
by Bass (1983), for more realistic descriptions of 
managerial decision making has to some extent been answered 
as there is now no lack of descriptive case studies 
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reporting how decisions are made, for example, Snyder and 
Page (1958), Duffy and Taylor (1962), Cyert and March 
(1963), Allison (1971), Baldridge (1971), Pettigrew (1973), 
Pugh, Donaldson and Silver (1976), Axelsson and Rosenberg 
(1976), Lund (1980), and Wilson (1980). However sample 
sizes in these studies are invariably small due to the time 
consuming nature of this form of data collection. Until 
recently this has hindered theoretical development and the 
expression of testable, generalizable hypotheses about 
decision making, and none have really taken on-the task of 
explaining duration (Astley et al 1982). 
Nonetheless the last decade or so of research activity 
in this area has seen several major efforts aimed at 
redressing the balance between descriptive work and 
theory development. 
Mintzberg et al's (1976) analysis of 25 decision 
processes lies neatly on the divide between small and large 
scale investigations and between description versus 
empirical and theoretical development. Although their work 
was a notable first in terms of sample size it could be 
suggested that their data, although extremely interesting, 
lacked a coherent theoretical framework against which it 
could have been reflected. Perhaps their sample, whilst 
larger than most, was too small, when divided among seven 
types of decision making, to permit ready generalization. 
Indeed as they themselves point out they "barely scratched 
the surface of organizational decision making" (p. 274). 
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More recently a series of studies, on a larger scale, 
have emerged. The most prominent are those of the DIO team 
(1983) in Dutch organizations; Nutt's (1984) study of 
decision processes of organizations in the U. S. health care 
sector; and the Bradford Studies (Hickson et al 1986) of 150 
decision processes in 30 U. K. organizations. Whilst most of 
these studies measure and report the speed with which 
decisions are made none have as yet accounted for the 
differences found. This then presents the research challenge 
faced by this present study. 
The little empirical work that has been done on this 
topic has emerged largely from the research undertaken by 
members of the Organizational Analysis Research Unit at the 
University of Bradford Management Centre. 
My colleague David Wilson's Phd thesis (Wilson 1980), 
based on six case studies of decision making, touched on 
issues of pace of decision making, concluding that the 
number of interests involved "has a marked association with 
the pace of decisions" but that it is also the nature of the 
interactions amongst the interests that explains it. 
Perhaps, as his analysis suggests, it is an organizational 
and not decisional phenomenon: "a high pressure environment 
... creates and necessitates smooth continuous high pace 
decision making". 
Rodrigues (1980), in a study of the factors 
contributing to the success of decision making also 
discussed some of the issues affecting duration of process. 
0 
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In her sample of 53 decisions drawn from eight U. K. 
organizations, she found that the greater the time pressure 
put on decision makers the less conflict there was and the 
shorter the duration. This result appeared in both the 
non-business organizations (p. 206) and business 
organizations (p. 246) in her sample. 
Mallory et al's (1983) analysis of a sub-sample of 20 
cases from the Bradford studies (Hickson et al 1986) 
mentions speed of decision making as a possible difference 
between British and American owned firms. Their findings 
suggest that it is British managements' proclivity for 
routing their biggest decisions through the formalities of 
standing committees that may account for the longer decision 
times when compared to American owned companies operating in 
Britain. 
Yet a regression based analysis of all 150 cases from 
the Bradford studies (Butler et al 1983) failed to account 
for a significant amount of variance in either of the two 
measures of decision duration used. However other evidence 
from correlations and an examination of representative cases 
from the Bradford data (Hickson et al 1986), does provide 
some guidance for this investigation. The findings of the 
Bradford Group are reviewed more fully in chapter 3 of this 
thesis. 
1.4 The Activity of Decision Making 
Another more practical reason why speed demands further 
study is that, whilst the implementation of strategic 
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decisions consumes what may very well be scarce resources 
such as capital, the making of decisions consumes managerial 
time and, if researchers such as Mintzberg (1973) and Kurke 
and Aldrich (1983) are correct, then managerial time is a 
precious commodity. Its expenditure should therefore be 
more closely examined. 
As the managers of organizations have fiduciary 
responsibilities to stakeholders and obligations to the 
community at large it is appropriate that important 
strategic decisions should be made after due deliberation. 
Forcing the pace of decision making on major issues could 
lead to inadequate and ill-considered solutions. On the 
other hand over-cautious, unwarranted procrastination or 
unnecessary analysis may result in a missed strategic 
opportunity or an increase in costs, in short managerial 
inefficiency. 
Organizations are forces for economic and social 
change (Colignon and Cray, 1980) and the decisions, 
especially the strategic ones, made within them have an 
impact on the society in which we live. For this reason 
they should be correctly but also effectively made. When 
these pages were first drafted members of parliament for 
Kent constituencies were alarmed by the intention of both 
the French and British governments to force the pace of 
decision making on the nature of the fixed Channel link 
project. They feared that the imposition of a January, 1986 
deadline would not allow sufficient time for thoroughly 
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developed alternatives to be considered. This proposed time 
frame can be put into a perspective by comparing it with the 
length of time devoted to the decision regarding the 
location of the third London airport. This process which was 
reported on by Alexander (1979) began in the late 1950's 
and has only recently crystallized into a final outcome. 
This despite there being clear and well developed solutions 
to the problem from the very early stages. It is also 
argued, particularly by those most directly affected, that 
the final choice is, in any case, still the wrong one. 
The Channel link is an example of a government making 
decisions under pressure but management teams in 
organizations are also faced with similar pressures - to 
act, to do something, to select an alternative. As Webber 
(1972) points out: 
"Of course, the alternative could be 
to do nothing, but the mere investment 
of time in the decision making process 
creates a movement for using that 
investment - and use is more apparent in 
deciding on change" (p. 97) 
Managements pressured by time factors may well be 
tempted to curtail the decision making process and combine 
causal determination, which is the development and 
evaluation of solutions, with problem definition, working 
out the actual problem to be solved. This may of course 
result in a less than optimal solution and may account for 
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the idea that 
"in the broad sense managers tend to 
place action ahead of diagnosis and to 
reward speed" (Webber, p. 98). 
As Shakespeare's Macbeth proclaims when deciding to 
kill the king 
If it were done when Itis done, then 
Itwere well it were done quickly" 
(l. vii). 
It appears then that even early managers (i. e. would- 
be kings) were preoccupied with speed and effectiveness. 
There is also the implication that the two are related, 
that decision process time is somehow an indicator of 
managerial efficiency. Protracted, over deliberate, and 
perhaps tortuous decision processes apparently characterize, 
and are concomitant with, images of red tape, and of buck 
passing, in public sector bureaucracies. Indeed within the 
U. K. the current Conservative government's preoccupation 
with its own expenditure has led to investigations into the 
managerial style and decision making of both the Health 
Service (Griffith 1983) and higher education (Jarrat Report: 
Committee of Vice Chancellors and Principals 1985). Such 
concerns reflect the prevailing view that in some way quick 
and, of course, accurate decision making reflects managerial 
efficiency. 
Beyond problems of explanation and of saving managerial 
time, lie external pressures for managerial decision making 
to proceed apace. 
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The work of Burns and Stalker (1961), Emery and Trist 
(1965) and Johne (1984) indicate that organizations facing 
turbulent or unstable environments need to be flexible and 
responsive in the face of rapidly changing circumstances. 
Grinyer and Norburn (1975) point out that "systems theory 
leads us to expect that a faster reaction time can improve 
company performance" (p. 89) a view stressed by both Beer 
(1969) and Forrester (1961). Prolonged decision making time 
may also result in lost opportunities and performance lags. 
This argument is congruent with the work of Rogers 
(1962) who uses a time dimension to differentiate response 
to innovation pressures. He suggests that responses to 
demands to innovate are normally distributed along a 
continuum which can be characterized by, at one end, early 
adopters, to laggards at the other end. For the laggards 
the adoption processes (decision making) is slowed "to a 
crawl". They are set apart from a fast moving world. 
Benjamin Franklin's oft quoted homily that "time is money" 
can therefore be thought of not only in terms of managerial 
time but in terms of missed opportunities and the cost of 
recovery. 
1.5 The Nature of Time in Organizations 
The Franklin quotation cited above neatly encapsulates 
a modern western management view of time. It is another 
variable in the complex equation that makes up 
organizational efficiency. It is considered modern in that 
it stems from the industrial revolution and the growth of 
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mass transportation. Mumford (1934), held the firm view that 
"the clock not the steam engine is the key machine of the 
modern industrial age" (p. 4). The industrial revolution 
required a movement of workers from field to factory, and a 
consequent shift in patterns of activity. One 
characteristic of agricultural work has always been 
irregularity. This means that during the course of a year 
there were periods of intense activity, such as ploughing, 
sowing and harvesting, which were followed by relatively 
relaxed periods, for example during the winter months. The 
length of the working day was also largely determined by the 
time of year. 
According to Clark (1978) this contrasted sharply with 
the factory owner's view of time. The owners were (and 
still are) part of a network within which the calculation of 
interest rates against time had become an established 
practice. 
"They wanted their employees to work 
for defined periods each day and each 
week. Further they wanted equal amounts 
of work produced in each time period. 
Clocks were placed on the walls of 
factories. Wages were calculated 
against the clock. Also clandestine 
timing of work commenced". (Clark, 
1978, p. 394) 
Thus time, and more particularly clock time, became 
another commodity. The spread of a unified time reckoning 
system, a construct standardized around the minutes and 
hours of the clock, the months of the Gregorian calendar and 
the years of the Christian era (Zerubavel, 1982) can be 
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attributed to the establishment of national and 
international communication networks following the 
introduction of first the mail coach network and 
subsequently the railway network and telegraphic 
communication. 
Both the introduction of factory working and the 
development of both domestic and then international 
communication systems served to reinforce the homogeneous 
nature of the time reckoning systems. Virtually all 
approaches to management science use such a conception in 
the planning of activities, for example critical path 
networks and forward scheduling of production capacity. 
Time comes to be treated as a homogenised and readily 
calculable facet of organizational life (Clark, 1982). 
The standardization of time has met with some 
opposition. Some of this has been on purely practical 
grounds, "mainly from communities whose local times differed 
materially from the standards they were required to adopt" 
(Zerubavel, 1982, p. 18). Some groups viewed the 
introduction of standard time as being a blasphemous 
interference with the divine natural order. Clark's view 
however is that within organizations there is a 
heterogeneity of time reckoning systems, for time is 
structured by the members of an organization. However all 
systems of time reckoning possess two common features. 
"First they referred to some 
identifiable sequence of events. Second 
the intervals were given a durational 
interpretation" (Clark 1978 p. 402) 
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As he put it subsequently (Clark 1982) 
"The challenge facing organizational 
sociology is therefore to incorporate a 
notion of time reckoning systems which 
are embedded in the social constructs of 
organizational members. " 
Time, therefore, is not only standardized clock time, 
it is a construct of events, embedded in a culture. The 
phrase "a long time" has a difference in meaning for 
individuals, organizations and cultures. That all peoples 
do not share the same view of time is 
"implicit in actual complaints voiced 
by United States managers doing business 
abroad: (1) why are foreign managers so 
late for business appointments (2) when 
Americans and foreigners do meet, why 
are the latter so slow in getting down 
to business" (Webber, 1972, p. 16) 
Visitors to Morocco, for example, are swiftly made 
cognizant with the meaning of one of that country's 
frequently used expression; "inshallah". This is usually 
added on to the end of a phrase predicting the occurrence of 
an event and literally means "God willing". The train will 
leave at 3.00 p. m. "inshallah"! This may mean that the train 
leaves at 2.00 p. m., 3.00 p. m., 6.00 p. m. or 3.00 p. m. the 
next day. 
This difference seems to reflect both the individual's 
and society's conception of time. Thus any research 'into 
time in organizations should take account of both time 
reckoning systems: that which is represented by the standard 
chronological code, which in decision making terms, means 
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the elapsed time or duration of process, (which most studies 
measure), and organizational time, which will require a 
different identification and measurment. 
The empirical research reported in this thesis will 
endeavour to cover both of these concepts by firstly, 
developing a model of the factors that affect duration of 
process measured in chronological terms and secondly by 
examining the utility of possible measures of organizational 
time and its determinants. 
1.6 Summary and the Research Agenda. 
The primary concern for the research reported in this 
thesis, is what factors or variables explain and account for 
variations in duration or elapsed time of decision making. 
This interest is generated by the fact that although 
successive studies of strategic decision making have 
hypothesized and reported on relationships amongst variables 
that may affect duration, none have accounted for the wide 
variations found. 
This was not surprising in the "early" phases of 
research given the almost exclusive use of case study 
methodology employed, but even later larger scale surveys 
have failed to significantly advance our knowledge on this 
topic. 
Other more practical reasons for seeking to answer the 
question as to what factors influence duration revolve 
around the relationship between duration of decision making 
and perceived managerial efficiency. This suggests that 
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strategic. decisions should not take too long to make as, for 
example, a market opportunity might be missed, or threat 
might develop. However decisions should not be made too 
quickly as important distinctions may become blurred 
resulting once again in a non-optimal solution to the 
problem. 
Any saving of managerial time, particularly in this 
important activity, should also reduce cost and improve 
effectiveness. 
Finally the existence of more than one time reckoning 
system within organizations was discussed as an additional 
factor that may require explanation and therefore complicate 
the project. A discussion of the determinants and 
relationship between clock time and socially constructed 




The preceding chapter discussed the preoccupations 
managers have with the effective use of time. Since time is 
a crucial managerial resource, (Mintzberg 1973, Kurke and 
Aldrich 1983)it is an important factor in the complex 
equation that determines managerial action. Time becomes a 
measure of the effort put into an activity and, sometimes, a 
measure of how efficient that effort was. 
In order for organizations and managers to function 
well, decisions, especially strategic decisions, need to be 
made at an optimum speed. The adjective optimum draws 
attention to the fact that decisions should not necessarily 
be made as quickly as possible as this may lead to a less 
than satisfactory solution. On the other hand they should 
not take up too much managerial time as that effort might be 
wasted in the search for a better solution which does not 
exist. Too much time spent on a decision may mean the 
neglect of other duties or other strategic opportunities. 
To fully understand how strategic decisions are made 
as well as how they ought to be made, it is necessary to 
develop a model of the factors that influence their 
duration. Such a model would generate insights into the 
decision making process as a whole as well as identifying 
factors which influence the speed of decision making. Given 
the central position of decision making in current 
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organizational theory (Bass 1983) this should contribute to 
organization theory as a whole. 
2.1 How long are Decisions? 
As indicated in Chapter 1, speed has been one of the 
characteristics included in most studies of decision making. 
The time taken to make a decision seems to be relatively 
easily measured and is of general interest to both decision 
makers and scholars. Elapsed chronological time or the 
duration of process will be the major variable on which this 
study will focus. 
From the results of the Bradford Studies, which are 
outlined more fully in Chapter 3, it was found that the 
total elapsed time can be divided into two distinct 
components. Hickson et al (1986) make the distinction 
between gestation time, the period between a problem's 
emergence and the first deliberate moves being made towards 
a solution, and process duration, the time between the first 
move and final authorization. 
In the Bradford Studies the length of gestation time 
depended on a variety of circumstances; for example waiting 
for the market to develop, waiting until managerial time was 
available or waiting for other resources. However the 
utility of gestation time for explaining the subsequent 
process time seemed to be limited, although future research 
may find it to be important in understanding a specific 
decision or those taken in a particular context. For example 
the Japanese system of "nemawashi", the informal almost 
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casual discussions prior to the drawing up of the formal 
"ringi-sho" document which requests assent from all parties 
to a decision, seems to institutionalize this gestation 
period. In the U. K. Mallory et al (1983) also found this to 
be a reasonably informal period of activity. It may appear 
from these examples that decisions with a gestation period 
should display accelerated process times as all involved 
parties would be aware of the problem and have been 
developing views as to its solution. 
However Hickson et al (1986) indicate that such wide 
generalizations about gestation time are not possible for 
the whole of their sample, it is an issue that deserves 
further investigation. This study however will only examine 
gestation time as a subsidiary issue. Of more interest is 
the effect it has on process duration and discussion of this 
relationship does provide a starting point for modeling 
those aspects of decision making process that also affect 
process duration. 
2.2. Two basic Models of Process and their implications 
for Duration 
2.2.1 The Search Model 
Perhaps the earliest and best known model of decision 
making process is the so-called rational model derived from 
economic theory and used as a "straw man" by many 
researchers into decision making. March and Simon (1958) 
severely criticize this model in their discussion of 
satisficing behaviour. They emphasize the inherent 
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cognitive limitations of decision makers when developing, 
evaluating and choosing possible outcomes. Decision makers 
are forced to constrain their search in order to cope with 
these limitations, so that theirs is a bounded rationality 
from which a satisficing rather than optimal decision may 
result. 
Allison's (1969) examination of the Cuban missile 
crisis used three distinct conceptual lenses or models to 
explain the emergence of eventual outcomes; these were the 
rational, the organization process and the bureaucratic 
politics models. Allison suggests that each approach 
emphasizes elements that the others ignore; each 
concentrates on one class of variable. The rational model 
focuses on external factors as perceived by the decision 
makers, whilst the other two characterize the internal 
organizational mechanisms by which possible solutions are 
developed and from which decisions are subsequently made. 
Allison ended his analysis with a plea for the 
synthesis of these approaches, and this has been achieved in 
a limited way by March and Olsen (1976) and the work of the 
Bradford Group, initially outlined by Astley et al (1982) 
and amended in the light of empirical findings by Hickson et 
al (1986). The latter make out the case for a theory based 
on the notion that process is shaped by the technical 
complexity of an issue and the political concerns that 
surround it. Decision topics that arise pose problems which 
require solutions to be sought out and therefore implicate 
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varied interests. These two, the problem and the interests 
in their several forms together shape the decision process. 
The multiple technical features of decision problems 
are embraced by using the broad term complexity to include 
features such as uncertainty of information and outcomes and 
the endurance of the outcome chosen. 
Problem complexity represents the view that decision 
making is a task centered activity where decision makers 
face dynamic and novel situations which are simplified to 
fit their cognitive limits: their ability to search for and 
process data. The multiple features of politicality 
includes such ideas as the pressure or weight of influence, 
the balance of influences, and the divergent interests of 
those involved, all of which flow from involvement of 
interests in the decision making arena. This view 
represents decision making as an inherently political 
activity. 
If one views complexity as an important aspect of a 
problem, then how is it solved? Complexity gives rise to 
uncertainty since more factors must be considered and the 
interaction of disparate variables becomes harder to 
predict. One mechanism for reducing uncertainty is search, 
a fundamental step in all decision making (March and Simon 
1958, Hage 1980, Hickson et al 1986). Hickson and his 
colleagues emphasize that search costs time. It slows down 
the process, finding and evaluating information makes the 
21 
months go by. However search activity itself may not lead 
directly to a solution - 
"Despite the dictum that you cannot 
find the answer until you have 
formulated the question well, you often 
do not know what the question is in 
organizational problem solving until you 
know the answer. " (Cohen et al 1972: 3) 
Mintzberg et al (1976) also emphasized the ambiguous 
relationship between search and a solution. They identified a 
cyclical pattern of decision making behaviour between the 
search and design routines. Thus search may actually serve 
to increase uncertainty and complexity by introducing new 
solutions and challenging assumptions about cause and effect 
relationships. Search cannot, therefore, be seen as a 
single stage in the process, it must be understood as a 
characteristic of the whole. 
Search can be thought of as having two dimensions; 
breadth, how wide the net is cast, and depth, how much 
effort must be expended to find the information necessary. 
In the Bradford Studies (Hickson et al 1986) breadth was 
reflected in the number of experts who contributed 
information to the search. The greater the number of 
experts consulted the longer process should take as 
coordination and feedback delays increase. 
Depth of search might also affect process time if 
research is specially commissioned and completed. This 
would cause delays whilst terms of reference are worked 
out, a contract negotiated and data collected and reported. 
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This scenario can be contrasted with the situation where 
internal records alone are consulted or the accumulated 
experience of the decision makers is brought to bear. 
Search may not be directed purely towards solving the 
technical aspects of a problem. It may also be politically 
motivated, as those involved in the process collect data and 
present it to support their positions vis-a-vis possible 
outcomes. Further search is a common tactic for prolonging 
discussion and putting off a decision until it can be 
influenced towards the desired result. 
Thus increased search activity may have a political 
origin as the interests involved in the process seek to 
further or protect their own positions by influencing the 
final choice. 
2.2.2 The Political Model : Interests and Process 
Turning to a more political explanation of process, 
Mintzberg et al (1976) find evidence which suggests 
"that the greater the number of 
persons involved or interested in the 
outcome the more time decision makers 
spend disseminating information about 
its progress. " (p. 262) 
They found this to be a particularly strong association 
in 6 out of their 25 reported cases. Involvement of numerous 
interests could prolong decision duration as the amount of 
the interaction amongst decision makers increases. Hage 
(1980) supports this view by suggesting an association 
between duration and extensity of participation in a 
decision process via the amount of negotiation. An increase 
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in the number of interest groups involved (Hage's measure of 
participation extensity) means more consultation, more 
bargaining and a longer time to effect a decision. 
There are therefore two possible factors which may 
affect the amount of negotiation and interaction. A decision 
may involve many units with similar interests, for example 
all the sales regions of an organization, or it may involve 
many and varied interests, such as all the functional 
departments. Either the absolute number of interests 
involved or the number of different interests among them or 
both, may affect the speed of decision making. 
The importance of divergent interests can be seen in 
Walsh et al's (1981: 133) observation. 
"the starting point of the political 
model is the existence of 
differentiation. An organization is 
conceived as being made up of separately 
identifiable groups differentiated both 
horizontally and vertically according to 
the division of labour and the division 
of authority which has its source not 
not only in the organization but also in 
society as a whole. These differentiated 
groups may just as easily have 
conflicting as coinciding interests and 
values. It is now a commonplace that 
organizations, per se, do not have 
goals. What we call goals are products 
of processes of interaction and 
negotiation within the organization and 
indeed across organizational 
boundaries. " 
Thus there may be a political motivation to an 
expressed interest, for example an attempt to maintain the 
status quo, or an attempt to gain power and influence within 
the political structure. As Hage (1980) notes, it is the 
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strategic decisions that managements take that are likely to 
provide the vehicle for changes to the power structure. 
Conflicting interests lead to contention over 
possible outcomes. Butler et al (1983) operationalized 
contention as the extent to which there are firm aims on 
both sides (opposition and support) of an issue. Pettigrew 
(1973) calls this political cleavage, the extent to which 
interests disagree. 
Allison (1969) argued that using a bureaucratic 
politics model of decision makes it possible to view 
outcomes as the end result of a bargaining game. Issues and 
their definition become coloured by where each unit stands 
in relation to its own goals. The eventual decision, of the 
United States Administration, in this case, to impose a 
naval blockade in an effort to resolve the Cuban Missile 
crisis was the culmination of a "story of the most subtle 
and intricate. probing, pulling and hauling, leading, guiding 
and spurring" (p. 714). Eventually a coalition of interests 
formed around the final outcome. It is the organizational 
context including the ongoing hierarchical system, which 
provides the frame for the emerging coalition. 
Mintzberg et al (1976) suggest that such political 
activity generates bargaining which in turn lengthens 
process time. This received some support from Butler et 
al's (1983) findings which suggest that highly contentious 
issues have greater interaction (r = . 27: p<0.01), and 
this in turn is likely to lead to increased process time (r 
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= . 18: p<0.05). However, they did not confirm a direct 
association between contention and process time. 
Hage (1980) also highlights the relationship between 
discussion and duration. He argues that for low risk 
decisions, decentralization increases the amount of 
discussion, negotiation and joint creation and hence 
lengthens duration. However he also points out that as 
decentralization increases, delegation and routinization, 
which reduce duration also increase. This may offset the 
effect of more discussion and negotiation. High risk 
decisions also involve much discussion. For these decisions 
part of the discussion revolves around possible 
consequences, but some of it serves only to handle 
participants' anxieties. Thus whilst it is clear that high 
risk decisions should take a long time to make, low risk 
decisions will take less time only if they can be routinized 
and delegated so that little discussion is required. At this 
point one may wonder how strategic such low risk decisions 
are likely to be. 
As the Walsh et al (1981) quotation cited earlier 
implies, interests involved in the bargaining/negotiating 
process may be based either insid6 or outside the 
organization. The most obvious of these outside interests is 
the owning group, which may constrain decision making via a 
control mechanism (Cray 1984) if the focal organization is a 
subsidiary or branch of some larger unit. Alternatively 
increased influence may be exercised more directly by 
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representation on the board of directors or by imposing a 
ratification procedure upon decisions (Mallory et al 1983). 
This is external control, which Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) 
argue is a function of resource dependence. 
The involvement of external interests is likely to 
increase the total number of interests in what Hickson et al 
(1986) term the "decision set" of interests units involved 
in a decision. The involvement of larger numbers may result 
in increased coordination delays as some issues cannot be 
debated without'the presence of all interested parties. For 
example, in one of the cases reported in the Bradford 
Studies (Hickson et al 1986), decision making on a jointly 
financed program in a public utility could not proceed 
without its industrial partners being present. External 
involvement may also result in authorization delays. Again 
in an example from the Bradford cases, a state owned 
chemical manufacturer needed H. M. Treasury permission before 
investing overseas, and although all internal decision 
making was complete, the process was delayed until the 
company's chairman made a personal visit to the minister in 
order to prompt a decision. 
Wilson (1980) also suggests that there is a direct 
association between the amount of external involvement and 
what he calls decision pace. External interests with their 
wider, more policy oriented viewpoints tend to be more 
"cosmopolitan". They require more information and 
consequently more search, and probably longer periods of 
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negotiation. The net effect is to prolong the decision 
process. 
2.2.3 The Political Model: The Balance of Influence 
Not only are the existence and involvement of external 
interests thought to slow decision making, but as 
Wilson(1980) suggests this deceleration may be a direct 
function of the pressure exerted by such interests. Until 
now there has been an underlying, yet unstated, assumption 
of equality of influence exerted by interest groups over the 
decision arena. Should near parity of influence occur, then 
perhaps as Hage (1980) suggests "one must proceed slowly, 
carefully, paying attention to their interests". Such 
parity is, however, unlikely. There are more likely to be 
inequalities of power or influence amongst the interest 
units involved. Kenny et al (1985) report that the 
influence that a group exerts varies with the type of 
decision topic. Centrally located interests or those which 
occupy a powerful position may exercise "influence 
extension" pushing their interest into the domain of others. 
A more balanced arena, as Hage (1980) implies, may 
result in delays to process, as negotiations would perhaps 
have to proceed delicately in order to arrive at a 
consensus. Since power and influence are exercised in an 
attempt to ensure that an interest's objectives are embodied 
in the decision that is finally made if all are equally 
powerful then all their objectives must somehow be 
accommodated and the process may in consequence be delayed. 
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This very condition of requiring consensus or accommodation, 
was one of the key causes of inefficient and slow decision 
making in the British health service identified by the 
Griffith enquiry (Griffith, 1983). 
It seems logical that the distribution of influence 
exerted has a direct effect on the duration of decision 
making, but it is unclear what that effect might be. 
Influential interests may procrastinate and slow or block 
decision making by increasing the delays due to bargaining 
and negotiation. Alternatively they may actually speed up 
process, i. e. "force the pace". An example of this comes 
from one of the pilot cases used in this research project. 
The regional authority of a health district studied imposed 
a strict and immovable deadline on all districts for the 
submission of their strategic plans. One consequence of 
failing to meet the submission dates would have been a zero 
capital expenditure appropriation for that budget year. 
This would have meant a severe setback for the district's 
long term strategy of consolidation and building 
development. Here external intervention by regional 
officers forced the pace in the district. 
Under what circumstances will the presence of 
influential interests accelerate or retard the decision 
making process? If two powerful interests with opposing 
objectives balance each other then it seems likely that the 
process will be prolonged as each searches for political or 
informational advantage, but if one or two powerful 
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interests have similar objectives then the process may be 
speeded up if there is some particular reason to make an 
extra effort. This might be the existence of an outside 
threat, the possible entrance of another powerful party into 
the arena or simply the fact that it is a "pet project" of 
one of the important interests (Nutt 1984). Failing such a 
motive the powerful interest would let the process proceed 
at a normal pace secure in the knowledge that it will be 
settled satisfactorily. 
Power and influence may also be exerted to ensure that 
some outcomes are excluded from the arena altogether. The 
ultimate extension of this idea finds expression in 
Bacharach and Baratz's (1962) idea of non-decision making 
when bias is mobilized to exclude not only interest units 
but also issues from an arena. Lukes (1974), reporting on 
community decision making in Gary, Indiana, suggests that 
the City governors' actions are considerably affected simply 
by the presence of one large employer and the impact that 
this employer has on the issues raised for decision. The 
power to influence the agenda allows influential actors to 
exclude not only issues but also players who may be brought 
into the arena by specific topics. When powerful interests 
effect such a closure, some issues are never raised for 
negotiation, and some solutions are precluded from 
consideration. This will speed decision making by reducing 
process activity especially through the reduction of search. 
30 
The review of these two basic models of decision making 
indicates that both complexity and politicality may have 
effects on the duration of the decision process. For 
complexity the effects are mediated mainly through 
uncertainty and the ensuing search process which aims, not 
always successfully, at reducing it. For politicality, a 
number of characteristics of the political setting may 
influence the time a decision takes but quite possibly in 
opposite directions. The relationship of the variables 
affecting speed of decision making discussed. thus far are 
summarized in Figure 2.1. This model also implies a further 
set of issues. If complexity and politicality are the key 
process concepts, what organizational attributes affect 
them? 
2.3 Sources of Politicality and Complexity 
Politicality in organizations stems initially from 
differentiation (Walsh et al 1981) which creates groups with 
divergent interests. Each group strives to accomplish its 
particular objectives. In doing so it needs to acquire 
resources which are also in demand by other groups. 
Political activity is a natural outcome of this competition. 
The type and degree of political activity tolerated in an 
organization depends on the "rules of the game" which have 
been laid down in the organization's history (Clegg and 
Dunkerley 1980). 
The divergent groups which exist within every 
organization face different environments and are charged 
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with different tasks. This gives rise to contingencies 
(Hickson et al 1971) which can be sources of power. These 
contingencies may be internal, such as communication and 
coordination networks which are necessary for the 
integration of the whole (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967), or they 
may be the external dependencies on suppliers, clients or 
regulatory agencies analyzed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). 
The group or individual who is able to manage these 
contingencies can accumulate considerable power within the 
organization (Hickson et al 1971). 
The structure of politicality is shaped by and helps to 
shape the dominant coalition (Child 1972). The coalition may 
extend outside the organization and even be controlled by 
external interests (Butler et al 1979). The characteristics 
of the dominant coalition, its size, stability, history and 
orientation, constrain the decision problem parameters 
(Mallory and Cray 1982). The decision process, including 
its speed, depends on the dominant coalition and its 
orientation towards a decision. 
According to Child (1972) the forces that shape this 
configuration, stem from the choices of the dominant 
coalition on the contingencies of size, environment and 
technology of an organization. Each of these has the 
potential for affecting the way that decisions are made. 
In introducing the debate on size he states that, "the 
argument from size has a long history within organization 
theory" (p. 6) 
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From Weber (1947) through Blau (1970) to Pugh and 
Hickson (1976) organization size has emerged as a powerful 
predictor of structural factors, and although others have 
challenged the logic of this whole approach (Argyris 1972), 
two main themes have emerged with similar implications for 
decision making processes. 
Firstly, increasing size offers more opportunity for 
economic benefit from increased specialization. This 
greater differentiation will lead to a greater heterogeneity 
amongst an organization's sub-units; a heterogeneity of 
goals and therefore interest. At the same time it may also 
lead to greater homogeneity within each sub-unit. Increased 
heterogeneity makes coordination difficult and will probably 
lead to the imposition of formal methods and mechanisms 
of coordination. Increased homogeneity of intra sub-unit 
interests strengthens and reinforces this diversity and may 
serve to harden positions over a problem thus increasing the 
level of contention. Increasing size in organizations may 
thus increase the number of interests and interest units 
drawn into the decision arena and heighten the level of 
contention experienced. Both effects should lengthen the 
decision process. 
The second argument regarding size implies that as 
organiz ations grow the management can no longer employ 
centralized control and instead must rely on a more 
decentralized system. Such a system may require impersonal 
procedures applied by administrators and clerical staff, or 
33 
the employment of professionals (Blau and Schoenherr 1971), 
and has important implications for decision making 
processes. Hage (1980) argues that one consequence is an 
elaborate committee structure, which tends to encourage 
groups to participate in negotiation, thus potentially 
introducing delays into the process. 
In reporting the results of several studies, Child 
(1973) highlights the effect of the size of any owning group 
on organization structure. As group size increases the 
level of formalization increases indicating that if the 
focal organization is part of a larger entity it is more 
likely that a decision will be routed through even more 
complex procedures. This again focuses attention on 
external forces at work in the decision making arena. These 
may work directly through the intervention of outside 
organizations or indirectly through market forces. 
Organizations are not closed systems, they depend upon 
their environments for resources and for the disposal of 
outputs. Imbalances in these exchanges can lead to 
dependence relationships and the potential for external 
control (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Increased dependency 
of one organization on others is a correlate of increasing 
centralization (Pugh and Hickson 1976) which may, of course, 
lead to the "paralytic" organization (Butler et al 1979). 
Whilst there appears to be little evidence offered in 
support, it is generally held that this ossification may be 
particularly true of public sector organizations which have 
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a heavy dependence on central government for funding and 
support. organizational paralysis would indicate a very slow 
decision process, if indeed strategic decisions could be 
made at all. 
Kenny et al (1985) examined differences in the 
involvement and influence exerted by interest units on the 
decision making processes of organizations in both public 
and private sectors. Their results suggest that there is no 
evidence for a stereotype of decision makers at the top of 
public sector organizations having to thread their way 
through a maze of multiple interests and levels of 
regulation. Both public and private organizations appear to 
draw on many sources for assistance and to encounter many 
constraints The decision arenas are crowded for both. 
When external as opposed to total involvements are 
examined, then a different pattern emerges. In the private 
sector an organization's "output" interests, particularly 
customers, are more involved whilst in the public sector 
government regulatory agencies are prominent. The private 
sector can also expect high involvement from non-state 
regulatory bodies, for example, auditors, trade associations 
and shareholders. Kenny et al (1985) suggest that a 
"bureaucratic homogeneity" of interests in strategic 
decision making exists across both sectors but those 
organizations in the public sector which also sell their 
products in the market, for example British Airways, are 
subject to a very distinct constellation of interests. 
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These organizations are subject not only to direct 
intervention of government departments but also to the 
influence exerted by organizations in their market sectors. 
This seems to happen irrespective of the issue for decision. 
Of course these organizations comprise only a part of the 
public sector and comparing public and private sector 
organizations more generally it appears that external 
control is much more direct in the public sector which may 
serve to slow decision making as more interests need to be 
accommodated and there may be more conflict amongst them. In 
contrast Government influence in the private sector seems to 
be exerted more by legislation than by direct intervention. 
In the U. K. trade unions are also seen to exert 
different degrees of control; they seem to have more impact 
in the public sector and more particularly over those topics 
concerned with personnel issues and organization . However, 
across both sectors and all issues trade unions were not 
found to be powerful influences in the strategic decision 
making processes of British organizations (Wilson et al 
1982). 
In both sectors decision making processes are likely 
to be affected by direct intervention of an "owning group, " 
be it a government bureau, a holding company or parent 
corporation. This can mean authorization delays, as 
proposals are referred to higher authority, or delays while 
the necessary paperwork is completed, or both. 
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As well as this kind of direct external control, 
general environmental or market forces can also have an 
effect on process and consequently process duration. This 
occurs particularly through the level of structuring and the 
degree of uncertainty faced by decision makers. 
Burns and Stalker's (1961) pioneering work on 
innovation and adaptation pointed up differences between the 
then emergent electronics industry and firms in more 
traditional sectors of the economy such as textiles, 
sfiipbuilding and heavy engineering. This study highlighted 
the problems that firms in the latter experienced when 
entering the new environment of the electronics market. 
This market was characterized by high uncertainty and 
instability. No-one really knew what the market was, what 
products would and could be made, or what technology was 
required. 
This idea of variability was one of the characteristics 
of environment identified by Child (1972). His summary 
argument suggests that varying environmental conditions and 
differing types of relationships with outside parties 
require a different type of structural accommodation if a 
high level of performance is to be achieved. These 
conditions he identifies as variability, complexity and 
illiberality. 
A number of writers, for example, Stinchcombe (1959), 
Burns and Stalker (1961), Hage and Aiken (1967) and Lawrence 
and Lorsch (1967) have arrived at roughly the same 
37 
conclusion in that increased environmental variability 
should be accommodated by an adaptive structure, where roles 
are open to redefinition, and coordination of roles is 
achieved by frequent meetings and a preponderance of lateral 
as opposed to hierarchical communication. 
This conclusion has several implications for decision 
making duration. There may well be coordination problems in 
adaptive organizations which delay process. For example it 
may be difficult to assemble the diverse interests together 
at one time. There may also be increased negotiation as 
interests redefine and articulate their positions over the 
issues for decision . 
The second of Child's (1972) factors, complexity, 
refers to the heterogeneity and range of environmental 
activities which are relevant to an organization's 
operations. The greater the degree of complexity, the 
greater the variety of information that is likely to be 
relevant to decision makers so that monitoring this requires 
greater role specialization, particularly in boundary 
spanning roles. This then leads to possible coordination 
problems (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967) which delay process. 
Environmental complexity also has the tendency to increase 
differentiation and consequent diversity of interests which 
may also affect duration through negotiation delays. 
However the major effect of variety and complexity 
taken together is to increase the uncertainty faced by 
decision makers. As Child (1972) himself comments, 
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environmental complexity by itself does not give rise to 
uncertainty if there is little variability present. This 
increased uncertainty has major implications for process 
duration. As argued earlier, it prolongs process by 
motivating search activity as decision makers seek to reduce 
it by the collection and processing of information. 
Child's (1972) final dimension of environment is 
illiberality. This refers to the degree of threat faced by 
an organizations decision makers from outside forces, 
through competition, hostility or indifference. Child (1972) 
suggests that the consequence of increasing threat will be 
an attempt to centralize decision making and to exercise 
tighter controls. 
Increasing centralization has opposing effects on a 
decision making process and its duration. It may well 
reduce the numbers and diversity of interests involved in 
the process thereby lessening contention, negotiation and 
speeding things up. Contrarily delays in obtaining, 
authorization from overloaded hierarchies may well increase, 
and thus increase duration. 
In summary, environmental influences may serve to vary 
not only the level of uncertainty that faces decision makers 
but also the amount of differentiation and centralization 
all of which have effects on process and process duration. 
The direct impact of a final contingency, technology, 
is in some ways the least clear cut. Child (1972) points to 
a considerable confusion in the literature as to what 
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technology is and what aspects of structure it may 
influence. Bedeian (1980) for example lists 33 major 
studies with nearly as many definitions of technology. 
However, Child (1972) suggests that taken together it 
appears that the employment of a "routine" technology such 
as found in mass production systems is accompanied by high 
structuring of activities, i. e. high specialization, 
standardization and formalization. 
It was Perrow (1970) who suggested that another way of 
looking at technology is to'look at variations in the 
materials being operated upon. The extent to which there is 
variation and the extent to which mechanisms are available 
for coping with them has effects on organization structure 
particularly on centralization and formalization. 
Jackson and Morgan (1983) further complicate the 
picture when they conclude a thorough review of the 
literature by suggesting that there are really three phases 
to technology; input, conversion and output. Since the 
inputs and outputs represent the interface with an 
organization's environment perhaps it would be more useful 
to examine these aspects especially as there is a case (see 
Hickson et al 1969) for arguing that the impact of 
throughput technology is limited to the structuring of shop 
floor activity and does not extend to the organization as a 
whole. 
Such an argument would lead to the hypothesis that the 
impact of technology on organizational structures and 
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decision making stems largely from variation in inputs and 
outputs. This variation poses threats to the stability of 
the technological core(Thompson 1967). 
This argument can now be linked back to the preceding 
discussion of the effects from increasing size and 
environmental instability. Greater instability of inputs 
has consequences particularly for the level of 
centralization and formalization as managers use hierarchy 
and written procedures in an effort to control variability 
Decision making then may become more routinized (Hage 1980) 
and therefore faster as familiar procedures are employed. 
On the other hand it may be slowed by the necessity to have 
action authorized at a high level. 
The relationships amongst the contingent factors 
discussed above and their impact on structural attributes 
are summarized following Child (1973) in Figure 2.2 
2.4 Summary 
In this chapter several classes of variables were 
hypothesized to influence the speed of decision making. The 
most obvious way in which a variable may have influence on 
decision making process is to slow or impede it. 
In strategic decision making an endemic impediment is 
the uncertainty which surrounds important topics. This 
uncertainty gives rise to search activity by which 
information is collected and examined in order to develop 
and evaluate alternative courses of action. In general more 
search means a longer decision process. Wider searches draw 
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in more experts, generate more opinions which are likely to 
take decision makers longer to sift through. Deeper 
searches require active research rather than the simple 
recall of past experiences from archival records or personal 
memories. The data generated will again require more 
processing to reduce it to a usable form. 
Political activity around the decision topic is the 
other major source of delay. The larger the number of 
interests that are involved, the more conflicts may emerge 
and the longer will be the negotiation process needed to 
arrive at a conclusion which is acceptable to a sufficient 
portion of the interests. Additional interests may also 
delay the process simply by making coordination more 
difficult. Something as basic as scheduling a meeting of 
all parties concerned can become a serious impediment. The 
addition of external interests seems to make further delay 
likely as the means of representation are not as well- 
defined as those for internal interests, and consulting and 
contracting take time. 
of course political pressure may, conversely, speed 
the process. Whilst a decision arena balanced between 
equally powerful interests may see negotiation prolong the 
process, the presence of a single, powerful interest could 
likely curtail negotiation (if any occurs at all) and lead 
to a speedy decision. 
Process may also be delayed in the authorization phase 
(Mintzberg et al 1976). This may be because of the 
0 
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political content of the decision topic or the formal 
requirements of the authorization process itself. Mallory, 
et al (1983) suggest that the occurrence of authorization 
delays may vary through the influence of national or 
cultural characteristics and cite a comparison between U. S. 
and U. K. owned firms to back this claim. The formal 
authorization procedures endemic to U. K. organizations in 
the Bradford sample appeared to lengthen process time. 
The literature reviewed suggests that coordination, 
negotiation and authorization delays are due mainly to 
political causes, but that the level of search activity is 
an outcome of both the technical nature, the complexity of 
the problem, and the political activity it may generate. 
Political characteristics include the number of interests 
involved, the influence they exert, the closure which is 
applied and the centrality of the dominant coalition. 
Technical complexity is rooted in the uncertainties posed by 
the decision topic. 
in their turn both politicality and technical 
complexity are influenced, sometimes in contradictory ways, 
by the contingencies of the organizational context. The 
content of the organization's environment, the dependency 
relationships between the organization and the elements in 
its environment and the technology of the transformation 
process influence the speed of the decision process, albeit 
often indirectly through the structure of the organization. 
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The complete model of the direct and indirect 
influences on speed of decision making (see Figure 2.3) 
presents a large number of possible associations and 
networks of effects which may accelerate or delay the 
decision process. In the next chapter some evidence from a 
recent large scale study of decision making, the Bradford 
Studies, will be used to begin the task of evaluating this 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Bradford Studies of Decision Making 
The most exhaustive large scale empirical study of 
strategic decision making is that reported by Hickson and 
his colleagues (1986). The Bradford Studies, as they are 
known, are given a chapter to themselves partly because the 
theoretical formulation that guided them also provides the 
starting framework for this thesis. The Bradford Studies 
are also of special interest due to the availability of 
measures of decision making duration in the data. This 
chapter examines both the published and unpublished results 
of this study, but only in so far as they concern speed of 
decision making. 
This work can be divided into three phases which 
occurred as writing and publishing was progressing 
throughout the life of the project. During the first early 
thoughts phase the group began to build a model of decision 
making process using samples of their own and others case 
material. The second phase presented empirical results 
using both the full data base of 150 cases of strategic 
decision making and also a subset thereof for certain 
analyses and could be thought of as a period when ideas were 
being developed. The last phase was in the final review and 
analysis of the data when a book by Hickson et al (1986) 
examined results, including those on process time 
differences, in some depth. In this book they developed 
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primarily a general typology of process, but a few of the 
many hypotheses discussed and tested concerned duration of 
decision making. 
3.1 Early Thoughts on Process and Duration 
During the opening phases of the Bradford Studies 
Butler et al (1979) reviewed both the theories and published 
case material on strategic decision making. From this a 
preliminary model was developed and examined using a sample 
of their own and others' data to demonstrate its utility and 
to derive some tentative conclusions. In comparing two 
published cases, those reported by March and Olsen (1976) 
and Pettigrew (1973) they found that : 
"The surprise in the whole comparison 
is that on these two very different 
topics, two very different organizations 
perform in much the same way. 
Admittedly, the new dean decision was 
far more rapid (it was made in only nine 
months); but the continuity of the two 
processes seems to be similar. Both 
organizations cycled and recycled the 
matter to committee or board and back 
for reconsideration; both experienced 
manoeuvring and negotiating among 
factions, but neither to such an extent 
that the eventual decision was made by 
bargaining; both moved step by step to a 
timid decision, the one playing safe 
with an established insider for dean, 
and the other playing safe with the same 
brand of computer as before. "(Butler et 
al 1979, p. 23) 
Thus the degree to which decision making follows a 
smooth uninterrupted and non-repetitious sequence seemingly 
has no impact on process duration. The nature of the 
process which took nine months to arrive at a decision had 
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much in common with one that took around seven years. Given 
thA these two decisions were on contrasting topics, the 
authors then attempted to control for topic by considering 
cases on the same topic in very different organizations -a 
university and an intermediate chemical manufacturer (both 
reported in full by Wilson 1980). 
The comparison was of new output decisions, i. e. of 
the way in which the university went about introducing a new 
course and the firm a new product. The analysis revealed 
that the time taken by the university to decide on the new 
course was three times longer than the firm took to 
introduce a new chemical (three years as opposed to one 
year). Yet 
"it is clearly premature to jump 
straight to the conclusion that private 
enterprise is able to move rapidly to 
decisive action whereas collegiate 
university organizations fumble along in 
equivocal procrastination". (Butler et al 
1979 p 24/25) 
However the analysis did show that the firm when faced 
with low equivocality (that is, hard data were obtainable) 
was able to use a "battery of specialists" and committees to 
scrutinize proposals for technical and financial viability. 
The university, in contrast, moved hesitantly through the 
process unable to apply such aids. In fact the situation 
may be as one of Wilson's (1980) informants in the 
,; n 
university suggests 
"The problem is that the pros and cons 
get debated to such a protracted and 
high level that the pros begin to 
resemble the cons and vice versa. " 
Both organizations can be seen to use committees to 
scrutinize proposals, but the significant difference is that 
in a university the committees have authority to make 
decisions whereas in the company decisions were made by 
individual office holders. This is described as 
"academic committee and senate 
'approval' versus 'managing director 
decides', a difference that extends 
right down the two hierarchies. Both 
have a panoply of committees, but the 
university is governed by committees and 
committee politics, whereas the firm is 
not. " (Butler, et al 1979, p. 25) 
This analysis, coupled with an analysis of one of 
Mintzberg et al's (1976) cases, a hospital, indicates that 
this is the 
"likely style of decision making in 
the I'value rational 11 (Satow, 1975) 
"Autonomous Professional Organizations" 
(Scott, 1965 (p. 25) 
Such analyses require a set of concepts . Butler et 
al's (1979) contribution was one of making the essential 
step of moving the study of decision making on from 
descriptions of variation to the evolution and use of 
concepts and variables for analysis. 
Butler and his colleagues suggest that duration, or, 
as they then termed it, rapidity, was affected by the 
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frequency of occurrence of that kind of topic, by how novel 
a topic it was, by how equivocal, and by how difficult it 
was to evaluate possible outcomes. Thus the rarer, more 
novel, more equivocal and more difficult to evaluate a topic 
for decision was, the longer it would take to make a 
decision. 
Butler et al (1979) also hypothesized that duration 
would be affected by the consequentiality of a topic (the 
degree to which a topic is important to the organization) 
and centrality (the degree to which a topic does not involve 
the levels of hierarchy below the apex). 
Two caveats to these hypotheses were suggested. 
Firstly, does Parkinson's (1965) law of triviality hold to 
the opposite effect? That is, do the more trivial issues 
command more attention? In a system of scrutiny by 
committee, highly consequential and equivocal matters may go 
through "on the nod" and trivial issues be examined in great 
depth. The second caveat enquired whether or not non 
decision making fits the framework: are such decisions, if 
made consciously, made so rapidly that they just do not 
break the surface? Can highly consequential matters yield 
rapid but concealed processes? 
These two perhaps somewhat extreme caveats did serve 
to highlight the relatively small amount of data collected 
thus far into the project. This was to be rectified in the 
next phase. 
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In summary, this early phase was one when most of the 
concepts and variables with which to characterize and 
analyze process were developed. These and the underlying 
model of process had begun to be tested using others' data, 
early original data from the Bradford Studies ( for example 
Butler et al 1979), or contrasting cases (Astley et al 
1982). 
3.2 Development of Ideas 
The dual explanations model of decision making, 
present in embryonic form in Butler'et al (1979) was 
subsequently developed by Astley et al (1982). At this 
stage of the project a data base eventually to reach 150 
cases from 30 organizations in the U. K., was being 
accumulated and coded. Preliminary analyses began to emerge. 
The first of these tested the dual explanations 
hypotheses in that an increase in either topic complexity or 
in the political cleavage that surrounds it, or both, will 
lead to more circuitous and prolonged decision making. The 
specific question that Butler et al (1983) set out to answer 
was, what were the relative strengths of each of these 
explanations over a series of variables of decision making 
process. Duration of process was one of the latter. 
The Butler et al (1983) paper first introduced the 
notion that there were two distinct periods of process 
duration. The first of these periods was gestation time 
already discussed in Chapter 2 which they define similarly 
as the period from first recognition of a continuing issue 
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during which no overt action is taken towards a decision, to 
the point where deliberate action begins. At this point in 
time the process phase begins. It is indicated for example 
by information being called for, or a meeting being 
arranged. The process phase ends when authority to act is 
given, that is, the decision is taken. 
Having postulated these two components of duration 
Butler et al (1983) then set about accounting for the 
variation in them as part of a multiple regression analysis 
using all -the variables they had developed to measure 
process and technical complexity and political cleavage. 
However whilst there was much variation to be explained 
little could be found to explain it. The only thing clear 
from their results is what does not slow decisions down. 
The complete regression equations for both process 
duration and gestation time are given in Table 3.1. The 
variables are labelled and defined in the same manner as in 
the original paper. None of the complexity variables has 
any impact on the length of either gestation time or process 
time . Such a result challenged much previous thinking about 
the duration of decision making process. For example, it 
had been expected that, as Butler et al (1979) suggest, a 
rare topic for decision would protract the process as 
decision makers decided how to route this unfamiliar matter 
through established procedures and committees, worked out 
the full ramifications of possible outcomes, and developed 
and evaluated possible solutions. However there was no 
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evidence for this . Furthermore the level of seriousness, 
the degree to which consequences would be adverse if things 
went wrong, also did not seem to have an impact on duration, 
neither did the number and diversity of interests involved 
"despite the presumption that more fingers in the pie might 
hold up process. " 
Thus after failing to support the more obvious 
hypotheses developed beforehand by Butler et al (1979) the 
question remained as to what other variables could possibly 
-be associated with the two duration variables. 
Gestation time did show a positive association with 
the level of contention in a process arena - contention 
being defined as the extent to which there were firm aims on 
both sides of an issue. A conclusion that Butler et al 
(1983) suggest "challenges March & Simon's (1958, p. 106) 
proposition that decision time will be increased by 
incomparability but not by the unacceptability of 
alternatives. " Contention is a reflection of 
unaceptability. In Table 3.1 the number of criteria by which 
a decision may be evaluated, similar in meaning to 
incomparability, is seen to be unrelated to either component 
of duration whilst contention, similar in meaning to 
unacceptability is related to gestation time but in the 
opposite direction to that suggested by March and Simon 
(1958). This implies that opposed objectives or unacceptable 
alternatives are likely to prolong any procrastination 
before active decision making commences. 
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In the same way, process time also relates to a single 
political variable. It shows a positive association with 
intervention, the extent to which external interests 
irifluence process. 
"It is as if decisions are slowed by 
the need for discussions with major 
customers or with a remote corporation 
headquarters for example. " (Butler et 
al, 1983) 
So far then the results reviewed have yielded very 
little in the sense that few associations with duration have 
been found. However the scope of the Bradford Studies meant 
that there was more than just this analysis to form a basis 
for later research including that undertaken for this 
thesis. 
From a sub-set of 20 decisions within the Bradford 
group's sample of 150 decisions, Mallory et al (1983) 
examined how far a multi-national's management can project 
characteristics into the processes of making decisions even 
though those making the decision are of a different 
nationality. In this case they were British managers in 
American owned subsidiaries, where no American manager was 
personally present. Even so there appeared to be an 
'American' ownership effect on the speed of decision making. 
The major differences Mallory et al (1983) found 
between British owned and American owned but British managed 
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subsidiaries were in interaction and duration 
"It is in the kinds of interaction and 
routines that differences stand out, and 
in the time it takes to take a 
decision. " (Mallory et al 1983, p. 202) 
Decision making in the American owned subsidiaries was 
found to be faster. Briefly Mallory et al suggest that 
"British managements in British owned 
subsidiaries are prone to route their 
biggest decisions through the 
formalities of standing committees in 
conformity with pre-existing customary 
procedures and taking a comparatively 
long time to do sof often presaged by a 
prolonged gestation before anything at 
all is deliberately done. That is, high 
interaction formality, procedural 
standardization (unwritten), and 
duration. " (p 207) 
This is contrasted with the process in American owned 
f irms. 
"Whereas British managements in 
American owned subsidiaries tend to rely 
on informally assembled working groups 
which help to arrive at a decision 
comparatively rapidly through a process 
which does not ostensibly follow any 
recognized procedure. That is, lower 
interaction formality, procedural 
standardization, and duration. " (p 207) 
However an analysis of only twenty cases, five each 
from two American subsidiaries and five from each of the two 
most similar British subsidiaries, is perforce a limited one 
and the conclusions are bound by these limits. 
In summary, this middle period of development for the 
Bradford Studies was a major empirical investigation which 
failed to confirm those hypotheses on process duration that 
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had been developed in the early papers, but it did suggest 
that duration was associated with the amount of external 
influence exerted relative to that exerted by internal 
interest units. It also showed that the level of contention 
and the length of any gestation phase were related, with the 
implication that opposed objectives are likely to prolong 
any procrastination that occurs before the decision making 
process itself commences. Mallory et al's (1983) analysis 
suggests that interaction per se does not slow process but 
formal interaction does. This latter point is picked up in 
Hickson et al's (1986) final review of the project's 
findings on process time. 
3.3. The Final Review and Analysis 
Hickson et al (1986) report that the ultimate 150 
cases took on average just over 12 months to reach an 
authorized outcome. This was somewhat shorter but not so 
far out of line with the 70 weeks reported from the mixture 
of strategic and tactical decisions studied in Dutch 
organizations by-members of the DIO Team (1983). The process 
times for the 150 cases were plotted (see fig. 3.1) which 
shows the time taken and frequency. Five peaks appear on the 
graph at six months, one year, eighteen months, two and three 
years. Hickson et al (1986) suggest that there is no firm 
explanation for this although perhaps it is because 
manager's and administrator's thinking is in six monthly 
time periods (e. g. a review is scheduled for six monthly 
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intervals) which gradually extend as the years pass into 12 
months time periods. 
This suggested to the present author that the data be 
banded around the peak duration periods into a scale which 
could be used in further analysis. However even when this 
was done and regressed on the variables outlined in the 
previous section, in short recalculating Butler et al's 
(1983) regression equations, no further significant results 
emerged. This line of enquiry was not pursued any further. 
Hickson et al (1986) begin their discussion of process 
duration by contrasting in narrative form three cases from 
their data base. They first describe a "short process", 
which was a decision in a northern municipality to launch a 
lottery as a means of raising funds, a decision which took 
barely a month from inception to authorization. 
They then recount a "medium" term process, one near 
the average process time for their sample, about twelve 
months, which was the time taken by the managers of a 
financial institution to take on the major commitment of 
being a cheque issuing bank. This was a decision which 
would effectively make it a "proper" bank. 
They then described the process with the longest 
duration which was a decision taken by a market dominant 
manufacturer of ceramics, which took four years to decide 
whether or not to put a massive investment into a new plant. 
Among the reasons suggested for the speed and fluency 
of the first of these three decisions was that it was not 
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bound up by the decision making procedures that had been 
built up in the municipality over many years. Most 
significantly it did not fall into the institutionalized 
conflict of the budget balancing and revenue raising annual 
exercise. For as Hickson et al (1986) suggest, "this 
particular decision was backed by individuals" who were in a 
position to manipulate its passage "through and around 
procedures. " This case demonstrates that a determined 
person in authority who chooses the moment correctly can 
lever a new type of decision through quite rapidly. They 
conclude : 
"If anything, it is the bypassing of 
normal procedures, and avoiding seeking 
fresh information, that saves time and 
speeds decisions and that can be so in 
any organization". (p. 104) 
The "average" case took about a year. This duration it 
is suggested, was due mainly to the establishment of a 
working party which had to carefully assess the 
probabilities of the other "clearing banks" admitting a 
competitor, the costs of modernising branches, the effect on 
employees and the effect of moving out from its established 
traditional base and taking on some very formidable 
competition. Time in this instance was taken up by careful 
search to resolve the uncertainties surrounding the one 
possible course of action this bank could take to increase 
its visibility, reputation and client base. 
The longest case involved the management of a large 
public company in answering the question as to whether or 
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not to fully exploit a revolutionary manufacturing process. 
This was already in being but when and where and on what 
scale should it make a major commitment to large scale 
utilization? According to Hickson et al (1986), 
"About half the total process time was 
spent waiting in the hope that market 
prospects would clarify, and half was 
spent in and out of the numerous 
committees and working parties in a copy 
book exercise of gathering and sifting 
information and arriving at a 
conclusion". (p. 105-106) 
These authors identify two major implications for 
process duration from this analysis. 
First and most obvious is that scrutiny, the search 
for and analysis of data, costs time. Both the long and 
medium time decisions discussed above covered issues on 
which it was possible to collect both financial and 
technical data. The fast decision, the lottery, in contrast 
did not require any information beyond that which was 
readily available from the lotteries promotion consultants 
being dealt with. Hickson et al (1986) also suggest that 
decisions which commit money take time, implying that such 
decisions, unlike the lottery or another one of their cases 
(a fast decision in a polytechnic to run short courses) did 
not commit resources in the way that the medium and long 
term processes did. Perhaps the two ideas are related in 
that a major financial commitment needs associated search 
and scrutiny to justify it. It is as if a commitment is 
being made of what may be a major portion of an 
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organization's resources, and those who own the assets, 
important stakeholders, demand that a decision is not only 
made but is seen to be made through the collection and 
evaluation of supporting data. 
Another implication again associated with search is 
that procedures for scrutiny 
the decision does not requiri 
these procedures are able to 
are determined to act. 
However most processes 
can slow decisions down, but if 
aa great deal of resources then 
be bypassed by individuals who 
0 
can and do "run into all sorts 
of interruptions and disruptions", and in the Bradford 
Studies there was a positive association between disruption 
and process time (r = 0.27, p <= 0.001 Hickson et al 1986 
P. 108). 
The graph associated with Table 3.2. which is a plot 
by Hickson et al (1986) of the, frequency of scores on the 
impedance scale provides an opportunity to examine the 
nature of delays. If the frequency of delays due to 
searching and problem solving together with delays due to 
reconsiderations and resistance are added together they 
account for the majority of cases in the sample (127 out of 
the 150). This finding reinforces the argument that both 
problem complexity and politicality shape decision making 
processes and corroborates Mintzberg et al's (1976, p. 276) 
suggestion that what they term "interrupts" are due most 
often either to "new options" which raise further unsolved 
problems, or to "political imbasses". 
62 
The conclusion that scrutiny costs time is also 
indicated by an association between the number of 
information units researching the problem and process time. 
"More specialists preparing reports, 
more departments preparing figures, more 
external agencies preparing advice mean 
that it of ten takes longer to reach a 
decision. " (Hickson et al 1986 p. 111) 
These authors then go on to explore the question raised 
earlier by Mallory et al(1983), as to whether ornot 
committees retard decision process . As already indicated 
there is a positive association between the amount of 
interaction and process time. Hickson et al (1986) 
em phasize the point 
"Talking is the very stuff of decision 
making, it is the activity that occupies 
most of the daily round for managers and 
administrators. There is talk on the 
telephone, talk in the hallway, talk 
around the office desk, talk over tea, 
and talk in meetings of every 
conceivable kind. 
Personal contact, the chance to talk, 
can be divided into informal and formal 
interaction. Informal interaction 
includes all the more casual forms of 
talking time, on 'phones, in offices, 
over meals, and so on. Formal 
interaction includes every size and 
shape of board, council, general 
committee (like an executive committee) 
and specialized committee (like a 
finance committee), and of the 
relatively transient project groups, 
working party or arranged meeting. That 
is formal interaction covers all degrees 
of pre-arranged meetings by whatever 
name. "(p. 111) 
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However, they were surprised to find not even a small 
association between formal interaction and length of 
process. They had to conclude that committees are as 
likely to speed things up as to delay them. The time 
involved is individual member time or labour cost and not 
necessarily elapsed time of decision making. "Scrutiny by 
committee costs no more time than any other way of doing 
things. "(p. 113) 
Such a conclusion does not invalidate Mallory et al's 
(1983) findings. When what is an overwhelmingly British 
sample of organizations is taken as a whole no effect can be 
found due to committees. However when the two American 
owned subsidiaries are extracted and compared in a 
controlled way a national difference is exposed. 
To summarize this aspect of the Bradford studies so 
far; it appears that the nature of the interaction, whether 
formal or otherwise, has no impact on process duration but 
that the amount of interaction does lengthen it. The 
strongest conclusion was that "search costs time" and thus 
the search for and evaluation of information increases 
process duration. 
This analysis, by explicitly treating process duration 
as a dependent variable, suggested to the present author 
that a further analysis of the data base of 150 cases could 
yield dividends. Such an analysis had not emerged in any of 
the work produced and had been only briefly dealt with in 
the book (Hickson et al 1986). 
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The first step was to examine the zero order 
correlations between both the duration and all other process 
variables that had been covered. The results of a this 
analysis are given in Table 3.3. 
This shows the variables of process used by both 
Butler et al (1983) and Hickson et al (1986) grouped into 
the four main headings; search and scrutiny (scrutiny, in 
the terminology of Butler et al 1983 or information sources 
as referred to by Hickson et al 1986), interaction and 
negotiation, discontinuity, and authority. 
The second row of coefficients in Table 3.3 shows 
clearly the relationship reported by Hickson et al (1986) in 
that search, as represented by the number of experts drawn 
into the process, correlates significantly and positively 
with duration (r = 0.14). There is also a significant and 
positive relationship of duration with informal interaction 
(r = 0.18) which quite simply indicates that the more 
discussion, toing and froing encountered during the process 
the longer decisions take. 
The relationship between duration and two of the three 
discontinuity variables confirms much of what is intuitively 
obvious. The relationships with both impedance(r = 0.22) and 
disruption(r = 0.27) tell us that the more obstacles 
encountered and the more delays resulting, then the longer 
process duration became. 
However the correlation matrix also shows a very strong 
association between these two independent variables 
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themselves, disruption and impedance (r = . 71). These kinds 
of interrelationships amongst variables make it difficult to 
establish the true effect of each on process duration. One 
method of examining this is to use partial correlation 
analysis (Cohen and Holliday 1982 for example) which 
controls for the effect of an intervening variable in the 
situation described above. 
Calculating a partial coefficient for the relationship 
between duration and impedance with disruption held constant 
gives a negligible value for the partial r=0.04. Similar 
interrelationships can be seen to prevail amongst all of the 
independent variables which correlate significantly with 
process duration . These coefficients are isolated in Table 
3.3.1. It would of course be possible to calculate the 
effects of each on duration with the others successively 
held constant, but in such situations the most effective 
technique, given the need to interpret the effects clearly 
would be to build a regression equation in which the beta 
weights, which are the standardized partial correlation 
coefficients, and their significances would present the true 
effects. Such an analysis is presented in Table 3.4. 
The equation for gestation time is presented first and 
although an insignificant equation results (R2 = 0.11 ) 
there is a positive association between gestation and level 
of authorization, the effects of both expertise and 
externality being controlled. Decisions with long gestation 
periods may sometimes be the contentious ones (see Table 
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3.1) which require resolution by top management, and thus a 
high level of centralization. 
However, gestation may well be better regarded as an 
independent variable as it is really concerned with prior 
processing or preprocessing. It may serve to reduce 
contention and speed the subsequent stages of process. This 
was discussed in Chapter 2 and will be discussed again later 
in the thesis. 
Examining the regression equation of process duration 
on the other variables, a significant amount of variation is 
explained (see Table 3.4). The major determinants, with all 
other variables controlled for, are identified as being 
informal interaction and disruption . 
Whilst this further analysis confirms much of what is 
reported by Hickson et al (1986)in that the extent to which 
there is informal interaction lengthens process duration, it 
does suggest that search may have no real impact on process 
duration when the effects of all other process variables are 
controlled. 
However disruption is one variable which, according to 
the regression equation, does have a strong predictive 
relationship with process duration (see Table 3.4), and 
delays whilst search is being undertaken is a major 
component of the disruption measure (see Table 3.2. Scale 
points 4 and 5). 
The research reported in this thesis explores the 
possibility of decomposing this measure of disruption into 
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its components and examining their individual impact on 
process duration. 
3.4 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed and re-examined the major 
findings of the Bradford Studies in as far as they relate to 
duration of decision making. 
The results of this extensive study were presented as a 
progression from early tentative ideas and model building, 
which used a sample of cases from the literature and some 
-collected for the purpose (Butler et al 1979) and resulted 
in the development of testable hypotheses and operational 
concepts for subsequent and more thorough analysis. 
Further results from an analysis of subsamples (Astley 
et al 1982, Mallory et al 1983) developed the theory and 
gave insights into possible cross national differences in 
process. 
Analysis of the complete data base of 150 cases by 
Butler et al (1983) empirically tested the hypotheses 
developed in the earlier papers. 
The final review of the study by Hickson et al (1986) 
drew together the many threads into a more complete 
statement of the projects results, and provided the spur for 
some reanalysis for this thesis by the present author which 
used the two components of duration as dependent variables. 
The net effect all these relationships between process 
and duration have for further work was first suggested by 
this final review and the analysis presented in Table 3.3. 
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Both highlighted the significant and positive relationship 
between impedance, disruption and process duration (r = 0.22 
and 0.27 respectively) thus confirming much intuitive 
hypothesizing and empirical result (Mintzberg et al 1976) 
that the extent to which process is delayed and impeded 
lengthens duration. However impediments must be removed or 
overcome in some way if a decision is to be reached at all. 
The evidence from Table 3.3 suggests that amount of informal 
interaction and search activity, as expressed by the number 
of sources of information drawn in, may be the major 
mechanisms used to overcome these impediments. Is this 
however too simplistic an interpretation? The relationships 
between search, interaction, impedance, disruption and 
duration could be thought to be fairly ambiguous given that 
delays due to search account for so many of the impediments 
to decision making (see Table 3.2) and the 
interrelationships between them (see Table 3.3.1). 
To some extent these issues were clarified by 
regression analysis which controlled for the effects of 
theses and other variables on duration. This analysis 
suggested (Table 3.4) that disruption and interaction have 
the most significant and positive effects. When this is 
taken together with Butler et al's (1983) result from 
regressing duration on process which found a positive 
association between the extent of external influence another 
piece of the explanation emerges. These external forces 
somehow impede and delay process, indeed intervention and 
69 
impedance are significantly correlated (r = 0.17) but there 
is no correlation with disruption. Intervention also 
correlates significantly with interaction (r = 0.24) and 
directly with duration (r = 0.23) (Butler et al 1983). It 
therefore appears that interaction, disruption and 
intervention are the major variables which influence process 
duration, increases in all three lengthen duration. 
Also of particular significance are the findings that 
indicate the variables that do not associate with or predict 
duration. 
None of the complexity variables presented in the 
regression equation (Table 3.1) are significantly related to 
process duration which appears to have a political 
explanation, even though only one variable, intervention, is 
significant. 
The non significant, virtually non-existent, 
relationship between duration and negotiation scope (the 
extent to which there was room for negotiation (Table 3.3)), 
is also surprising. If there was wide scope for choice, 
somewhat akin to an outcome of closure, a variable 
identified in chapter 2 as probably having a significant 
impact on duration, then high interaction could be expected 
and was indeed found (r = 0.25). 
The other major variable, level of authorization or 
degree of centralization also demonstrates no significant 
relationships with process duration but does correlate 
(Table 3.3) significantly with gestation time (r=0.20). 
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The effect of level of centralization on process duration 
proved difficult to isolate theoretically in chapter 2. 
There it was argued that a high level of centralization 
would probably result in authorization delays, but that 
decentralized decision making may also result in long 
process times as more discussion will take place amongst the 
increased amounts of interests involved. 
These two results suggest that there may be some 
discrepancies between the theory and empirical evidence 
presented to account for duration. Firstly search, 
interaction and disruptiori do correlate with process 
duration although when combined together in a regression 
equation the effect of search, a measure akin to search 
breadth in Chapter 2, does lose its predictive significance. 
The relationships between disruption, interaction and 
duration are in line with the theory. Coordination is a new 
variable and therefore was not operationalized by the 
Bradford group. It is presented here as being an important 
component of impedance (see Table 3.2). However level of 
authorization seems to have no effect in the empirical work 
which reflects the ambivalence expressed in the development 
of the theoretical model. 
The results of the Bradford studies had already 
informed the development of that model to a significant 
extent as far as the complexity of the problem was 
concerned. None of the the measures they employed had any 
significant impact on duration. Instead more measures of 
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uncertainty, a central concept in decision making research 
were derived and developed for use in this research project. 
The measures of politicality used (political cleavage 
in earlier formulations) were refined, for example 
contention and its relationships, and added to. Time 
pressure was one factor which emerged from preliminary 
discussions and theory development and of course externality 
or intervention remained as it both theoretically and 
empirically associated with process duration. 
Number of interest units and diversity of interests 
were included in the politicality group of variables as it 
was felt that with contention, closure and time pressure 
they constituted a potential for political action and were 
thus more associated with a political rather than technical 
complexity (c. f. Hickson et al 1986). 
That both search and interaction have significant 
effects on process time suggests that the dual explanation 
of duration, in terms of politicality and complexity will 
occur as search was hypothesized to occur in response to 
problem complexity and interaction to stem from the 
politicality of the problem. 
The impact of search activity on duration looks to be 
smaller than the theoretical model anticipates, but that of 
interaction does appear to lengthen process. Talking does 
indeed cost time. 
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In subsequent chapters of this* thesis, these 
relationships will be further tested with a new sample of 
cases collected specifically for this research 
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TABLE 3.1 
Regression Equations of Complexity 




Rarity -. 02 . 06 
Precursiveness . 06 -. 12 Proactivity . 11 . 18 Openness . 01 . 01 Seriousness . 05 . 07 Criteria -. 14 -. 08 
Horizon . 14 . 07 
Political Cleavaae 
Interests . 22 . 07 
Diversity -. 13 . 00 
Contention . 24* . 06 
Pressure . 12 . 07 
Imbalance -. 08 . 07 
Intervention . 02 . 22* Impact . 19 . 01 
R2 . 18 . 12 
d. f. 14.135 14.135 
p 0.05 N. S. 
* P: 5 0.05 
Source Butler et al (1983) 
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Figure 3.1. The duration of strategic decision making: 
Process times of 150 decisions (Reproduced from Hickson 
et al. (1986)) 
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IMPEDIM ENTS TO PROCESS 
Of 150 decision making processes, 42 had no identifiable 75 
impediments of the kinds given below. (Reproduced from Hickson 












The reasons given by informants for delays in decision 
processes were coded on the following scale: 
1. Sequencing; awaiting priority in the order of attention. 
2. Co-ordinating: awaiting requirements becoming available. 
3. Timing, awaiting an opportune time. 
4. Searching, * awaiting the obtaining or analyzing of data, 
either by direct action or by the action of other 
agencies. 
5. Problem solving: awaiting, investigation of what is not 
understood. 
6. Supplying; awaiting the availability of resources. 
7. Recycling; awaiting reconsideration of what has already 
been gone over. 
8. Internal resistance; awaiting the outcome of active 
internal opposition. 
9. External resistance. awaiting the outcome of external 
opposition. 
i 
Each decision Process was scored by its highest coding. 
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IMPEDANCE SCALE SCORES 
TABLE 3.3 
Pearson Zero Order Correlation Coefficients Between 76 
Process Variables and Process Gestation and Duration 
23456789 10 11 12 13 
- ------- --- ------------------------ 
Duration 
Gestation (1) . 07 -. 06 . 08 -. 14* . 14* -. 01 . 05 -. 01 -. 01 . 06 . 13 . 20* 
Process (2) . 14* . 09 . 09 . 11 . 09 . 18* . 06 . 22* . 27* . 12 . 01 
















. 01 . 23* -. 05 . 14* . 
15* -. 06 . 22* . 14*-0.3 -. 01 
. 15* -. 11 . 02 . 05 . 11 . 09 -. 12 . 06 . 05 
-. 02 -. 03 . 21* -. 16* . 28* . 17* . 05 . 07 
-. 15* . 16* -. 01 . 14* . 11 . 08 . 11 
. 01 . 12 . 04 . 09 -. 10 . 18* 
. 25* . 36* . 25* . 18* . 19* 
. 08 . 07 . 15* . 20* 
. 71* . 04 . 14* 
. 09 . 15* 
. 15* 
* P: ý 0.05 
n=150 
Source: The Bradford Studies of Decision Making Data Files 
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TABLE 3.3.1 
Significant Correlations of Process Variables and Duration 
38 10 11 
2 Process Duration . 14 . 18 . 22 . 27 
3 Expertise . 15 . 22 . 14 
8 Informal Interaction . 36 . 25 
10 Impedance . 71 
11 Disruption 
Source: The Bradford Studies of Decision Making Data Files 
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TABLE 3.4 
Regression Equations of Selected Process Variables 




Search Expertise -. 06 . 11 
& Externality . 06 -. 03 Scrutiny Disparity -. 14 . 05 Effort . 07 . 14 
Interaction Formal -. 03 . 11 Informal . 12 . 21 
Negotiation Scope -. 13 . 01 
Discontinuity Impedance -. 10 -. 02 
Disruption . 05 . 25* Outcomes . 09 . 07 
Authority Level . 19* -. 04 
R2 11 . 22 
d. f. 7.142 7.142 
p NS . 001 
* p: 5.05 
Source: The Bradford Studies of Decision Making Data Files 
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CHAPTER 4. 
Research Design and Methodolgy. 
It is at this point in most research reports, when the 
questions have been posed, the relevant literature 
consulted, reviewed and synthesized into a testable model, 
that the researcher is faced with explaining the related but 
in some ways distinct problems as to why he or she chose to 
collect data using a particular strategy and how and why 
what actually happened differed from that intended. 
This faces up to a reality of research in that that 
which is intended seldom happens and decisions and 
adjustments are made as data collection is in progress. 
This chapter outlines the basis and method of data 
collection used and discusses the problems encountered and 
the adjustments made to overcome them. It also gives the 
operationalization of the variables used in the research. 
4.1 The Research Design 
According to Kerlinger (1973) research design has two 
basic purposes: to provide answers to the research questions 
and to control variance. Whilst research designs are 
invented to enable researchers to answer questions as 
validly, objectively and accurately as possible, the main 
technical function of a design is to control variance. 
"A research design is in a manner of 
speaking, a set of instructions to the 
investigator to gather and analyze his 
data in certain ways. " (Kerlinger, 1973, 
p. 306) 
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Accordingly the investigator should attempt to 
maximize the variance of the variables in the substantive 
hypotheses and to control the variance of extraneous or 
unwanted variables and to minimize the error or random 
variance. 
Astley (1978) suggests that comparative organizational 
research is particularly susceptible to the effects of 
extraneous variation, and discusses two strategies for 
dealing with them. The first is by the use of multivariate 
statistical techniques and the-second is by designing the 
sample to reduce these effects. He argues for the 
alternative to statistical control which "is to homogenize 
the nature of the sample. " An example would be if the 
researcher hypothesized a relationship between the number of 
vertical levels in an organization and the degree of 
horizontal differentiýtion, but that both were related to 
the size of the organization then homogenizing the sample 
with regard to organization size would indicate how much of 
the total covariation between number of levels and 
horizontal differentiation was of a non-extraneous origin. 
Homogeneous sampling, apart from having the same 
controlling effect as multivariate statistics, has further 
advantages. "It is simpler conceptually" (Astley, 1978). 
It is less error prone as extraneous factors are not allowed 
to vary, do not need to be the subject of imperfect 
measurement and cannot confound relationships in other ways 
(i. e. non-linear effects). Lastly, homogeneous sampling can 
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control for extraneous variables that have not been 
identified. 
From this analysis it would appear that homogeneous 
sampling is an ideal way to conduct macrorganizational 
research. For example the methodological rationale behind 
the testing of strategic contingencies theory by Hickson et 
al (1971) relied a great deal on sample homogeneity. Their 
sample consisted of 28 sub-units, made up of four identical 
sub-units, from each of seven manufacturing organizations, 
the only sub-units in these firms (i. e. a 100% sample). 
There is, however, always a trade off of advantages in 
controlling variation in this manner. Since there are 
thought to be many species of organizations how can results 
be generalized into populations of organizations? It also 
makes establishing the conditions when a theory will and 
will not hold difficult if not impossible, since conditions 
once selected and used cannot be varied. 
The research hypotheses developed earlier in this 
thesis taken together with the review of the Bradford 
Studies in the preceding chapter, suggest that it is 
variation in the problems facing decision makers and in the 
political forces surrounding them that determine process and 
thus process duration. It was therefore decided to follow 
Kerlinger's (1973) advice and maximize variation in the 
groups of variables representing these aspects of decision 
making, rather than attempt to try and homogenize cases of 
decision making across organizations. 
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The sample was chosen firstly to maximize variation in 
the complexity of problems. Given that these problems stem 
from different environments, the sample was chosen to 
reflect this diversity by using the simple Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) scheme as a sampling base. 
Whilst organizations in every category were surveyed, 
the private sector sample finally collected covered all but 
two categories of the scheme (see Table 4.1). That is it 
covered agriculture, iron and steel producers, engineering, 
textiles, merchanting transportation and financial services 
and finally entertainment, but neither the extractive nor 
construction industries were represented. 
As well as sampling from within each category a 
further selection was made within each category to ensure 
that some of the organizations were autonomous, and some 
subsidiaries. The selection and the names and addresses 
were taken from Key British Companies, 1983, a publication 
complied by Dun and Bradstreet of the top 20,000 companies, 
assessed by turnover, located in the U. K. 
Public sector organizations were not included in this 
sampling frame even when an SIC code was applicable (e. g. 
utilities). A separate classification scheme was applied 
(see table 4.2), to include the diversity of organizations 
in that sector since this was not fully reflected in the SIC 
codes. 
The sample was split in this way to maximize a source 
of "Political" variation in the sample. Several authors 
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have highlighted and commented on public and private sector 
differences in organizations (Rainey et al 1976, Pugh and 
Hickson 1976, Kenny et al 1985, Hickson et al 1986). Public 
or private ownership was earlier hypothesized to account for 
variation in process duration (Chapter 2) in that more and 
different interests would be drawn in. 
Therefore this criterion was built into the research 
design and a selection of public sector organizations was 
made from those listed in the Municipal Year Book 1983. In 
addition most of the nationalised industries were 
approached, this part of the sample being drawn from 
Whittakers Almanac, 1984. Educational organizations were 
sampled using listings in the World of Learning, 1983. 
Another variable of ownership, that which 
differentiates between being a subsidiary or principal or an 
autonomous unit, was also expected to account for variance 
in process and hence process duration so this too was 
included amongst the sampling criteria. Thus in an attempt 
to maximize variation a fairly straightforward sampling 
frame was devised (see Figure 4.1). 
In organizational research it would also appear that 
sampling strategies and quotas can be confounded by problems 
of gaining access to organizations. The evidence on non- 
responses (see below) suggests that many such surveys are 
going on at the same time and that even from within the same 
business schools organizations are being contacted by more 
than one department. This adversely affects access and may 
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partially account for the imbalance of organizations who 
finally agreed to participate. A full description of 
participating organizations is given in Appendix A but the 
numbers in each category of the sampling frame are given in 
parentheses in Figure 4.1. They include airlines, food 
processors, a consulting group and industrial machinery 
manufacturers. These are all privately owned. In the public 
sector those who agreed to cooperate ranged from local 
authorities, universities, an intervention board, health 
care organizations and utilities. 
organization size was also expected to affect the 
degree of horizontal differentiation and thence, through the 
number of interest units involved, process duration. Size 
was therefore allowed to vary, but in no systematic way 
except that organizations with under 150 employees were not 
approached as it was felt that they would not exhibit 
much horizontal differentiation (c. f. Hinings et al 1974). 
Sizes of participating organizations ranged between 165 and 
180,000 employees with a mean of 10,785, and a standard 
deviation of 27,587. 
4.2 Principles of Data Collection 
Trow (1957) advises that: 
"the problem under investigation 
properly dictates the methods of 
investigation". (p. 33) 
The method should not be chosen because of a 
particular epistemological bias in the researcher (Bryman, 
1984) although this bias may be more apparent in the first 
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framing of the research question. This project seeks to 
answer an essentially simple question, why do some strategic 
decisions take longer to make than others. The dependent 
variable, duration of decision making, is capable of quite 
precise measurement. Much exploratory work had already been 
done in the field of decision making, if not on duration, 
both within the broad framework of the Bradford Studies and 
elsewhere. Methods had been built up from intensive case 
studies to a survey "mini" case approach. Table 4.3 gives a 
developmental sequence of the stages in decision making 
research to date, This sequence indicates both a refinement 
of concepts used to characterize and explain decision making 
process and a more comparative approach with larger samples. 
It shows how research has moved from case studies and 
generalizable concepts such as simple minded search (Cyert 
and March 1963) and incrementalism (Lindblom 1959) through a 
more comparative description of phases of decision making 
(Mintzberg et al 1976) and on to a more comprehensive 
conceptualization and comparison phase (Hickson et al 1986). 
This research is located firmly at the comparative 
end of the sequence and such an objective in demanding a 
large number of cases to maximize variation on complexity 
and ownership effectively precludes the use of an in-depth 
case methodology. What was sought was not the richness of 
data that this latter methodology provides but, data from a 
number of cases on measured variables best collected by a 
survey approach. When so much work has gone before (see 
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Table 4.3) in the development of concepts and measures, the 
employment of a survey method is greatly facilitated. Given 
a research design that required a reasonably large sample 
size then how could this be achieved ? 
The Bradford Studies employed a data collection 
strategy that had involved six intensive case studies which 
laid the groundwork for a structured interview method based 
on a large number of open ended questions and a descriptive 
narrative. Data from the questions were subsequently scaled 
and then coded to provide the empirical data base. These 
codings were subsequently used by the author and David 
Wilson to produce a more structured instrument translated 
into Swedish and used by Axelsson et al (1986) to collect 
data on decision making processes in ten Swedish 
organizations. 
So by the time the detailed problems of the data 
collection method came to be considered many of the measures 
were available from the various interview schedules. It was 
then realized that many of these could be used in a 
questionnaire. This raised the possibility of using a 
mailed survey technique as opposed to personal interviews. 
Interviewing with a more structured schedule than the 
one employed by the Bradford Studies (Hickson et al 1986) 
and its derivative was the initial preferred method of both 
the author and his supervisor. However a tightening of 
expenditure in general and travel budgets in particular at 
that time would have meant that a much reduced coverage of 
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both numbers and types of organization would have been 
necessary. Therefore the use of a mail survey was explored 
and subsequently adopted. 
Such an approach does have enormous advantages given 
the size and variety of the sample required. Not 
surprisingly it also has several limitations and drawbacks. 
Erdos (1970) suggests several advantages of this 
method over others. A wider distribution is possible: the 
postman reaches areas that it would be particularly costly 
for a personal interview strategy to reach. A mail survey 
also removes the incidence of interviewer bias either 
through poor interviewers or interview cheating when, in 
order to fill a quota, the interviewer may alter the 
characteristics of the situation to fit requirements. Such 
a criticism is really directed towards team interviewing 
which employs many interviewers, but nonetheless getting 
unbiased answers is difficult if the response is filtered 
through the mind and writing style of another person, i. e. 
the researcher. This would appear to be particularly true 
of a case approach (e. g. Pettigrew 1973) though it is 
lessened to a great extent when a more structured instrument 
is used (e. g. Hickson et al 1986). 
Erdos (1970) further suggests that the mail 
questionnaire gives a greater chance for respondents to be 
truthful. Here there is a suggestion that respondents in a 
face to face or telephone contact are even more likely to 
tell an interviewer what they think interviewers would like 
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to hear, whereas when no-one else is present the social 
pressure is lessened. There is also the chance of a more 
thoughtful response being made. If the respondent does 
decide to answer the questionnaire then this can be done at 
their leisure and not confined to the few minutes of a 
telephone call or the usual time constraints of the personal 
interview. For decision making research such benefits may 
be substantial. 
This approach, it is suggested, also saves time. 
Erdos (1970) suggests that a national sample across the 
United States could be accomplished within two weeks. This 
compares favourably with the experience of the Bradford 
Group who would have expected only to set up a preliminary 
interview with a chief executive in that time. Their data 
collection was done in three phases, the majority of their 
data being collected in the last three years, but they had a 
five man team to collect 150 cases. A depth case 
methodology may be even more time consuming. Pettigrew, for 
example, spent four days a week in the Brian Michaels 
organization between September, 1966 and July, 1967; from 
July until the following April his visits were "rather less 
frequent" (Pettigrew 1973). Wilson (1980) who employed an 
in-depth case methodology in the opening phase of the 
Bradford studies to one ongoing and one archival case in 
each of three organizations was actively collecting data 
from the spring of 1975 until 1979, almost four years. 
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Mailed surveys also eliminate the need for a 
centralized control structure to monitor and allocate 
resources, which is needed when there is a large and 
dispersed team of researchers. Even for the lone researcher 
the effort of coordinating and arranging visits is 
eliminated, making control less complicated and data 
collection faster. 
Finally, there is the "bottom line" consideration. 
Postal and telephone charges cost less than interview 
expenses. Erdos (1970) argues that a given budget could 
produce a far larger number of responses if the mail method 
is used. In addition there is an opportunity cost involved. 
Writing and other activities could be proceeding during a 
mail survey since the data should almost collect itself. 
Unfortunately research groups do not publish data on cost 
per case even on an expenses only basis. 
What are the disadvantages? For there must be some. 
Erdos (1970) suggests several problems, some revolving 
around the mailing list, and the nature of the research 
instrument used, and others relating to questions of 
confidentiality and issues that arise if the respondent is 
not the person targeted. 
If a suitable mailing list was not available creating 
one would be expensive and the cost benefit would be 
seriously reduced. Even where a list exists it may also be 
incomplete in that it lacks, for example, chief executives' 
names, and has incomplete and/or out-of-date addresses which 
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would result in an excessive number of undeliverable 
questionnaires and thus effect reliability. The mailing 
list may also be biased in that to get on it organizations 
would have already had to satisfy someone else's sampling 
criteria. 
For this project, although a mailing list per se was 
not available, the availability of library reference sources 
was such that the creation of a list for the first phase of 
collection took only four man days. Subsequent lists 
required much less effort. The lists were complete in all 
respects: no questionnaires were returned due to being 
incorrectly addressed, although subsequent follow up (see 
later section for full details) did reveal that there had 
been some changes of chief executive during the period from 
the various guides being compiled and their use to create a 
list. This did not seem to pose much of a problem however 
as the current incumbents in most cases simply treated the 
mailing as if it had been addressed to them. 
That the mailing list might be biased did pose a minor 
problem in that for private sector organizations to be 
included in the Dun & Bradstreet directory they had to be in 
the top 20,000 companies in the U. K. assessed by turnover. 
This was the only sampling criterion imposed by outside 
sources and it was felt that this nevertheless provided a 
wide enough base from which to draw the sample to be 
contacted . 
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The nature of the survey instrument or questionnaire 
may also be a problem. This would occur if the subject 
matter was very specialized, for example medicine or 
computing, which would probably result in the questionnaire 
becoming jargon laden or so specialized that a specialist 
interviewer would be required. However as the subject here 
was decision making and senior executives and administrators 
are hopefully fairly familiar with the subject and no jargon 
was employed, or needed to be employed, to describe the 
ideas it was felt that this was not a limitation. The only 
anticipated problem was how far the same instrument could be 
applied to both the public and private sectors of the 
economy. For example, the administrator in the public 
sector may talk of surplus or deficit and the manager in the 
private sector of profit or loss. Both are, however, 
understandable to one another, and the interview schedules 
used by both Hickson et al (1986) and Axelsson et al (1986) 
were successfully used in both sectors. 
The questionnaire used in this project (see Appendix 
D) was carefully scrutinized, by both author and supervisor, 
for such language problems and was successfully pre-tested 
in both sectors. They were sent to three executives in each 
sector personally known to the author who were kind enough 
to comment on its suitability. When the total sample had 
been mailed only two executives replied saying that the 
questionnaire was not applicable to their organization. 
These were the director of strategic planning for the 
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British Tourist Authority, and the chairman of the Advisory, 
Conciliation and Arbitration Service. 
Other problems associated or identified with a survey 
instrument could be that it is too long, the subject matter 
could not be sufficiently structured for expression in 
questionnaire form and that it is too difficult to complete. 
The preparation of the instrument used here involved 
the examination of questionnaires used by other researchers 
in this and related fields. Some of them, particularly 
those used by researchers in the United States, asked over 
100 questions (for example, the instrument used by Hage and 
Aiken (1967). This raises the question of a possible 
cultural difference as faced with a questionnaire of over 
100 items and no compulsion to fill it in most Britons would 
probably gracefully decline. It appears that U. S. executives 
are not deterred by volume and would complete it anyway. 
Perhaps it has something to do with their being more used to 
formalized documentation that their British counterparts 
(Jamieson 1980) or their use of leisure time as an extension 
to work time (Child & McMillan 1972). Given the increase in 
the use of the mailed questionnaire (Grinyer and Norburn 
1975) what was an acceptable number of questions 20 years 
ago may be drastically reduced now. 
Therefore the instrument used for this research 
project whilst covering all the variables looked relatively 
short in the hope that its length would not be a barrier to 
completion. The number of questions was deliberately 
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limited to the number which could comfortably be 
accommodated on both sides of a folded sheet of A3 paper, 
the equivalent of four A4 sheets. 
Regarding the suitability of the subject matter for a 
structured format, only two questions were unstructured. 
These were questions on the sequence of the process and one 
which required the respondent to identify and write out the 
names of the interest units, both internal and external, 
which were involved (see question 20 Appendix D). Most of 
the 32 questions merely required an informant to circle or 
to insert a number. 
Asking executives to give information to outside 
parties raises issues of confidentiality. Experience with 
organizations contacted for the Bradford Studies suggested 
that response rates would be lessened if financial data of 
any kind was required. No information of this kind was 
solicited, but even so this issue was given prominence in 
the initial contact letter as it was felt that any lingering 
doubt should be extinguished by a firmly worded explanation 
(see Appendix B). Despite this one organization in the 
public sector declined to reply for this reason and two in 
the private sector indicated that as a matter of policy they 
did not give any information about anything to anyone they 
did not have to. 
Erdos (1970) suggests that problems may arise when 
someone other than the addressee fills in the questionnaire. 
It results in sample bias. This applies mainly to research 
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directed at households where the wife and not the husband or 
vice versa fills in a questionnaire intended for the other. 
In organizational research there is always a chance that a 
secretary or personal assistant will complete one for the 
targeted informant, but it would be doubtful that either of 
these would possess sufficient knowledge to complete one in 
this project. However no objections would have been raised 
if the schedule was passed to a senior colleague, indeed in 
the initial mailings such a situation was sought as the 
completion of two questionnaires was required. One was 
hopefully to be completed by the chief executive and the 
other, or both,. by other senior executives who were involved 
in the process. The rationale for and results of this 
strategy are discussed at length in a later section of this 
chapter. Astley (1978) also used a similar pass along 
strategy, getting chief executives to involve others in the 
project, in an attempt to maximize his response rate. 
Even given the advantages and despite making strenuous 
efforts to overcome the limitations inherent in the mailed 
questionnaire survey technique, it was difficult to ignore 
the misgivings expressed by some researchers, for example, 
Grinyer & Norburn (1975) who suggested that the growing use 
of mailed questionnaires in the field has increased 
resistance of businessmen to them. 
Heller (1971) regards it as the weakest of all research 
methods whilst acknowledging that those who insist on large 
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samples are often forced into using it. 
Kerlinger (1973, p. 414) is more explicit: 
"The best advice would seem to be not to use mail 
questionnaires if a better method can possible be used" 
He argues that the defects are serious enough to make 
the mail questionnaire worse than useless "except in highly 
sophisticated hands". 
Despite these misgivings and by minimizing the 
limitations it was decided that given the constraints of the 
time available for a piece of doctoral research and a lack 
of money for extensive travelling, the questionnaire 
approach should be tried. However heed was taken of 
Kerlinger's (1973) warnings and attempts were made to 
"sophisticate" the method. To this end one of Kerlinger's 
(1973) "useful" sources, Parten (1950), was consulted. 
On the subject of mail surveys she begins by arguing 
that: 
"Since the organization, training, and 
supervision of a staf f of investigators 
is unnecessary when data are secured 
through mail questionnaires, the 
collection work consists primarily of 
designing the questionnaire, inducing 
people to respond to it and analyzing 
and correcting the sample with a view to 
presenting representative returns. " 
(p. 383). 
One possible problem she envisages is due to the same 
phrasing being used for all respondents. The leeway given 
and used by interviewers rephrasing questions cannot be part 
of a mailed schedule strategy. However, if the group is 
relatively homogeneous, and all these schedules were 
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targeted at highly literate senior executives, the problem 
may be greatly alleviated. The only anticipated problem, 
referred to earlier, was the schedule not being applicable 
to both the public and private sectors of the economy. 
In using a mailed questionnaire Parten (1950) stresses 
that more care should be taken with the appearance of the 
instrument compared with one used in a personal interviewing 
situation : 
"Since the impression gained from a 
hasty glance at the form may d6termine 
whether or not an attempt will be made 
to answer it. " (Parten, 1950, pp 383- 
384). 
She goes on to discuss evidence from Sletto's (1940) 
work on protesting questionnaires which although lacking 
quantitative validation indicates the effectiveness of 
various features of the mailed questionnaire . 
The first feature is appearance. The questionnaire 
should be "attractive" although the use of different or 
unusual colours may cause more problems than it solves. The 
questionnaire must also look easy to fill in, requiring very 
little writing by the respondent. Only two sections of the 
current questionnaire required much writing, the section on 
sequence and that on the involvement of interests. 
Secondly length, she cites a rule that a questionnaire 
must be "as short as possible to get all the information 
needed by the survey" (p. 385). Although some people will 
respond, given the right incentive, to very long schedules 
as Sletto (1940) found in the United States after 
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experimenting with schedules of 10,25 and 35 pages in 
length. He found that there was no significant differences 
in response rates, but does suggest, somewhat paradoxically, 
that response rate may significantly increase if the 
schedule is no longer than 10 pages. Norton's (1930) work 
also supports this contention. The instrument used in this 
research fits well with these findings in that it was only 4 
pages long. 
Thirdly there is the content of the questionnaire 
itself. Parten's (1950) view is that in order'to effectively 
focus respondents' thoughts and thus increase potential 
replies all the topics should be related. In this research 
all questions are on one specific topic, i. e. one pre- 
specified strategic decision. 
Finally there is the letter of transmittal to consider, 
according to Parten (1950) this should be clear, on 
official stationery, preferably indicating that the research 
has some institutional backing. It should contain a 
statement of purpose and the uses to be made of the data, 
together with instructions on how to fill out the form. It 
has also been found, she argues, that "a personal touch in 
the letter of transmittal is'quite effective in bringing in 
returns", (p. 386); for example such devices as a postscript 
which looks as if it were written by hand, a personal 
signature, or even that a mistake be made and corrected in 
handwriting. 
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Following these leads, the letter used (Appendix B) 
emphasized that the research was aimed towards improving 
management education, and was on official Management Centre 
stationary but could not indicate any institutional backing 
from a grant giving agency. The letter also contained 
instructions for selecting a decision and for filling in and 
returning the questionnaire. It was personally signed but 
did not contain a postscript or a corrected mistake as it 
was felt that these would detract from the crisp effective 
image of letters to Chief executives and therefore be 
counterproductive. 
Assuming that the mailing list is satisfactory the 
most opportune time for sending it out must also be chosen. 
Certain periods, puch as holidays, extremely hot weather, 
and important national events should be avoided (Parten 
1950). 
However, despite careful design and testing, a certain 
proportion of non-respondents cannot be prevented. Factors 
such as the sex, economic status and educational level of 
the target groups, the interest the subject provokes and the 
prestige of the sponsoring group together with the appeal of 
the questionnaire, and with strong agreement or disagreement 
with the propositions surveyed all have significant effects 
on response rate. 
It appears that in this research, effectively only the 
appeal of the questionnaire itself and the accompanying 
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letter are capable of manipulation the other parameters 
essentially being fixed. 
To obtain sufficient returns also requires some form 
of follow-up technique. Parten (1950) suggests that a 
follow-up postcard or letter were found to be of much 
greater value in securing returns than sending another 
copy of the original questionnaire. Astley (1978) preferred 
telephone to written follow-up, yet even then some 
respondents who agreed to respond after such a call 
subsequently defaulted. 
In designing a follow up strategy Parten (1950) 
suggests that the following points should be taken into 
account . 
1. Form of follow-up: 
A short note or postcard with a tactful references to the 
effect that reply may be on the way is usual. A second 
reminder may contain copies of the schedule. 
2. The number of follow-ups: 
The greater the number the greater the returns. 100% 
returns have been achieved with up to six follow-ups 
(Parten, 1950, p. 398). 
3. The timing of follow-ups: 
Initial returns should by plotted against time and follow- 
ups sent when the response curve declines, this usually 
occurs at at about 16 days from first mailing. 
Finally: non returns should be analyzed for any possible 
pattern. 
100 
For this research a follow up letter was used (see 
Appendix C) after 16 working days. This was followed by a 
phone call to the Chief Executives office after another 10 
working days or so. The effectiveness of both the initial 
approach and the follow up strategy are discussed more fully 
in the next section of this chapter. 
More recent writers have added surprisingly little to 
the knowledge base on-mail surveys. Green and Tull (1966), 
for example, cover much the same ground as Parten in 
discussing the pros and cons, but do suggest that an overall 
response rate of between 10-20% was probably all that could 
be realistically hoped for from mailed surveys. 
The research strategy chosen for this study can be 
summarized as being to use a short mailed questionnaire to 
minimize interviewer bias and minimize cost and maximize 
speed, allied to a follow-up procedure to generate a high 
response rate. It was also decided to target for two 
informants per decision to provide a cross check on the data 
as part of a "pass along" tactic whereby Chief Executives 
were asked to obtain their colleagues participation . 
Finally, a total of 50 decisions would be aimed for covering 
both public and private sectors and across all industries. 
4.2.1. Data Collection -Activity 
The process of data collection began in October, 1984 
when an initial sample of 100 private and 75 public sector 
organizations were contacted using the word processed letter 
in Appendix B. It was addressed personally to the managing 
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director, chief executive, or public sector equivalent, for 
example, general manager, director general, district 
administrator. This letter asked the recipient to select 
the most recent strategic decision taken and ask two senior 
people who were involved to complete the questionnaire and 
return it in a reply paid envelope. 
The initial response rate was very low, and after 
three weeks a follow-up letter was sent (see Appendix C). 
This had the unintended effect of inducing many 
negative replies, a full analysis of which is presented 
later. Those organizations not responding to either the 
initial request or the follow up were then contacted again 
two weeks later by telephone. This elicited a variety of 
reasons for non-response. Some managers or their 
secretaries claimed that they had not received the request 
and were promptly sent another copy, but the most quoted 
reason for non-participation was pressure on time and many 
respondents referred to the vast numbers of such requests 
currently being made on their time. The main reasons given 
(in rank order) were: 
1. Pressure on time, 
2. Current changes in their organizations, in both structure 
and location 
3. An inability to identify a strategic decision for 
analysis 
These reasons are reflected in an analysis of reasons for 
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non-response for the whole mailing exercise, to be discussed 
more fully later in this chapter. 
The net result of the initial mailing was a response 
rate from the private sector of 5% and 8% from the public. 
Neither follow-up strategy, letter or telephone, perceptibly 
improved on this. These results were extremely disconcerting 
and cast doubts on the validity of the approach for 
collecting data, and it looked as it the misgivings 
referred to in the earlier sections of this chapter were 
being realized. 
However, on the credit side, the completed 
questionnaires returned were very thoroughly completed and 
meaningful, confirming the effectiveness of the 
questionnaire for collecting the data if not for gaining 
access. Very obviously an improvement in response rate was 
essential to the success of the project and means of doing 
so were actively searched for. 
It was discovered that a colleague on the Marketing 
faculty of the Management Centre had recently prepared for 
publication a paper on maximizing response rates in 
commercial mail surveys (Jobber 1985). His review covered 
the results obtained from a variety of sources with a 
variety of experimental treatments, for example, the use of 
monetary incentives, coloured questionnaires, 
personalization of the letter and so on. It appears that a 
token monetary incentive (a 25 cent coin) did have a 
significant effect on response rates when offered to U. S. 
103 
executives. However none of the surveys using this approach 
were targeted directly at the chief executive and it was 
felt that offering a 20p piece for a cup of coffee or 
whatever would be treated with something akin to derision by 
most British chief executives. 
The use of non-monetary incentives was also considered 
for example the sending of a fibre tip or ball point pen 
with which to complete the questionnaire with the letter. 
However according to Jobber (1985) it appears that these 
have only at best a marginal effect on response rate and the 
practical problem of including them in an already full 
envelope would outweigh any possible advantage. 
Providing a means of readily returning a completed 
questionnaire is another variable seemingly open to some 
manipulation. In a survey addressed to presidents of large 
corporations whether or not a stamped return envelope was 
provided had no impact on response rate (Jobber 1985). 
Using the pre-paid business reply was felt to offer at least 
a reasonable compromise. 
Individually typed letters were found to give a 
significant advantage over a duplicated form but as this was 
already being done any advantage had already been wrung from 
that approach. 
The promise of anonymity and confidentiality does seem 
to increase response rate (Jobber 1985) but again maximum 
advantage was probably already being taken of this. 
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There was also an indication that whilst a preliminary 
notification letter did not increase response rates a 
preliminary telephone call might. First results of such an 
approach now published by Jobber, Allen and Oakland (1986) 
indicated that both a phone call and a preliminary 
notification letter significantly improved response rates 
when applied to quality controllers in the U. K. textile 
industry. 
It was therefore decided to try this, and for the 
second wave of organizations contacted by the author in the 
private sector a preliminary phone call was made to 20 of 
the 90 organizations surveyed. Using this approach great 
difficulty was experienced in getting past the "gatekeeper" 
invariably present at that level of organization usually in 
the person of a secretary or personal assistant. This was 
not a problem that had been experienced during the telephone 
follow up or by Jobber Allen and Oakland (1986). None of 
the organizations contacted in this preliminary fashion 
responded to the subsequent letter and questionnaire, 
and clearly at this level an initial phone call was 
completely ineffective. 
However 10 of the other 70 chief executives did 
respond, a response rate of 14% (11% overall). Although 
both these rates were low they were a definite improvement 
on the first wave results. 
No follow up technique was employed at first for the 
20 organizations in the second wave of public sector 
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mailings but 6 did reply, a response rate of 30% again a 
definite improvement. 
Whilst the increase in response rate was encouraging 
the number of responses was still well below the target of 
50 organizations (by now 12 public sector organizations, and 
15 private had replied) and changing to a pre-notification 
approach was not paying any dividend. The initial letter 
and overall strategy were therefore closely reexamined. 
As was pointed out earlier, the initial approach' 
required chief executives to firstly identify the most 
recent strategic decision taken and to arrange for two 
people, one of whom may of course have been themselves, to 
complete and return a questionnaire each. 
However not all the responses thus far received had 
complied with the parameters set, for a variety of reasons, 
the prime amongst them being that there was no one else left 
in the organization capable of answering the questions. 
Others simply gave no reasons. Furthermore only four out of 
the 15 private sector responses were dual compared with 7 
out of 12 for public sector responses. This raised two 
questions. Was two informants per decision both feasible 
and strictly necessary? Did it so overcomplicate the task 
that it was a reason for the high non-response rate? 
The objective of a dual respohse was to provide a 
cross check but a minimum of three responses per case would 
be required in order to calculate a Kendall coefficient of 
concordance, which tests the agreement of judges (Cohen and 
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Holiday 1982) Therefore a straightforward zero order 
Pearson Correlation was computed as a measure of agreement 
between both informants. Responses on all the major 
variables hypothesized as having an impact on decision 
making process were used in the comparison and the results 
were very encouraging as the correlations (see Table 4.4 
for a complete analysis) ranged from . 82 to 1.00 (perfect 
agreement) p< . 001. 
Given that there was this very close agreement the 
decision was taken to proceed with a third wave of mailings 
using a simplified approach and shorter access letter 
(Appendix E). The essence of this was to make responding 
easier by requiring that only one questionnaire be completed 
which effectively made the new letter shorter and more to 
the point. It was also decided to enhance the perceived 
institutional backing and the letter was now to be 
personally signed by both the researcher and supervisor 
(using the title Professor) and not just the researcher 
alone. 
The third wave of mailings quickly produced the 
desired number of cases although the response rate was no 
higher than for the second wave. Fifty more public sector 
organizations were contacted by letter alone which produced 
a further 13 positive responses. No follow up letters were 
sent and the target of 25 cases was ýairly quickly reached. 
On the other hand decision makers in the private sector 
remained unmoved by this new tactic and a further 200 had to 
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be contacted to produce just 16 responses (8%), six more 
than the minimum needed, 25 cases. 
The overall figures are given in Table 4.5 which 
breaks down response rate by mailing waves and by sector as 
well as giving total figures. The final response rates do 
not approach expected values. The one which comes nearest 
to the rough 20% estimate of expected responses is that from 
the public sector. Overall, the response rate was about 
10%. This result was disappointingly low, essentially one 
half that anticipated. However generating responses from 
what well may be a saturated population (c. f. Grinyer and 
Norburn 1975), as some of the negative responses suggested 
that managers now are, seems to be an increasingly difficult 
undertaking. 
Mail surveys seem to generate good response rates from 
very specialized target populations such as marketing or 
quality control managers (Jobber and Sanderson 1983 ), 
responses from corporation presidents or chief executives is 
much less well documented . This group of executives are 
invariably busy (Mintzberg 1973) and under severe time 
pressures dealing with the increasingly complex strategic 
problems facing them for decision (Ansoff 1979). 
Nevertheless this study represents the first successful 
use of a mail survey to characterize decision making 
process, at least in the U. K. Although Stein (1981 a&b) did 
measure some process features in a questionnaire on 
contextual domain and decision making methods, little seems 
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to have been done elsewhere. Stein (1981 a&b) however did 
not give any data on response rate, he merely states that 64 
questionnaires were available for analysis. 
Most of those who replied but declined to complete the 
questionnaire did not in fact say why. Whilst the responses 
were invariably polite, only two were mildly insulting, they 
gave no reason whatsoever for not completing the 
questionnaire. The second most prevalent excuse given was 
lack of time due to other pressures. Perhaps if the aim of 
the research had been made more explicit in the initial 
approach letter some of these 26 negatives might have become 
positives. However the decision had been taken not to bias 
response by revealing all the objectives of the research to 
the subjects, who might well have responded by making 
themselves and their colleagues appear more speedy and 
dynamic in their decision making than they in fact were 
4.3 The Instrument and Measures 
This section deals with the construction of the 
questionnaire and the definitions of the variables used in 
the conceptual framework, elaborating on explanations given 
at earlier points in the thesis. Both the constitutive and 
operational definitions are presented. A full list of the 
measures and their statistical distributions are given in 
Appendix F. A discussion of the factors that may run 
through the variables is held over until the analysis 
chapters which follow. 
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4.3.1. The Instrument 
The survey instrument or questionnaire consisted of 32 
questionnaire items to measure those variables in the model 
outlined in Chapter 2 and operationalized later on in this 
chapter. 
Question development was helped by a variety of 
sources. First the Bradford Studies (Hickson et al 1986) 
provided ideas and a few questions which were carried over 
directly to the new questionnaire, for example those 
questions on sequence and influence . Others such as those 
which measured search activity and contention arose from 
concepts which they had measured in a slightly different 
way. other items, for example those relating to aspects of 
uncertainty, were adapted and developed from sources such as 
Hickson et al (1971) and Lawrence and Lorsch (1967). 
Questions on time pressures, procedures and time horizons 
were in part developments of the Bradford Group's ideas but 
also stemmed from a short series of informal interviews 
about the topic of speed of decision making which the author 
held in the spring of 1984 with one private sector and two 
senior public sector managers. 
Questions concerning organization variables were 
again developed from the Bradford Group's but this time with 
additions from Robinson, Hitchens and Wade (1978) on market 
competition and an adaptation of Perrow's (1970) ideas of 
variation in material to measure the level of variability 
emanating from the environment. 
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The drafting process took a good deal of time as an 
awareness of the pitfalls inherent in this approach outlined 
above and of Parten's (1950) advice on the survey 
instrument was at the forefront during the design effort. 
The seemingly never ending series of drafts were commented 
on conscientiously and unselfishly by members of the 
Organizational Analysis Research Unit and others from within 
the Management Centre of different disciplines and 
methodological orientations. A "final" interim draft was 
then sent out to the managers and administrators who had 
participated in the earlier exploratory stage. Finally these 
respondents were then contacted by telephone in an attempt 
to accomplish some degree of question testing (Belson, 1981) 
and to resolve any ambiguities encountered by them in 
completing the questionnaire. Question testing involves 
asking respondents what the questions meant to them, for 
example, the question on contention: what did the word 
contention mean to them and what did they have in mind when 
answering the question. This was only done for new and 
previously untried questions. 
The questionnaire, amended for the final time, was 
then printed ready for use. 
4.3.2. Measures of Process Duration 
As explained previously duration has two identifiable 
components; gestation and process times. The first, 
gestation time, is the period from first recognition of a 
problem, during which no real action has taken place. Even 
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though the issue might have been mentioned or talked over 
briefly, no substantial steps have been taken towards a 
solution. 
Process time begins when some identifiable action 
occurs; a meeting takes place, a report is commissioned, the 
problem crystalized into a topic on which a decision is 
intended. Process time ends when action to implement a 
decision is authorized. 
Operationally these time periods were calculated from 
the questionnaire using a combination of questions 4,5, and 
7 (Appendix D). 
These questions asked for the dates, the month and year, 
when the first move was made towards a decision (question 
4), if and when the matter was first aired (question 5) and 
when the decision was finally taken (question 7). The 
difference between questions 5 and 4 is gestation which may 
of course be zero. The difference between questions 7 and 4 
is process time. Both are expressed as a number of months. 
In Chapter 1 the effect of organizational time on 
process duration was discussed. organizational time was 
measured by question 19 which asks how the time taken by the 
decision described compared with the usual length of time 
taken by similar decisions. The construction of this 
question and the results of using it as an alternative way 
of looking at duration are presented in Chapter B. 
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4.3.3. Process Activity Variables 
The second group of variables, process activity, 
measures the possible sources of disruption to process. 
The first of these is due to authorization level. It 
was hypothesized that the higher the level of authorization 
a decision reaches the more process would be disrupted. 
Question 8 on the schedule allowed a freedom of response so 
that terms familiar to informants, for example council, EEC 
Commission, board of directors, could be used. The answers 
were then coded using a scale representing a series of 
hierarchical levels indicating whether the decision was 
authorized outside the organization (scale point 4) to a 
level below the chief executive (scale point 1). The scale 
points are fully identified in Appendix H. 
Process disruptions due to the need for coordination 
were measured on the familiar 5 point scale from a very 
great deal (5) to not at all (1) and were covered by 
question 25 (Appendix D), the extent to which process was 
delayed in getting the right people together. The extent to 
which delays due to negotiation activity occurred was tapped 
by question 24, which asked about the extent of negotiation 
that the decision generated. 
Search activity was hypothesized to have two 
components: depth and breadth. Both were derived from data 
contained in the block of questions on sources of 
information used. Search depth (how hard do decision makers 
search for data) was operationalized as being a composite 
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measure of scores on each component of question 22. 
The respondents were asked to answer on a five point scale 
ranging from not at all (point 1) to a very great deal 
(point 5) the extent to which the sources of information 
listed were used in making the decision. There were 5 
possible sources ordered in an ascending scale of search 
effort required, a derivative of the measure used by Hickson 
et al (1986). The sources ranged from experience (low 
effort) to external research from outside agencies (high 
effort). The scores on these components were then multiplied 
by a weighting factor which indicated the degree to which 
the source was used, weighting each successively more 
heavily in accordance with the search effort. 
Thus depth of search = experience score (question 
22.1) + material available (question 22.2) x2+ 
(Question 22.3) x3+ (question 22.4) x4+ (question 
22.5) x 5. 
If the source was not used the score was set to zero 
for computational purposes. 
Thus the more sources used, and the more the sources 
were used, indicated increased search activity, the greater 
became the search depth index. 
After calculation these scores were printed out and 
checked back to the pattern of responses displayed by the 
completed questionnaires. The index was found to 
discriminate well between high and low intensity patterns 
of search behaviour, that is, one which used many sources to 
a very great extent and ones which did not display much 
activity. 
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Breadth of search too is a composite measure. It is a 
summation of the number of sources consulted more than 'a 
little' (i. e. those scoring greater than scale point 2 on 
questions 22.1 to 22.5 inclusive were counted). These 
scores were also checked back to the questionnaire responses 
and discriminated well amongst the cases. 
In addition to the process of arriving at a decision 
how successful the decision was is also relevant. Are 
faster decisions "better" than "slow"? A measure of success 
of the decision is given by question 26. This will form the 
basis to address the above question and is included in the 
final chapter. 
4.3.4. Complexity of the Problem 
The two phases of total duration emphasize the subtle 
metamorphosis of an underlying or perhaps an immediate 
problem or issue into a topic for decision (i. e. the start 
of process time). This problem will exhibit certain 
characteristics. The technical difficulty or ambiguity it 
presents to decision makers will vary. The variables of 
complexity are designed to measure this. 
The first complexity variable is procedures; the 
extent to which a problem is able to be 
procedures, whether formalized or not. 
cannot be fitted to procedures the more 
novel and therefore more complicated to 
procedure for dealing with it has to be 
measured by question 9 (Appendix D) whii 
handled by existing 
The more a problem 
likely it is to be 
solve as a new 
devised. This was 
ch asked for 
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responses on a five point scale from all to none as to the 
extent to which the problem was capable of fitting into 
existing procedures and routines. Thus the higher the score 
the less complex the decision. 
The more sources there are to a problem should also 
increase complexity. An example would be if the sources 
were not only competitive pressure but also legislation by 
the government in the case of, say, the private sector steel 
industry. This would present decision makers with more 
complexity as the solution would have to take account of 
both interests. This variable was operationalized by a 
composite measure derived from question 3 (Appendix D). 
This question asked for a rating of the extent to which the 
problem arose from a variety of sources. The way this 
question was scaled the existence of a fourth point on the 
response scale, which ran from mainly to hardly: a scale 
point 4- 'not at all' was implied . This was utilized in 
the coding of this question prior to analysis. Thus there 
were 6 possible sources of a problem ranging from a 
response to competition to regular event and 4 possible 
responses to each of those sources. The final two points 
(3&4) on the scale were regarded as scoring zero. A score 
of partly (scale point 2) was weighted as one, a score on 
the'mainlyl point(scale point 1) was doubled. Thus the 
effect of sources became the sum of the weighted scores for 
each of the 6 components of the question. 
116 
greater length of time that is perceived between 
authorization of action and knowledge of results is 
hypothesized to add to the uncertainties facing decision 
makers. For in this period circumstances or preferences 
may change (Thompson 1967) and having to evaluate or think 
through these before a choice can be made adds to 
complexity. This was operationalized as the time in months 
between when the decision was taken and when the effects 
would be known (question 13). 
Once information has been searched for and evaluated a 
choice must be made. The rationalist approach to decision 
making requires that all information on options available 
and their consequences is collected and the options ranked 
according to a preferences schedule. However most decision 
making is at best constrained by the limits of human 
cognition and the ability of organizational resources to 
provide the information. There thus comes a point at which a 
satisficing solution (March and Simon 1958) is arrived at. 
At this point decision makers have a varying degree of 
confidence in the information being used as no one really 
knows how far the solution is from being optimal. Thus the 
degree of confidence in information is a measure of the 
value of the information on which the decision is made. 
This was measured on a5 point scale from a very great deal 
to not much (question 23). Thus a low score indicates high 
complexity. 
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The final group of variables designed to measure the 
degree of complexity of a problem tap uncertainty. The 
greater the uncertainty the more complex the problem should 
be as cause and effect relationships are difficult to 
unravel and preferences about possible outcomes become 
unclear (Thompson 1967). Question 10 measures the degree of 
uncertainty associated with information requirements. If 
decision makers do not know what information is needed to 
solve a problem it is more complex than if they know, for 
example, that all that is needed is a cash flow and return 
on investment calculation. 
Uncertainty of outcomes (question 11) measures the 
difficulties associated with evaluating outcomes. if this 
is easy to accomplish the problem becomes less complex as 
fewer evaluation schema and criteria have to be thought out 
and then applied. The more difficult this is the greater is 
the complexity of the problem. 
The last measure concerning information (question 12) 
is designed to tap the overall level of uncertainty faced. 
4.3.5. Politicality Variables 
The political view of decision making sees it as an 
arena in which interests attempt to gain advantage or 
protect the status quo (Hage 1980, Cyert and March 1963). 
The amount of attention a decision receives is influenced by 
its significance to the organization (Mintzberg et al 1976) 
but more by its importance to the interests involved 
(Pettigrew 1973). Information may be generated or utilized 
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in order to further the interests of particular groups 
(Wilson 1980). Disruptions may occur from lack of 
information but they will also arise from political 
activity. 
The variables characterizing this aspect of the 
problem are defined as follows. The first contention, is 
the extent to which interests hold disparate positions vis a 
vis the problem being considered. More contentious issues 
should generate more discussion and negotiation if it is to 
be resolved, therefore thd initial contentiousness of a 
problem represents a starting point for political activity. 
This was measured by the 5 point scale related to question 
14, which allowed ratings between 'extremely' and 'not at 
all1contentious. 
Question 15 on the nature of contention did not yield a 
sufficiently workable scale, when processed for it to be 
included in any subsequent analysis. 
The influence that each interest unit exerted in the 
decision making process was given by the scores on the 
scales in answer to question 21. Combining these gives 
several measures of politicality. There is pressure, the 
mean of the scores, which denotes the extent to which a 
decision process is subject to the exercise of power or is 
relatively free of such attempts. There is an imbalance of 
power when there is an uneven distribution of influence 
between interest units. Imbalance is the range of the 
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influence scores for each case, a narrow range represents a 
balanced arena and a wide range an unbalanced one. 
The next two variables represent the closure of 
process in two separate ways. The first indeed is called 
closure and is the extent to which some alternatives are 
foreclosed at the outset. This sets the broad parameters of 
what can and cannot be considered. The extreme of this idea 
is seen in Bacharach and Baratz's (1962) notion of the non- 
decision which occurs when powerful interests mobilize bias 
to keep issues out of the decision making arena. This was 
measured by question 16 which asked for a rating of the 
extent to which it was felt that a decision had already been 
made. The responses ranged from very strongly (scale point 
5) to not al all (scale point 1). 
Another way that process may be closed off is when a 
deadline is imposed. Someone sets deadlines and effectively 
limits the amount of negotiation and search activity that 
can be undertaken. Time pressure (question 17) measures on 
a5 point scale the extent to which the decision was made 
against such forces. 
The question which asked for the source of these time 
pressures (question 18) proved difficult to scale and was 
therefore excluded from further analysis. 
The number of interests and interest units indicates 
the extent to which the arena is crowded (Kenny et al, 
1985). These may be individuals, sub-units of the 
organization or external powers. The sheer number involved 
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was measured by counting the number listed by respondents 
in answer to question 20. The diversity of interest, the 
extent to which there is likely to be political action to 
protect or advantage a position vis a vis other interests, 
was taken from the list of internal departments and external 
organizations supplied in answer to question 20. This was 
coded using an extension of Katz and Kahn's (1966) 
classification of sectional dynamics or interests, ranging 
from those requiring stability or change to those concerned 
with proficiency or control. This formed the basis of the 
classification of interests used by Hickson et al (1986). 
This scheme, -as it was tried and tested, was adopted for 
this project. A full listing of interest types and examples 
is given in Appendix G. 
Finally political activity is intensified by the 
amount of intervention from outside the organization, 
indicated here by the potentially disturbing or frustrating 
influence of external interests such as customers, 
government departments or head office. This is again 
derived from question 21 and is operationalized as the 
percentage of the sum of influence ratings for all interest 
units that was due to external units. 
4.3.6. organization 
Organization variables were grouped under the three 
major headings of ownership, size and environment and are 
operationalized as follows. 
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Ownership was broken into two components. The first 
component was sector, whether or not an organization was 
owned partly or wholly by the state or by private 
individuals and institutions. This was easily measured by 
just scoring those organizations which came from the 
sampling frame for each sector 0 for public, 1 for private. 
The second component of ownership was whether or not the 
organization was autonomous or a subsidiary and this was 
coded from questions 27 and 28 (Appendix D) and again scored 
dichotomously, 1 for private and 2 for a subsidiary. 
The size of the organization and, the size of owning 
group if any, were also taken from questions 27 and 28. Size 
in organization studies is invariably measured in terms of 
number of full time or full time equivalent employees. 
Whilst net assets for example could be used to measure size 
of private sector organizations it may prove difficult to 
accomplish for some public sector organizations. As these 
two are usually highly correlated (Pugh and Hickson 1976), 
the logarithm of number of employees was used to represent 
both size of organization and of the owning group if any. 
Environment was covered by questions 29 to 32 
(Appendix D). Question 29, which asks about market 
position, was successfully used by Robinson Hitchens and 
Wade (1978) to measure the organization's position vis a vis 
other organizations operating in the same sector. Question 
30 about competition, measured a perceived level of threat 
from other organizations. 
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Questions 31 and 32 measured the difficulty of 
producing outputs and coping with variation in both quality 
and quantity of inputs. High scores on these three measures 
, should 
indicate a greater level of complexity for decision 
makers as they seek to protect the technological core from 
any fluctuation (Thompson 1967). 
4.4. Coding the Measures 
The transfer of raw scores into computer input was 
only one part of the process of building a file of data for 
use in the analysis phase of this project. 
Variables which had open ended responses or required 
the application of a previously developed coding structure, 
for example questions 2 and 21 which produced a 
classification of the topic for decision (see next chapter), 
and the interests in the list of interest units, were coded 
by the author and check coded by another member of the 
Bradford Group who had also coded their data base for 
interests. This process produced no disagreement. 
Transposing data from the questionnaire to computer 
input was checked on a random basis by one friend and the 
final data file verified to the source file by yet another. 
The analysis presented in the subsequent chapters of 
this thesis could then proceed. 
4.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed the issues and arguments for 
the methodology and approach adopted to collect data on 56 
strategic decisions in U. K. organizations. 
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One of the major choices that had to be made was to 
proceed with a mailed questionnaire strategy as opposed to 
personal interviews. The choice whilst being constrained by 
limited resources, particularly the cost of travel, and the 
time involved in conducting personal interviews appeared 
reasonable given the amount of work previously done in 
developing measures of process by the author and other 
members of the Bradford Group. 
The initial response rate was woefully short of 
expectations and the approach was reviewed and modified to 
increase it . The adjustments made and the rationale for 
making them have been discussed in some depth. A key point 
was the confirmation that there was a consistent agreement 
between pairs of informants and this made a single informant 
response acceptable. This in turn was probably vital in 
securing the return of the final batch of questionnaires. 
The design of the questionnaire has also been discussed 
at length, particularly as the evidence on mailed surveys 
suggested that the design and appearance of the instrument 
were crucial factors in maximizing response rates. It was 
deliberately kept as short and uncomplicated as possible. 
Finally the measures were operationally defined and 




Private Sector Organizations Classified By SIC Code 
SIC CODE DESCRIPTION NUMBER OF 
ORGANIZATIONS 
Aut onomous Subsidiary Total 
0 Agriculture/Horticulture 1 1 2 
1 Extraction/Refining 0 0 0 
2 iron and Steel/Chemicals 3 1 4 
3 Foundries/Engineering 3 5 8 
4 Textiles/Clothing/Publishing 2 2 4 
5 Construction 0 0 0 
6 Merchanting/Wholesale/Catering 1 3 4 
7 TransporUPacking/Telecommunications 1 4 5 
8 Finance/ComPuting/Consulting 1 2 3 
9 Entertainment 0 1 1 
TOTAL 12 19 31 
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TABLE 4.2 
Public Sector Organizations Classified by Purpose 
NUMBER 
Health Region 1 
District 1 
Education Poytechnic 2 
Universities 4 
Local Authority City Council 1 
County Council 2 
Boroughs 2 
Government Corporations 3 
Quangos 3 














Stages In Decision Making Research 
STAGE BRADFORD GROUP OTHERS 
Cases and Concept Wilson 1980 Cyert & March (1963) 
Development Pettigrew (1973) 
Allison (1971) 
Description Butler et al 1979 Mintzberg 
Mallory et al 1983 et al (1976) 
Comparison Hickson et al 1986 DIO Team (1983) 





Intercorrelations Between Informants 





. 87 zc 
. 99 BCA . 99 ADA . 97 
Public Sector 
AVP . 82 CRAI . 98 WFO . 99 
WAS . 93 CACC . 99 CHCC . 97 CAMD 1.00 
All significant p <. 001 
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TABLE 4.5 
Response Rates To Mailed Questionnaire 






1 st Wave 
Number sent 75 100 175 
Double Response 4 3 7 
Total Positive Response 6 5 11 
Response Rate 8% 5% 6% 
2nd Wave 
Number sent 20 90 110 
Double Response 3 1 4 
Total Positive Response 6 10 16 
Response Rate 30% 11% 15% 
3rd Wave 
Number sent 50 200 250 
Positive Response 13 16 29 
Response Rate 26% 8% 12% 
Overall 
Number sent 145 390 535 
Double Response 7 4 11 
Total Positive Response 25 31 56 
Total Negative Response 58 50 108 




The Content and Shape of Contemporary Decisions 
The decisions that are the subject of this thesis are 
, called strategic decisions, a class of decisions that have 
been the focus of most studies of organizational decision 
making. In an earlier chapter the distinctiveness of 
strategic as opposed to operational decisions was briefly 
discussed (Chapter 1). This chapter describes first the 
nature and content of the actual decisions in the sample, 
and secondly their duration how long they took to make. 
Subsequent chapters will endeavor to explain this duration. 
5.1 The Content of Strategic Decision Making 
There is now a large body of published work analyzing 
cases of strategic decision making (see Chapter 1), for 
example Wise (1966), Pettigrew (1973) and Wilson (1980). 
Additional examples are noted by the financial press who 
report and comment on the decision of X Plc to take over Y 
Ltd. or invest in a new technology. Unless they involve 
newsworthy circumstances such as a particularly combative 
takeover (Guinness v Bells) an industrial relations problem 
(Union Cold Stores v Dockworkers) or an example of apparent 
or real ineptitude by politicians (De Lorean) it is a rare 
for the strategic decisions that managers make to feature in 
the popular media and enter the full glare of the public 
eye. How representative is such a "sample" of the strategic 
decision making activities of U. K. organizations? 
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The large number of cases covered by the Bradford 
Studies enabled the first balanced view to emerge. The 
nature of the decisions they reported was very wide, varying 
from, for example, "the last decision" by a private company, 
whether or not to accept or resist a takeover bid, to 
decisions from the other side of the coin, i. e. whether or 
not to take over a company. There were also amalgamation 
decisions in the public sector, and decisions on the best 
way to structure previously independent bodies now unified 
by political edict. There were decisions in both sectors on 
the location of operations at home and overseas. There were 
internal restructurings, such as the insertion of a regional 
level between branches and Head Office in a building 
society; decisions to launch new products or offer new 
services and of course to re-equip with new production and 
computer technology. 
To get a general view of what the 150 decisions were 
about they were categorized into a number of topics. There 
were 10 of these categories in all. Table 5.1 gives a full 
listing with descriptive examples used by the Bradford 
studies (Hickson et al 1986). 
A topic is "simply a label attached by those 
involved" (Hickson et al 1986) to describe what was going 
on. It indicates what the decision was about. Most of these 
labels identify and focus attention at a particular point in 
time on longer standing and deeper issues. An issue being a 
"persisting problem or opportunity" (Astley et al 1982). An 
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example would be of a firm's stance towards overseas 
operations which will surface into a topic for decision as 
whether or not to build a plant of x capacity in country y. 
Utilization of such a classifichtion scheme makes it 
possible to compare the disparate published studies of 
decision making and to examine how the pattern of topics, if 
any, has changed over time. This pattern, if it exists, 
should reflect the demands placed on decision makers by 
shifting environmental contingencies at those points in 
time. 
Butler et al (1979) produced a tabulation of the 
historical longitudinal studies published up to that date 
(reproduced as Table 5.2) from which it is possible to 
detect an emerging pattern. In the late 1950's to early 
1960's computer and data processing issues "were 
disproportionately represented" (Butler et al 1979, p. 8) a 
trend which they suggest has continued ever since, due no 
doubt to the novelty of the issue. The main exceptions in 
this early phase of studies can be attributed to a modest 
influx of political science cases which focussed on aspects 
of the Korean crisis (Snyder and Page 1958) and the Cuban 
missile crisis of the Kennedy era in U. S. politics (Allison 
1971). 
From 1976 there was an "explosion (relatively speaking) 
of published data" (Butler et al 1979) which was significant 
partly because of a sudden shift from the study of 
industrial firms and more towards educational 
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organizations, namely universities and colleges, thus 
bringing the public sector into the research domain. 
An even more important shift occurred the same year 
with Mintzberg et al's (1976) study of 25 decision processes 
in Canada. Not only were almost as many decision processes 
recorded as had been published before put together (setting 
aside Witte's 1972 study of only one kind of decision with 
restricted data) but it was the heterogeneity of the sample 
of organizations and decisions that made it the first truly 
comparative study. Table 5.3 compares Mintzberg et al's 
(1976) sample of decisions, those of Hickson et al (1986) 
and Drenth et al's cases and those from this project, using 
the classification scheme developed by Hickson et al (1986). 
This shows the wide coverage of topics achieved by Mintzberg 
et al (1976) who covered decisions in seven of the ten 
categories. By comparison the sample collected by the DIO 
team (Drenth et al 1979) whilst achieving a larger number of 
decisions, is more restricted on topics covered, five out of 
ten. Categorizing the data collected during this project 
using the ten topic classification schema proved to be a 
fairly simple operation given the very full descriptions 
supplied by Hickson et al (1986). 
As can be seen from Table 5.3 the cases collected by 
the Bradford Group display the greatest diversity of 
decision types. However in asking the chief executives of 
participating organizations to nominate decisions to fit 
pre-defined categories, whilst it enabled them to generalize 
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about the scope of the matters covered by decisions, did 
make it difficult for them to say anything about the 
relative weight of each category. This makes it difficult to 
I 
tie the pattern displayed to the impact of macroeconomic or 
other societal forces prevailing during the time period 
spanned by their cases, since categories might have been 
over or under represented. 
However Dutton's (1985) review of their work suggests 
that they were in fact representative of the period (1966 to 
-1978). The Bradford Group's distribution of topics shows 
high numbers for decisions on (1) financial commitments (2) 
investments in new plant and equipment (3) outputs of both 
products and services and (4) organization structure. 
"In their emphasis on defining 
relations with key external economic and 
technical environments then their (the 
Bradford Group's) findings are congruent 
with the strategic management 
literature" (Dutton, 1985, p. 149). 
The sample of decision topics examined in this thesis 
is more random in that no attempt was made to prescribe 
categories of topic to managers . All that was asked was 
that they choose their most recent strategic decision. 
Therefore the sample should reflect the current economic 
climate and a comparison with that of the Bradford Studies 
should reflect any shift in the economic climate, assuming 
the representativeness of their sample. 
Table 5.3 shows that during the period between 1980 
and 1985 when all but two of the present sample of decisions 
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occurred, compared to the mid to late 1970's when the bulk 
of the Bradford Studies cases are concentrated, there were 
more decisions taken on technology (21% as against 15%) and 
more reorganizations such as departmental mergers(20% 
against 15%). There were more decisions in the boundary 
category, decisions such as acquisitions and mergers (18% 
compared to 7%), and marginally more locations, for example 
new premises (7% compared to 5%). The same proportion of 
controls (13%) was experienced. This suggests that in the 
early 1980's there were more decisions to invest in new 
plant and equipment, more internal restructurings to meet 
new circumstances and more mergers. 
The fact that decisions on control, primarily decisions 
concerned with data processing and information system 
issues, occur in the same proportion reflects the importance 
of such issues throughout the entire history of decision 
making studies. Many hypotheses could be advanced to 
account for this, but it may be primarily due to the ever 
changing technological capabilities of both hardware and 
software that cause existing and prospective users to 
carefully re-examine their commitments and requirements at 
each stage of development. 
The U. K. economy of the early 1980's was beginning to 
emerge from a deep recession. Many firms, particularly in 
the traditional sectors of textiles and engineering, had 
failed. Those that survived were able to pick up the pieces 
of the market that were left and develop into new areas with 
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more efficient production methods. The increase in 
investments in new technology and in the acquisition 
decisions reflect this trend. Investments in such things as 
CAD/CAM, software and hardware, fuel saving "kits" and new 
facilities are concrete examples of this. 
Increasing investments in and divestments of subsidiary 
companies indicate that not only have the conglomerates with 
their broadly based portfolios survived the recession in 
good shape but that diversification may be a successful 
business strategy for coping with economic fluctuation, as 
contrary to conventional wisdom, conglomerates' performances 
seem unaffected by cycles of economic activity (Luffman and 
Reed 1984). The recent explosion in the U. K. of such 
activities indicate that the current sample has captured its 
share of these contemporary decisions. 
In the public sector too there were a large number of 
reorganizations taking place. This captures the current 
government's policy of cutting public expenditure in a 
variety of ways. This policy has forced decision makers in 
this sector to "privatise" and in some cases, particularly 
in the area of mental health care, to close services. The 
government have, by restricting local authority spending on 
a variety of projects either by cutting the direct grant or 
by "rate capping", which affects their ability to increase 
the rate precept, exacerbated this trend. 
Some decisions also reflect changed exchange rate and 
control policies as merger and joint venture activity is now 
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reported'as being across, and not solely within, national 
boundaries. Some of the merger and joint venture decisions 
in the sample do involve overseas interests. 
The increase in service decisions and reduction in 
product decisions may reflect a shift away from 
manufacturing to a more service based economy, or it may be 
sample bias. The Bradford Group reported decisions from 
11 manufacturing and 19 service organizations. The current 
sample reports from 22 manufacturers and 34 service 
organizations, a split in the same proportion as the 
Bradford Studies, in percentages, 37: 63 for the Bradford 
Studies, 39: 61 for this study. However the greatest 
proportion of service organizations are in the public sector 
and decisions on reductions and/or modifications to the 
services offered reflect the central government intervention 
also noted by Kenny et al (1985). 
Indeed all decision making studies reflect Ansoff's 
(1979) view that within the last 20 years, for presumably 
all Western economies, an escalation of environmental 
turbulence has occurred. This has resulted in a shift in 
what he calls "the strategic problem. " 
"for the firm it has meant a change 
from a familiar world of marketing and 
production to an unfamiliar world of 
strange technologies, strange 
competitors, new consumer attitudes, new 
dimensions of social control and above 
all a questioning of the firm's 
(organization's) role in society" 
(Ansoff, 1979, p. 35). 
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The trend he outlines is reflected in the decline in 
the number of product and domain or market issues in the 
current sample compared with that found in the Bradford 
Studies and the emphasis on technology and boundary 
decisions. 
The reduction in personnel related issues to zero may 
indicate an organizational response to a munificent labour 
market. Do personnel issues only become strategic in times 
of labour shortage? 
The lack of inputs topics confirms Hickson et al's 
(1986) view that they "do not bulk large as a strategic 
concern". 
Thus the samples of decisions taken for research 
purposes do appear to reflect the strategic concerns of 
organizational decision makers at particular points in time. 
, The evolution of the strategic problem (Ansoff, 1979) 
has brought more issues and threats into the managers' 
world. This reflects a shift from internal to more external 
concerns, at least in private sector organizations. 
In the U. K. public sector increasing government 
control and intervention has apparently further eroded the 
already limited autonomy of decision makers over the nature 
and range of services offered. For example, this is 
reflected in the changing nature of the relationship between 
the department of Education and Science and the University 
Grants Commission on Universities funding and the mix of 
courses offered over the last 4 years or so. 
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5.2 Decision Making Process-Duration 
The distribution statistics of process duration in the 
present sample of decisions display a remarkable consistency 
with those from the Bradford Studies. Hickson et al (1986) 
report from their 150 cases a sample mean of 12.5 months 
standard deviation 10.6, minimum one month, maximum 48 
months. The current sample of 56 cases (2 had missing data 
on duration) has a mean of 12.4 months, standard deviation 
10.9, minimum two months, maximum 48 months. 
This consistency goes some way to establishing a mutual 
validation of the approaches and methods of both the 
Bradford Studies and the research reported on in this 
thesis. Taken together they provide a firm indication of 
how long strategic decisions take in U. K. organizations. 
The process times for the cases in this research are 
plotted with their frequency in Figure 5.1. The cases 
taking less than 12 months account for over half the total 
cases, the bulge around the mean to 18 months accounts for 
another 15 cases, so around 83% of cases take less than 18 
months to make. The smaller peaks at 2,2.1/2,3 and 4 
years, indicate the extent to which processes drag on. 
This pattern matches that found by the Bradford Group, 
when their data is graphed in a similar fashion (see Figure 
3.2). Why is this? Maybe it is because after 9 or 10 
months, executive thinking is in slices of time of 6 months 
and that periodic pushes are made to have outstanding 
decisions brought to a conclusion. "Two years has been long 
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enough to work out this problem - now is the time to act" or 
some similar attitude may account for the peaks. 
In general the results of this study and that of the 
Bradford Group (Hickson et al 1986) suggest that decision 
making is faster than might have been expected at this level 
given the results of other studies. Published cases report 
on decisions that dragged on for very long periods. An 
example would be the decision recorded by Pettigrew (1973) 
on new computing equipment in a British retail firm which 
lasted for seven years from 1961 to 1968. This case gave 
the impression that strategic decisions linger on 
interminably but clearly this is not so. The data from both 
this research and'the Bradford Studies indicate that for 
processes to go beyond two years is exceptional and in no 
case out of over 200 in total did the process persist more 
than four years. 
On the other hand there is a very wide range; from two 
to 48 months. This result again matches that of the 
Bradford Studies and also the 25 cases recorded in Canada by 
Mintzberg et al (1976), which ranged from less than one year 
to greater than four years. 
In Chapter 3, the process differences for a long, a 
medium and a short duration case from the Bradford Studies 
were summarized. What are the decision making processes in 
this new sample like? What happens on the way to making 
decisions which take a short time, an average length of time 
and a long time? 
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Amongst the shortest processes, or fastest decisions, 
which took 2 months, was one in a subsidiary of a large food 
processing and retail group. The subsidiary in which the 
decision making process took place was faced with declining 
profit as a result of an inability to recover cost increases 
through price rises thus threatening the firms economic 
survival. The decision revolved around how to do this. The 
options were whether or not to employ a firm of management 
consultants who had initiated contact with the Managing 
Director at the beginning of April, -1985, indicating that 
they were able to help reduce cost or to develop their own 
solution to the problem .A quick survey of the 
manufacturing units was immediately undertaken by the 
consultants to establish the scope, cost and potential 
savings of the project. Following a presentation by the 
consultants to all internal departments there was some 
disagreement. However the Managing Director made the 
decision to employ the consultants towards the end of May 
1985. 
Table 5.4 summarizes this case and compares it with a 
long and medium term process on some key variables of 
decision making process 
Whilst this short decision was considered to be very 
contentious compared to the other two, in that there were 
disagreements over possible outcomes, the interest units 
involved were unbalanced in terms of the influence they 
exerted. Some were influential and others not, and this is 
reflected in the decision ultimately being made by one 
person, the managing director, whose view on the decision 
finally overrode all dissent. The other two decisions, 
medium and long, rate as quite to very contentious, but in 
these cases the balance of influence increases. This 
suggests that more time is taken through discussion to 
remove or otherwise alleviate dissent. 
Medium term or average duration processes are 
exemplified by one decision made by a large autonomous 
international chemical and engineering conglomerate 
employing 40,000 worldwide. The company had been suffering 
continuing losses from about 1979 onwards with a particular 
division producing a traditional "core" product, in a 
particular market (the United States) but action was 
postponed when the U. S. economy "surged " in 1983. However 
the customer base did not recover as anticipated and the 
problem was steadily worsened by the effect of the 
prevailing US/UK exchange rate. Earlier cost cutting plans 
were dusted off and reconsidered and the possibility of 
selling this division put forward. These alternatives were 
debated for some time. Eventually the final decision was 
made to sell off this division to a competitor. 
This issue as indicated by Table 5.4 was not too 
contentious and the decision was made in a fairly balanced 
medium pressure arena with no external interests involved. 
Some discussion and debate led to the decision being made by 
the group board. 
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A lengthy process in which a health authority took 
four years to make a decision revolved around developing a 
strategy for the long term future of a specialist 
orthopeadic hospital. A project team was set up in March, 
1980 following a visit to the hospital by the regional 
planning team which established, in principle, the 
continuing existence of the hospital. Three years of 
planning proposals being submitted to and rejected by the 
regional health authority, of recasting the balance between 
wards and operating theatres and keeping the hospital open 
or closing it, resulted in an eventual build up of public 
pressure for a clear decision. This was finally made in the 
Spring of 1984. This issue was very contentious, drawing in 
many interested parties and the decision was eventually made 
under a lot of time pressure due to the by now limited life 
of existing facilities. The interests involved had fairly 
equivalent influence so the arena was balanced. All were, 
however, weak. Pressure for a decision was exerted mainly 
by the regional health authority and the local community 
health council, both of whom represented the public voice. 
The issues generated a very great deal of discussion and 
some coordination problems were experienced. This was in 
marked contrast to the short and medium processes which 
display none. The final decision was taken above the 
organization by the regional health authority. 
There is also clear support from theses cases for the 
argument that search costs time. Search depth, as indicated 
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by the scores is least in the shortest case and most in the 
longest (rising from 21 through 37 in the medium to 43 in 
the longest). 
It appears that the searching through alternative 
proposals and varied inputs which occurred in the four year 
long Health Authority decision, was the main reason it took 
so long. 
Of these three cases the decisions in the private 
sector organizations, although ostensibly concerned with 
cost, are really directed towards the long term viabilitli of 
the organizations in terms of profitability. The health 
authority decision, although lacking such explicit criteria, 
is also concerned with the effectiveness of the services 
offered by this particular hospital. When the extent to 
which procedures were used is examined the hospital problem 
looks very novel since it bypassed established routine 
completely whereas in the private sector, cost cutting 
exercises, whatever their outcome, have been extensively 
worked through in past years and ways of handling them have 
evolved. 
All these decisions were contentious to the decision 
makers dealing with them, the short 2 month long consultant 
versus inside solution being highest. The pressure of 
influence was also much the same but the balance of 
influence looks to vary inversely and linearly with 
duration as the more balanced arena is related to longer 
duration. 
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One variable that does appear to vary with duration 
is authorization. The short process was authorized by one 
man and the others by groups, one inside the organization 
(medium duration) and the other outside (long duration). 
This points to the possibility that a concentration of 
authority in the hands of one individual might speed 
process. 
5.4 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter first discussed the content of strategic 
decision making and compared the sample of decision topics 
considered here with those of other studies. 
It was argued that they do reflect contemporary 
decision making in as much as the trend in 'the strategic 
problem' (Ansoff 1979) has shifted over the years between 
the sample used by Hickson et al (1986) and the sample used 
in the research reported here. Environmental threat appears 
to have increased, reflecting a shift from internal to more 
external concerns. There also appears to be a shift in the 
public sector on the one hand to more control of local 
government and education but on the other to a loosening of 
the reins of those enterprises competing in the marketplace 
as evidenced by the denationalization, in varying 
proportions of such organizations as British Telecom and the 
British National Oil Corporation. 
The summary statistics presented for the duration in 
this sample display an almost exact correspondence with 
those reported by Hickson et al (1986). and an examination 
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of decisions of differing durations, similar to that 
undertaken by Hickson et al (1986), which was reviewed in 
Chapter 3 of this thesis indicates that indeed it would 
appear that decisions of different duration may well be made 
in different ways. 
Whilst the full extent of this variation is explored 
with more empirical rigor in succeeding chapters it does 
appear that the linkage of search activity and duration 
supports Hickson et al's conclusions that search does indeed 
costýtime. 
The analysis presented in this chapter also suggests 
that level of authorization may have an impact on process 
duration, but it is the impediments to process that this 
interaction and search present and resolve that prolong 
process and thus increases duration. However further and 
more rigorous analysis is needed. 
TABLE 5.1 
Topics of Decision 
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TOPIC CATEGORY EXAMPLES 
1. Technologies Equipment and/or premises e. g. whether to invest in new 
machinery and buildings, buy'new generation' aircraft, 
close hospital. 
2. Reorganizations Internal re-structure e. g. whether to insert regional level 
between branches and headquarters, merge 
departments, change overseas branches into 
subsidiaries (domestication' in host nations). 
3. Controls Planning, budgeting, and requisite data processing e. g. 
what the 5 year'strategic plan, or annual 'business plan' 
are to be, whether to purchase computer. 
4. Domains Marketing and distribution e. g. whether to bypass 
wholesalers and distribute direct, introduce 'no-charge' 
banking, standardize name for all branches of the 
company. 
5. Services New, expanded, or reduced services e. g. whether to 
launch novel form of interdisciPli nary university degree, 
to increase municipal housing, to decrease European air 
services. 
6. Products New products e. g. whether to launch a new beer, a new 
glass-impregnated cement, or to generate electricity. 
7. Personnels Job assessment, training, unions e. g. whether to make a 
first productivity agreement, to use consultants to 
re-grade all staff, to resist unionization. 
8. Boundaries Purchases of and mergings with other organizations e. g. 
whether to buy subsidiary company, to merge colleges. 
9. Inputs Finance and other supplies e. g. whether to raise funds by 
a share issue, or (local government) by a lottery, or to 
change the sources of supply of components. 
10. Locations Site and sites dispersal e. g. whether to build new plant 
abroad, to move company's principal offices, to reduce 
dispersal (by closing branches). 
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Topic Category British British British-Dutch Canadian 
& Yugoslavian 
Technologies 12 23 70 8 
Reorganizations 11 22 19 
Controls 7 19 17 2 
Domains 4 18 ---- 4 
Services 6 16 5 
18 
Products 2 12 2 
Personnels ---- 12 .... 2 
Boundaries 10 11 ---- 1 
Inputs ---- 9 ---- 
Locations 4 8 ---- 
1 
not classified 
Entries are numbers of cases. The allocation of cases from Drenth et al and Mintzberg 
et al is based on published details and was done by Hickson et al (1986). 
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Figure 5.1. The duration of strategic decision making: 
Process times of 56 decisions 
30 
25 /\ Mean: 12.4 months 
Std. deviation: 10.9 months 20 Range: 2 to 48 months 








Summary of Characteristics of Three Examples of Short 
Medium and Long Duration Decision Processes 
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Very Great Deal 
Some 
Search Depth Score 21 37 43 
Decision Made By One Man Board of Company Outside Agency 
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CHAPTER 6 
Explanations of Process Duration - Process Variables 
and Problem Variables 
Having examined the substantial differences found in 
the duration of process between one decision and another, it 
will be recalled that process time ranges from 2 to 48 
months, with a mean of 12.4, it is now possible to return to 
the central question addressed by this thesis. What is it 
that may explain this variation. 
The first possibility is that decisions are delayed, 
or accelerated, by the activities (or inactivity) generated 
within the decision making process itself. Figure 6.1 
suggests that these may be any of authorization (the final 
action of agreeing to implement), negotiation (the 
bargaining and interaction activity that leads to the final 
outcome), coordination (delays that result from the need to 
get people and resources together), search (collecting the 
information needed to develop solutions to the problem and 
make a choice) and finally gestation,. a pre-activity phase 
when the problem was around but not given managerial 
attention for whatever reason. 
In their turn these activities are hypothesised to 
stem from the characteristics of the problem, summarized 
under two headings. Firstly, the problem will be complex to 
a greater or less degree and secondly there will be a 
political orientation to the problem as various interest 
153 
groups promote or support preferred outcomes to enhance or 
maintain their position in the overarching political 
structure. The two summarising hypotheses developed from 
Chapter 2 state that authorization, negotiation and 
coordination activity stem mainly from the politicality of 
the problem, whereas search activity and gestation are a 
product of both its technical complexity and politicality. 
These hypothesized relations are shown graphically in Figure 
6.1. 
This model suggests that there are relationships 
amongst the variables named. For example, the more 
negotiation taking place the longer will be process time and 
so on. - This assumes that these relationships are linear and 
the use of the analytic techniques such as product moment, 
and partial correlation as well as multiple regression and 
factor analysis, are indicated. Possible non-linearities 
are discussed more fully in subsequent chapters. 
6.1 Process and Duration 
In order to test the initial hypothesis that the more 
process activity a problem generates the longer will be 
duration, the six variables of process were regressed on 
process time, the dependent variable representing duration 
here. The equation which resulted was insignificant and 
accounted for only 11.3% of the variation in process time 
It appears then on the face of it, that a great deal of 
activity, represented by high level authorization, by 
meetings, by lots of interaction and discussion to negotiate 
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and arrive at a solution, together with greater effort to 
coordinate the interests involved and search for the 
necessary information, even when preceeded by a gestation 
period, does not necessarily increase the time taken to 
process a problem to the point of decision. If such a 
simple relationship does not exist between the dependent and 
independent variables can there be a more complex pattern of 
interrelationships? 
To explore this possibility a principal components 
analysis was performed to uncover any possible underlying 
dimensions which could be used to summarize the 
relationships within the group of independent variables. 
The resulting rotated factor matrix is presented in 
Table 6.11. An examination of this reveals that only two 
factors of any substance emerge. Each loads significantly 
on two variables. Factor 1 is loaded heavily and 
significantly on the two search variables, depth and 
breadth. As these two are highly and positively correlated 
(see Table 6.12) r=0.84 p <= 0.001, this is not 
surprising. This factor accounts for a large percentage of 
variance (65%). Factor 2 loads on negotiation and 
coordination. These two variables are also significantly 
correlated (r = 0.25, p <= 0.05) . Factors 3 and 4 seem to 
be mainly comprised of gestation and authorization 
respectively, and factor 5 is merely nominal. The results 
of this analysis suggest that search and 
negotiation/coordination activity are not related. Search 
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activity does not seem to beget negotiation nor vice versa. 
There are four distinct and seperate ingredients to process, 
namely search, negotiation with coordination, gestation, and 
authorization, in that order of importance. 
However using the principal components analysis to 
reduce the number of variables would not have much effect. 
Since the combination of search depth and breadth together 
and negotiation and coordination in a similar fashion allied 
to the use of subsequent factor score coefficients would 
only reduce the number of variables in the analysis by two 
it was therefore decided to proceed with a zero order 
correlation analysis using all the process variables. 
The full correlation matrix of all variables in the 
model is given in Appendix I. The intercorrelations of the 
process variables and duration are given in Table 6.12. 
The clear message emerging from an examination of the 
matrix is that the only significant correlate of process 
time is search activity (r = 0.26 and 0.23) and moreover it 
is only search depth that is the significant part of that 
activity. As both depth and breadth vary closely together (r 
= 0.84, p <= 0.05), this may either be an indication of an 
inbuilt correlation from the coding or an interrelation 
which suggests that the more search is initiated the wider 
the net is cast to draw in and utilize more sources of 
information. 
The correlation matrix also confirms the lack of a 
relationship between negotiation and search activity. 
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Search thus seems to be the key concept in understanding and 
accounting for process duration, confirming both 
conventional wisdom and prior evidence (Hickson et al 1986). 
Negotiation and interaction appear to occur whether or 
not search has been very deep, although they do appear to 
occur rather more when reliance is placed on material 
generated by deliberate initiatives than when information is 
especially generated by internal sources or commissioned 
from external sources. These two component scores of 
search activity correlate with negotiation( r 0.37 and 
0.28, p <= 0.05 respectively). 
Coordination activity does not seem to affect duration 
to any significant extent and can probably be best thought 
of as being an incidental delay to process. 
That differing levels of authorization do not affect 
process time is not surprising given the distribution of 
scores on this measure. Over 70% of the cases score as 
having the decision authorized by the top governing body of 
an organization or above which indicates that strategic 
decisions are most often made at the highest level. That 
there was no variation in the other features of process 
attributable to authorization level was not totally 
unexpected. 
Gestation, the period between the emergence of a 
problem and action being taken towards a decision, appears 
from its significantly negative correlation with search 
depth to serve as a ruminative period of search activity. 
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No action is taking place but a problem is around and 
decision makers are aware of it. A kind of search may be 
occurring via a seepage of ideas and data without conscious 
action being taken. Any effect of gestation time on process 
time is mediated through search. By preparing the ground in 
advance it tends to reduce overt search later, and this 
allows a faster process. 
What can be added to search and gestation to build a 
more comprehensive explanation? Can search, which looks to 
explain duration, be explained in turn? 
6.2 Search Activity -A Dual Explanation by Complexity 
and Politicality- 
This section examines the links between search and the 
variables in the problem complexity and politicality 
groups. The question shifts for the time being from what 
directly causes longer duration to what causes greater 
search, and thereby lengthens duration. 
6.2.1 Problem Complexity 
Beginning with complexity, the variables that are 
assumed to describe and measure it are listed in Figure 6.1 
and their operationalizations detailed in Chapter 4. An 
examination of the intercorrelations between these variables 
(Table 6.21) indicates that there are a number of 
significant relations, particularly those with feedback 
time, confidence in information and all three uncertainty 
measures; information needs, outcomes and level. This once 
again suggested that factor analysis might be an appropriate 
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technique for reducing the number of individual variables 
into two or three underlying dimensions. 
The results of such an analysis are presented in Table 
6.22 which gives the factor loading for each variable for a 
rotated 6 factor solution. As can be seen factor 1 loads 
heavily on both uncertainty of outcomes and overall level of 
uncertainty. Factor 2 loads on these two variables plus 
uncertainty of information needs, but mainly on confidence. 
The next factor, Factor 3, is comprised basically of 
feedback and uncertainty of outcomes. Factor 4 is mainly 
procedures and again overall level of uncertainty. Factor 5 
loads only on information uncertainty as does Factor 6 on 
number of sources. However the presence of overall level of 
uncertainty, and of uncertainty of outcomes in 3 factors and 
uncertainty of information in 2 factors shows that the 
solution is not pure, in that it does not differentiate 
between the variables clearly enough. Therefore, despite 
the attractions of reducing the data to two or three 
dimensions from 7 variables it is plain that this is not 
feasible in this instance. 
Further examination of the correlation coefficients 
given in Table 6.21 does however confirm the hypothesis that 
search activity is related to the complexity of the problem. 
Both components of search activity correlate positively and 
significantly with two measures of uncertainty; uncertainty 
of outcomes and the overall level of uncertainty posed by 
the problem. Such a result is consistent with most 
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established thinking and with empirical evidence on 
organizational decision making from March and Simon (1958) 
through Thompson (1967) to the work of the Bradford Group 
(Hickson et al 1986) in that decision makers faced with 
uncertainty resolve it by search. 
Given this finding, it is therefore surprising that 
search exhibits no significant relationships with either 
uncertainty over what information was needed or with the 
level of confidence in the information that was used. The 
first of these results suggests that search goes ahead or 
not , irrespective of whether or not 
decision makers know 
what information is needed. The second is at first sight 
slightly more puzzling as a negative correlation would have 
been expected, in that less confident decision makers would 
be thought to engage in more search activity. However on 
reflection it is more plausible to suggest that there really 
should be no relationship between these two variables as 
they are to some extent orthogonal. Confidence is inherent 
in the information itself and not in whether search has been 
conducted to gather it. Confidence is placed in what has 
been found. 
Search depth is negatively correlated with the extent 
to which established procedures were used, and this variable 
itself also correlates negatively with the level of 
uncertainty. Thus as uncertainty increases the less 
decision makers are able to use established mechanisms, and 
the less these standard procedures are used the more search 
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is undertaken. This conclusion also corroborates 
expectations as not only do more uncertain questions 
stimulate search, they are also often beyond the scope of 
routine practice. 
The almost zero correlations between number of 
sources, feedback time and the search variables also 
deserves some exploration. Number of sources of a problem 
does not correlate with any of the other complexity 
variables suggesting either that it may not be a 
discriminating measure or that number of sources just does 
not increase the complexity of a problem, and decision 
makers isolate and concentrate on the most important one as 
Cyert and March (1963) would predict. 
The non significant correlation of search with 
feedback time suggests that search is not increased by 
greater anxiety over decisions whose results will not show 
for a long time into the future. Uncertainties far in the 
future cannot be resolved by information collected or 
available today. This conclusion is hardly surprising given 
the rapid change in technological and economic factors which 
face the decision makers of the 1980's (Ansoff, 1979). 
The clear message from the above analysis is that 
search activity, both depth and breadth, varies positively 
and significantly with two measures of uncertainty. These 
are uncertainty of outcomes; how difficult it was for 
decision makers to evaluate possible outcomes, and overall 
level of uncertainty posed by the problem. Very obviously 
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search activity is in part at least a response by decision 
makers to the uncertainties of the problem. 
6.2.2. Politicality 
The group of variables that describe the level of 
politicality surrounding a problem are given in Figure 6.1 
and their operationalizations were given in full in Chapter 
4. 
As with the complexity group, the amount of 
significant correlation between them suggests a principal 
components solution as a possible means of reducing-the 
number of variables. 
However, as with complexity, the results presented in 
Table 6.23 are not clear cut enough, nor do they reduce the 
number of variables enough for them to be of much use in 
further analysis. 
Total interest units for example has a significant 
presence in three factors and a maximum of only two 
variables seem to combine in any one factor. As with the 
complexity relationships discussed in the previous section 
an examination of the results displayed in the correlation 
matrix may prove more interesting. 
Tableý6.24 gives the pearson correlation coefficients 
for the politicality and search group of variables. It 
indicates that four politicality variables vary 
significantly with search depth and of these four, three 
also vary with search breadth. 
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The three which vary with both are time pressure, that 
is the extent to which the duration of decision making is 
constrained; total interest units, a count of all interest 
units in each process, and number of types of interest, an 
indication of different possible stakes in any outcome. 
The positive correlation between time pressure and 
search activity which at first may seem strange may be due 
to time pressures imposing a view that not only a decision 
be made but also be seen to be made and therefore lots of 
supporting evidence gathered by research is presented. 
Furthermore decision makers may be galvanised into an effort 
to collect the maximum information that the limited time 
allows and therefore they may not be selective in their 
search. 
It is difficult not to impute (as with all correlation 
analysis) a causal sequence between the interest unit 
variables and the search variables as the sequence could be 
argued both ways. It is equally plausible to argue that the 
need for search draws in more interest units, as it is to 
suggest that the presence of more interests and interest 
units results in more search being undertaken to back up 
positions vis a vis possible outcomes. This is a problem 
that will be considered further in this section. 
It would also appear from Table 6.24 that, unlike 
search, gestation time does not have a political origin nor 
any relationship to the political forces that attach to a 
problem. It appears that there is no support for the view 
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that long gestation periods lessen the contentiousness of a 
problem when it finally surfaces for decision. 
Procrastination does not necessarily remove differences of 
interest. 
One further relationship which deserves mention is 
that of intervention and search depth (r = 0.30 p<=0.05 
Table 6.24). Intervention measures the amount of the total 
weight of influence brought to bear that is attributable to 
outside interest units which could be a result of increased 
search activity, as those supplying the data gain influence 
within the decision making arena. A high level of external 
involvement and influence has often been thought to be 
responsible for long duration and indeed the percentage of 
outside interest unit influence does have a direct 
relationship with process time itself (r=0.31, p <= 
0.05). 
In general the dual explanation hypothesis that search 
activity is a function of both the complexity and 
politicality of the problem is supported in that search is 
related positively and significantly with the extent to 
which procedures are used and two of the uncertainty 
variables (uncertainty of outcomes and overall level of 
uncertainty)and four three of the politicality ones (time 
pressure and the number and diversity of the interests and 
intervention). The more managers are uncertain as to how to 
evaluate outcomes and the more uncertainty the problem poses 
the less they are able to route it through standard 
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procedures and the more they instigate investigations, 
reports and analyses to solve it. At the same time there 
are more interest units and and more diverse internal 
departments and external units drawn in, and when the 
external interests exert influence they have a significant 
effect on both process and process duration. 
Whilst the effects of complexity and politicality can 
be analytically distinguished in decision arenas the two 
interact to spur search activity, as both lie behind the 
need to aquire and examine information. Political abtivity 
cannot and does not take place in a vacuum. Almost all 
definitions of power emphasise its relational aspects. 
Indeed, to say that A has power is meaningless as A must 
have power in relation to another entity. Why should A 
exercise power? Basically to obtain some desired behaviour. 
Thus power and political activity in decision making is 
focused on gaining a preferred outcome. So just as power 
cannot exist without a relationship, the political activity 
which transmits power in decision making cannot exist 
without the substance of a problem which provides the stage 
on which "the game of decision making" (Hickson et al 1986) 
is played. 
Whilst the bases of power are rooted in the structure 
and interdependencies of organization, political activity 
requires a problem to provide a focus, one that for some 
interests may be fortuitous but for others may result from a 
deliberate raising of the problem. Thus the complexity of a 
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problem and the level of politicality that surrounds it 
should be related. 
An examination of the interrelationships-between 
these two sets of variables (Table 6.25) shows that this is 
indeed the case at least as far as contention is concerned, 
as it correlates significantly with five out of the seven 
complexity variables. Moreover these are the variables 
concerned directly with the uncertainty of the problem, 
outcome evaluation and feedback time, uncertainty of 
information needs, the confidence placed in the information 
gathered, and level of uncertainty posed. 
Thus the more likely the decision was to be contentious 
the greater the level of uncertainty facing decision makers 
the more difficult it was to evaluate possible outcomes, the 
less clear they were on what information was needed to make 
the decision, the less confident they were in it and the 
longer they would have to wait for feedback of results. In 
short, uncertainty and contention are mutually reinforcing. 
Level of uncertainty also correlates with imbalance in 
the pattern of influence. Therefore more uncertainty is 
experienced in an unbalanced arena, one where there is a 
wide difference in the influence exerted by the different 
interest units involved. This result, however, could be due 
more to both of these variables positive association with 
total number of interest units (imbalance and total interest 
units (r = 0.33, p <= 0.05), which raises the question as to 
which relationship is the stronger? 
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One method for answering this is by the use of 
partial correlation analysis in which the effect of one 
variable is held constant and the correlation of the two 
variables is recalculated to give the strength of the 
relationship net of the common influence of the third 
variable. For the variables mentioned above the partial 
correlation coefficient between the level of uncertainty and 
imbalance controlling for total interest units equals 0.17 
indicating that with the effect of total interest units held 
constant there is no significant relationship between the 
two variables. Such analysis is important when variables of 
complexity and politicality correlate not only with 
themselves but also with dependent variables. Similar 
associations which require untangling in a similar fashion 
occur between both the search variables, overall level of 
uncertainty and total interest units; and also for search, 
level of uncertainty and time pressure. The relationships 
between them are diagrammed in Figure 6.2. where the 
coefficients in parentheses are the product moment 
correlations between the variables. The problem is further 
compounded when the effects that intervention has on search 
depth and the relationship with total interest units is 
diagrammed in a similar fashion (see Figure 6.3). If the 
relationship of intervention with level of uncertainty is 
added the entanglement of partial correlations would take a 
good deal of decoding and an if and if and then explanation 
constructed. 
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In this situation where the effects of many variables 
are to be controlled, the most parsimonious technique is 
to build a regression equation for the two search variables 
using the politicality and comlexity variables as 
predictors. The beta weights are then analogous to the 
standardized partial correlation coefficients. For example 
the beta weights of the politicality variable total interest 
units would show its effect on search with all other 
variables held constant. 
The resulting analysis is presented in Table 6.26 The 
equations for complexity and for politicality are shownwith 
both variables of search activity, depth and breadth. The 
equation with search depth is significant, that with search 
breadth is not. 
Examining the significant beta weights in the equation 
for search depth it appears that search is more a result of 
political forces than of the complexity of the problem. 
Time pressure increases the search for information and so 
does influence brought to bear from outside the 
organization. 
Greater diversity among interest units involved has a 
somewhat similar effect indicated by the high value of the 
beta weight in both equations. The apparent anomaly of the 
highest beta weight being insignificant while slightly 
smaller ones achieve significance is due to the relatively 
small number of cases compared to predictor variables. 
Diversity of interests does increase search breadth and 
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depth but only at a marginal level of significance. 
However, whilst the beta is high in magnitude the ratio 
between the standard error of B and B the unstandardized 
coefficient only just approaches and does not exceeed 2, and 
therefore it just misses the 0.05 significance level. 
Thus search activity, a central part of the decision 
making process, appears to be driven by the political forces 
that surround to a problem rather than by the complexity of 
the problem itself. This finding provides empirical 
validation of Pettigrew's (1973) view that decision making 
is primarily a political activity on the platform of a 
problem. 
In any explanation which argues that search activity is 
due to both complexity and politicality, the political 
element should be foremost. 
6.3 Explaining other Ingredients of Process: 
Negotiation, Coordination and Authorization 
In the introductory section to this chapter it was 
hypothesised that whilst search activity was a result of 
both the technical complexity of the problem and its 
politicality, the three other process variables negotiation, 
coordination and authorization were the result of political 
activity alone. Even though none of these variables 
correlate with process time and are therefore no longer a 
central concern of this thesis which focusses on measuring 
and explaining process duration, some attempt should be made 
to test this hypothesis. 
169 
6.3.1. Negotiation with Complexity and Politicality 
Examination of the correlations between negotiation 
activity and both the complexity and politicality groups of 
variables that are given in the first column of Table 6.31 
suggests that the hypothesis stated above is to be rejected 
since negotiation is not related to politicality only. It 
has a number of relationships with the complexity variables 
as well, namely feedback time, uncertainty of information 
needs, uncertainty of outcomes and level of uncertainty, the 
last two being notably strong relationships. 
This suggests that uncertainty overall is handled by 
negotiation. Thus the longer feedback time is, the less 
clearly information needs are known, the more difficult 
outcome evaluation is and the greater the level of 
uncertainty posed the more decision makers will interact and 
negotiate to resolve these difficulties. 
However two of the politicality variables also 
correlate with the level of negotiating activity, these 
being contention and time pressure. The first result is 
fairly straightforward to interpret as it confirms a 
commonsense view of decision making in that contentious 
problems are handled by negotiation amongst the interests 
involved. The second relationship with time pressure 
confirms and adds to the explanation proposed earlier when 
search activity too was found to be related to time 
pressure. So not only do decision makers search more when 
under pressure but there is an increased level of 
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negotiation and interaction amongst them. Thus the commonly 
experienced "under the gun" feeling caused by an approaching 
deadline also occurs in strategic decision making processes 
handled by the most senior and exalted of executives and 
administrators. 
Those interrelationships again provoke the wider 
question of interaction effects amongst the complexity and 
politicality variables encountered in the last section, as 
indeed contention does correlate significantly with all four 
complexity variables identified as having a relationship 
with negotiation. There is also a strong relationship 
between time pressure and level of uncertainty (see Table 
6.25). 
Sidestepping the calculation of partial correlations 
which would control for both contention and time pressure, a 
multiple regression (Table 6.31) in which all independent 
variables are entered, reveals that the most significant 
predictor of level of negotiation is contention. 
This result reinforces the straightforward and common 
sense view, that contention, the degree to which interests 
diverge on an issue, is handled by negotiation. On the other 
hand, the regression analysis makes it clear that 
negotiation is not the means of handling complexity. 
Negotiation is politically motivated. 
6.3.2. Coordination with Complexity and Politicality 
The correlation coefficients of the relationships 
between coordination, politicality and complexity are given 
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in Table 6.32. This indicates that there are there are only 
two variables, both measures of complexity, which relate 
significantly with coordination activity these being 
feedback time; the length of time before feedback of results 
is known, and the uncertainty of outcomes; the degree of 
difficulty experienced in evaluating possible outcomes (both 
r's = . 34, p <= 0.05) these two variables are also 
intercorrelated (r = . 30, p <= 0.05). 
. 
In this case whichever way the partial correlation is 
calculated, by holding one or the other of these-variables 
constant the significant effect of the other disappears and 
therefore the construction of a regression equation would be 
pointless. 
The intuitively plausible hypothesis that the more and 
the more diverse interests involved would require increased 
levels of coordination activity does not hold. Essentially, 
the extent to which coordination is required during a 
decision making process is not explainable by the data 
collected for this project 
6.3.3. Authorization with Complexity and Politicality 
Finally the correlation results of complexity and 
politicality with the level of authorization at which a 
decision is made at the conclusion of the process, suggests 
a rejection of the hypothesis that this level results solely 
from political pressures. In a fashion similar to 
coordination, level of authorization seems to be related 
purely to the complexity of the problem and more 
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specifically to the confidence in the information used to 
make the choice and to the uncertainty of information needs. 
Thus the more confident the decision makers are in the 
information used then the higher the level within an 
organization a topic for decision reaches. Is this due to 
proposals only reaching boards etc. after thorough work 
being done on the available information, or is it that high 
level decision makers have no real choice other than to 
appear to be confident? 
Alternatively this could be an ex-post facto 
rationalization after the decision has been made, given that 
authorization level also varies with uncertainty as to what 
information is needed to make the decision. 
To summarize this section, negotiation varies solely 
with politicality as hypothesised. Analysis of the 
interrelationships between negotiation and the politicality 
and complexity variables displayed some significant 
correlations with both, but when intercorrelation effects 
amongst them were controlled, contention emerged as the best 
predictor. The more divergent the views, the more 
negotiation there is in the process. 
Coordination and authorization conversely have few 
significant interrelationships with either politicality or 
complexity, and those were found to be with the complexity 
group of variables. This raised several questions 
particularly about the meaning of the findings for decision 
making process. Do decision makers procrastinate by 
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temporarily leaving the decision arena when they have 
difficulty evaluating outcomes whose results are a long way 
into the future? Is confidence in information a fact of 
high level participation or is it a rationalization of 
uncertainty as to what information is actually needed? 
6.4 Conclusions 
This chapter began by addressing the central question 
posed by this thesis, what explains the large differences 
found in the duration of decision processes. Figure 6.4 
summarizes the major results. 
Firstly, the possibility that decisions are delayed by 
the activities that decision makers undertake to resolve the 
technical complexities of and the political activities that 
surround an issue for decision. 
of these search activity, particularly the depth of 
search decision makers undertake, was found to correlate 
significantly and positively with process duration. 
Duration was not related to amount of negotiation, 
level of authorization or coordination problems. Search 
depth rather than breadth, how much effort goes into getting 
information rather than how wide decision makers cast the 
net, was the only measure of process that actually 
associated firmly with duration. 
If searching results in increased duration what 
motivates this time consuming activity? 
Process activity in general was hypothesized to stem 
from the two characteristics of the problem referred to 
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above. These two summarizing hypotheses grouped variables 
that were expected to have a dual effect on process activity 
in that both groups together and not separately shape 
process. 
Although there was some initial evidence to support 
this proposition, when the interrelationships among the 
complexity and politicality variables were examined, the 
important relationships were thrown into sharper focus. 
As search was the only correlate of duration, attention 
was directed toward possible explanations of that activity. 
Firstly, taking the problem complexity variables, 
search was found to correlate significantly with two 
measures of uncertainty, how difficult it was for decision 
makers to evaluate possible outcomes and the overall level 
of uncertainty'posed by the problem. Such a result is 
consistent with established thinking and with research 
evidence on decision making processes in that to reduce 
uncertainty decision makers are assumed to actively search 
for information. 
That search was not signficantly related to the other 
two dimensions of uncertainty, those measuring the 
uncertainty of what information is needed to make a decision 
and the degree of confidence inherent in the information, 
suggests that search may have another motivation since it 
goes ahead whether or not decision makers know what they 
need. It lowers anxiety. 
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The other motivation for search activity was 
hypothesized to stem from the politicality of the problem as 
those who represent interests search for information to 
support their stance vis a vis possible outcomes. 
Four politicality variables correlated signficiantly 
with search depth. Three of them were time pressure, the 
extent to which decision making duration is constrained, 
total interest units, a count of all interest units involved 
in the process, and thirdly the number of types of 
interests. 
Thus, the more time pressure is applied, the more 
search is undertaken, which leads to the intriguing thought 
that if deadlines are put on decision makers the deeper they 
search and the longer the process actually takes. 
When this result is taken'together with that on the 
fourth politicality variable associated with search, 
intervention: the extent to which process is influenced by 
external interests, then it appears that not only does the 
decision have to be made, but the process has to be visible 
to influential outsiders. Search is undertaken to satisfy 
this requirement. 
It thus appears that the dual explanation of process 
holds in general for search activity, since it is due to 
both complexity and politicality. However, when the 
interrelationships of both complexity and politicality 
variables were controlled for, what emerged was the clear 
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message that search is motivated more by political forces 
than by uncertain problems. 
As far as the other variables of process were 
concerned, level of contention: the degree to which 
interests diverge on an issue, surfaced as the best possible 
predictor of amount of negotiation. Coordination activity 
was found to be a correlate of the complexity variables, 
feedback time and uncertainty of evaluating possible 
outcomes. It is possible that decision makers facing 
difficulties in evaluating outcomes which will occur far in 
the future are not eager to get together and arrive at a 
solution. 
Finally, the level of authorization a problem reaches 
before action can be implemented, seems to be related to the 
confidence in the information used, and the uncertainty of 
what information is needed to make the decision. 
Two nonsignificant results deserve some comment. 
Firstly, the mumber of strands or sources there are to a 
problem does not seem to add much to the overall level of 
complexity facing decision makers. Do decision makers as 
Lindblom (1959) and Cyert and March (1963) suggest actually 
succeed in breaking down large multi-component problems into 
smaller and more manageable issues? Or could it be that one 
or possibly two sources are perceived to override all 
others? 
The second non significant result concerned the 
politicality variable, closure, which displayed no 
177 
significant relationship with any other variable whatsoever. 
The descriptive statistics reported in Appendix F, ( a mean 
of 2.7 a sd of 1.3 and a range right across the scale) seem 
to suggest a fairly normal distribution and forces the 
conclusion that no matter to what extent outcomes are 
precluded decision makers still go through the moves in the 
process, at least for those options left open to choice. 
Overall it would appear that whilst the dual 
explanation of process by both complexity and politicality 
does hold, within it there are differential effects on 
different aspects of process. 
Complexity of the problem is related mainly to the 
level of authoriazation a decision reaches and the 
coordination problems posed. 
Most importantly search activity, the best predictor 
of process duration, looks to be undertaken primarily in 
response to political forces. Negotiation is similarly 
motivated in that it arises when contention between 
interests is involved. 
In other words , the main reason why strategic 
decisions take such a long time is that information is being 
sought and collated, and the main reason for quicker 
processes appears to be that information is either readily 
available or is simply not collected . The search for 
information is on the whole more politically spurred than it 
is an attempt to deal with uncertainty, though it is always 
to some degree a response to both. 
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This analysis focuses on the characteristics of the 
decision. Mention has yet to be made of the organizations 
in which decision making takes place. The next chapter 
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Orthogonally Rotated Factor Loadings of Dec ision Process (Delaying) Variables 
FACTORS 
VARIABI E 1 2 3 4 5 
Authorliation . 078 -. 018 . 037 . 377 -. 007 
Negotiation . 136 . 533 . 076 -. 198 . 142 
Coordination . 059 . 516 -. 060 . 081 -. 074 
Search Depth . 875 . 207 -. 389 . 063 . 165 
Breadth . 908 . 126 -. 052 . 196 -. 089 
Gestation -. 120 . 001 . 525 . 052 . 005 
Eigen Value 
% of Variance 
Cumulative 
% of Variance 
1.935 . 524 . 330 . 152 . 038 
65 17.6 11.1 5.1 1.3 
65 82.5 93.6 98.7 100 
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TABLE 6.12 
Interrelationships Among Process (Delaying) Variables, 
and Dependent Variable 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Authorization (1) -. 07 . 02 . 07 . 14 . 03 . 11 
Negotiation (2) . 25* . 21 . 14 . 02 . 12 
Coordination (3) . 
17 
. 
15 -. 04 . 15 
Search Depth (4) . 
84* -. 31 . 26* 
Breadth (5) -. 13 . 23 
Gestation (6) . 
07 
Process Time (7) 1.00 




Zero Order Product Moment Correlations Between 











: Info. Needs (5) 
: Outcomes (6) 
: Level (7) 
-. 24 -. 06 . 02 . 07 -. 13 . 37* . 38* 
-. 21 -. 03 . 09 . 06 -. 11 . 35 . 34* 
. 27* -. 03 . 08 -. 
17 . 23 -. 10 -. 01 
-. 16 . 04 -. 07 . 14 . 03 -. 24* 
. 18 -. 03 . 03 . 16 . 22 
-. 27* . 01 . 30* . 20 
. 29* . 10 -. 21 







Orthogonally Rotated Factor Loadings of Complexity Variables 
Vadable 1 
Procedures -. 058 -. 051 
Number of Sources . 115 -. 016 
Feedback . 161 -. 185 
Confidence . 017 . 771 
Uncertainty: Infor. Needs -. 234 . 278 
Outcomes . 833 . 244 
Level . 811 -. 274 
. 047 . 
562 . 099 -. 154 
. 140 -. 168 . 
058 . 444 
. 639 . 056 . 055 . 
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-. 204 -. 081 . 202 -. 029 
. 070 . 180 . 
557 . 099 
. 312 . 
079 -. 143 . 105 
. 020 -. 
287 -. 167 . 191 
Eigen Value 1.882 . 911 . 674 . 
424 . 131 . 046 
% Variance 46.3 22.4 16.6 10.4 3.2 1.1 
Cumulative % 46.3 68.7 85.2 95.6 98.9 100 
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TABLE 6.23 
Orthogonally Rotated Factor Loadings of Politicality Variables 
FACTOR 
VARIABLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Contention -. 021 . 307 . 495 . 427 . 258 -. 069 . 238 
Pressure -. 195 -. 881 . 073 -. 023 -. 019 . 048 -. 021 
Imbalance . 182 . 584 . 292 . 038 -. 188 . 397 -. 017 
Closure . 048 -. 021 -. 002 . 037 . 398 -. 016 . 005 
Time Pressure . 098 -. 026 . 791 . 021 -. 041 . 053 -. 027 
Total Int. Units . 823 . 329 . 211 . 280 . 087 -. 178 -. 154 
Diversity . 844 . 101 . 012 . 047 . 076 . 138 . 070 
Intervention . 116 -. 001 . 029 . 593 . 041 . 009 -. 008 
Eigen Value 2.364 . 919 . 814 . 523 . 226 . 137 . 042 
% Variance 47 18.3 16.2 10.4 4.5 2.7 .8 
Cumulative % 47 65.3 81.5 91.9 96.4 99.2 100 
k 
TABLE 6.24 
Zero Order Correlation Coefficients: Search, 




345 6 7 8 
Search Depth . 07 . 05 . 07 . 10 . 
37* . 26* . 36* . 30* 
Breadth . 07 -. 01 . 11 . 04 . 
36* . 34* . 42* . 14 
Gestation . 12 -. 19 -. 01 . 
11 . 03 . 12 -. 04 -. 09 
Politicality 
Contention (1) -. 25* -. 26* . 11 . 37* . 31 . 07 . 27* 
Pressure (2) -. 51 -. 01 . 07 -. 45* -. 24 -. 03 
Imbalance (3) -. 08 . 26* . 33* . 26* . 05 
Closure (4) -. 01 . 08 . 07 . 04 
Time Pressure (5) . 24 . 09 . 04 
Total Interest (6) . 72* . 27* 
Diversity Units (7) . 13 
Intervention (8) 1.00 





Zero Order Correlation Coefficients Complexity 
and Politicality 
COMPLEXITY 
12345 6 7 
Contention -. 12 . 07 . 26* -. 29* -. 30* . 31 . 55* 
Pressure . 04 -. 11 . 04 . 11 . 09 -. 08 -. 22 
Imbalance -. 10 . 08 . 03 -. 12 -. 26* . 16 . 28* 
Closure . 17 . 08 -. 09 -. 01 -. 03 . 13 . 17 
Time Pressure -. 15 . 01 . 25* . 01 -. 14 . 19 . 26* 
Total Interest Units -. 05 -. 36* . 16 -. 02 -. 14 . 15 . 41* 
Diversity -. 01 . 12 . 01 -. 15 -. 28* . 11 . 23 
Intervention -. 09 . 16 . 17 -. 17 -. 05 . 11 . 22 
1 3 5 7 
Procedures Feedback Information Level 
2 4 6 
Number of Co nfidence O utcomes 
Sources 




Interrelations Between Complexity, Politicality and Search 












INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN INTERVENTION, TOTAL 




Level of Uncertainty 
Total Interest Units 
(. 26) 
TABLE 6.26 
Regression Equations of Both Complexity 





Procedures -. 16 -. 18 
Sources -. 21 -. 24 
Feedback -. 18 -. 08 
Confidence -. 04 -. 06 
Uncertain Info. Needs . 09 . 10 
Outcomes . 26 -. 08 
Level . 28 . 21 
Politicality 
Contention -. 29 -. 25 
Pressure . 02 . 05 
Imbalance -. 18 -. 14 
Time Pressure . 38* . 32 
Total Interest Units -. 09 . 12 
Diversity . 42 . 40 
Intervention . 35* . 12 
R2 . 54 . 47 Adjusted R2 . 33 . 23 
F 2.54 1.91 
Significance . 016 NS 
189 
* p: 5 0.05 
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TABLE 6.31 
Relationships of Negotiation with 








Procedures -. 01 . 10 
Sources -. 06 -. 09 
Feedback . 27* . 21 
Confidence -. 02 . 22 
Uncertainty of Info. -. 32* -. 13 
Outcomes . 46* . 
13 
Level . 52* . 03 
Politicality 
Contention . 64* . 
61* 
Pressure -. 06 . 09 
Imbalance . 20 -. 10 
Time Pressure . 43* . 
11 
Total Interest Units . 24 -. 
15 
Diversity . 17 . 
29 
Intervention . 03 -. 13 
R2 . 53 
F 2.25 
Significance 0.033 
* p: 5 0.05 
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TABLE 6.32 
Relationships of Coordination 







Procedures -. 06 
Sources . 01 
Feedback . 34* 
Confidence . 07 
Uncertainty of Information -. 09 
Outcomes . 34* 
Level . 17 
Politicality 
Contention . 04 
Pressure -. 15 
Imbalance . 18 
Time Pressure . 12 
Total Interest Units . 18 
Diversity . 12 





Relationships of Authorization 


















Total Interest Units 
Diversity 
Intervention 
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Explanations of Process Duration - Organization level 
variables 
In the model for explaining variation in process 
duration developed in Chapter 2, the effects of organization 
were hypothesized to impact on the decision making process 
through both the complexity and politicality of the problem. 
So, for example, the level of centralization of 
decision making is likely to be affected by the extent to 
which one organization is dependent on another. One 
manifestation of this occurs when an organization is owned 
by another. In this case there may well be a tendency for 
the holding group to examine and ratify the decisions made 
or recommended by the decision makers in the subsidiary. 
The probability of delays is further increased in such 
situations by decision makers having to follow dictated 
procedures or is reduced when time constraints are laid down 
by headquarters. This would appear to be particularly true 
of decision making in public sector organizations where the 
dependence relationship appears to be stronger, due to 
funding arrangements, and where the intervention of the 
relevant government department is more direct. 
Increasing size of organization may impact on the 
number of interests and interest units and on contention 
mainly through the structural dimension of specialization. 
Size as well as increasing internal differentiation, i. e. 
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specialization, also has effects on the level of 
centralization as direct personal control is hardly a 
realistic strategy given increasing size. A system of 
impersonal procedures and administration is more likely 
because it is invariably more effective. 
organizations operating in highly uncertain and 
threatening environments are likely to have this uncertainty 
transmitted in the complexity of problems to be solved by 
the decision makers. They are also likely to specialize 
their monitoring activities which adds to the difficulties 
of coordinating the process. 
This chapter will explore possible direct organization 
level effects on process and indirect effects of the 
complexity and politicality of the problem. It will 
therefore extend the model and results presented earlier. 
More specifically it will examine the relationships of 
variables of organizational context, ownership, size and 
environment, firstly between themselves and secondly with 
process and finally with complexity and politicality. These 
three groups of organizational level variables include the 
major aspects of contingency theories of organizational 
structure (Child 1972), that were hypothesized (in Chapter 
2) to vary both the level of complexity facing decision 
makers and the political structure within which decision 
making takes place. 
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Level of complexity was said to vary with degree of 
environmental threat while the political structure is shaped 
mainly by ownership and size. 
7.1 Organizational Features 
Before embarking on an examination of the associations 
of organization level variables with decision making process 
it is useful to consider the results of the zero order 
intercorrelations amongst organizational level variables 
presented in Table 7.1. Whilst there are not many 
significant relationships between them thus limiting any 
opportunities for data reduction, those that there are 
deserve some comment. 
First is. the strong positive association of 
organization size to group size, the number of employees in 
any owning group. This is of a much greater magnitude (r 
0.64) than for the original Aston Studies (Pugh & Hickson, 
1976, p. 81) who report a product moment correlation of 0.43 
(n = 46, p <= 0.05) a difference which might indicate that 
in the intervening ten or so years large organizations have 
become parts of larger groups. This shift is also reflected 
in the variable relative size (not included in the table), 
one component of the measure of dependence used by the Aston 
Group. The mean for this variable has shifted from 37.4% 
for Aston to 67% in the Bradford Studies up to 72% in the 
current study showing that larger organizations have become 
even larger proportionate parts of larger groups. This may 
of course be a reflection of the sample characteristics (see 
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Chapter 4). Whereas the Aston group's sample was random, 
stratified by size and product or purpose, both the 
Bradford Studies and this one attempted to maximize 
variation on autonomy of ownership. As a result it would 
appear that any correlations with a variable of dependence 
or relative size would be distorted by such a heavily skewed 
distribution of scores as it reflects more the autonomous 
subsidiary split. It would therefore appear to be more 
useful to treat this variable as a dichotomous measure of 
ownership. This being so its effects will be explored in a 
later section. 
The other two significant relationships, those between 
difficulty in dealing with variations in the quality of 
critical inputs and market competitiveness(r = 0.25), and 
quality and quantity of input variations(r = 0.41), indicate 
that market threat is not restricted to output markets but 
also impinges on inputs. On the other hand, product 
variation does not appear to have much impact on degree of 
environmental threat or on any other organizational level 
variable. 
As the degree to which a firm dominates or leads a 
market increases, environmental threat should reduce, and 
thus the negative but insignificant correlation between 
market position and competitiveness is disappointing. It 
may be more a reflection of response weighting as 63% of 
organizations responding identified themselves as either 
leading the market or being a strong presence within it. 
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7.2 Ownership and Decision Making 
This section begins to address the main topic of this 
chapter, namely the impact of organizational level variables 
on decision making. 
In Chapter 2, ownership was hypothesized to play a 
significant role in accounting for differences in decision 
making processes and therefore duration. Ownership has, in 
this study, been constructed around two basic ideas. Firstly 
whether the organization is autonomous or a subsidiary of a 
larger entity. Secondly whether or not it is an agent of or- 
is "owned" by the state, for example health authorities, 
universities and polytechnics, crown corporations and energy 
utilities (for a full breakdown of the sample see Appendix 
A). Both these distinctions were hypothesized to have 
effects via level of centralization and formalization on the 
politicality and complexity of the problem. 
The examination of the effects of these two 
dichotomous variables followed two forms. Firstly whether 
either had any effect when introduced as dummy variables in 
the regression equations given in Chapter 6 (Tables 6.26 and 
6.31). When this was tried neither was found to have any 
significant impact on the process variables, either 
separately or together, nor did the significance of the 
predictor variables used and explained in Chapter 6 alter. 
However when the mean scores were examined for publicly 
and privately owned and autonomous versus subsidiary other 
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pictures emerged. These are dealt with in the next two 
sections. 
7.2.1 Public/Private Differences 
Perhaps the most significant result is for process 
duration between the public and private sectors. Decision 
making processes in the public sector take on average 15.9 
months compared with 9.8 months for those in the private 
sector. 
This result goes some way towards confirming the 
stereotypical view of public sector organizations whose 
actions are said to be slowed by bureaucratic red tape and 
inefficient systems, despite evidence from the Bradford 
studies data set which had suggested the contrary. Kenny et 
al (1985) found that there was no real basis for the view 
that public sector decision makers have to deal with 
multiple interests and many levels of regulation . 
It seems odd that whilst the Bradford studies 
distribution of scores for the total sample of decisions 
mirrors almost exactly that for the sample collected for 
this thesis there is no matching public/private finding. 
Why should this be? - 
It may be that the fundamental change in decision 
making autonomy referred to in Chapter 5 for organizations 
in the public sector means that less funding requires more 
scrutiny of decisions by higher levels and more careful 
consideration by more interests. This would lengthen 
process duration. 
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Perhaps it is because the Bradford studies sample of 
public sector organizations included some that were subject 
to the influences from both their market environment and 
from direct government intervention. This should however 
lengthen process duration, as potentially more interests are 
capable of being drawn into the arena. There is, however, 
no evidence to suggest this even though Hickson et al (1986) 
find that decision making in the private sector is less 
impeded and disrupted than in the public sector 
organizations (p. 205). - 
Hickson et al (1986) suggest that although organization 
sets the background in terms of the underlying political 
structure and uncertainties faced, it is "the matter for 
decision (that) matters most. " These matters were given a 
topic "label" by the managers involved and these labels were 
subsequently-coded into 10 topic types. The decisions in 
this sample were similarly coded and the pattern of results 
was discussed in Chapter 5. Table 7.2 presents a breakdown 
of decision topic by ownership sector and process duration. 
This shows that with very few exceptions, decision 
making on each topic reflects the degree of differences in 
process duration between the two sub-samples reported 
earlier, in that where decisions have been made on the same 
matters the public sector takes just about twice as long as 
the private sector. 
There are no "product decisions" in the public sector 
to compare with the private sectors mean of 16.25 months. 
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No public manufacturing organizations responded to the 
questionnaire, which is not surprising given that the 
population is small and dwindling. Thus there are no 
responses in that category. There are also no boundary 
decisions in the public sector organizations in the sample. 
Perhaps the amalgamations and service reorganizations of the 
mid-seventies were a unique occurence. The current 
government's stategy appears to lean more toward disposal 
than amalgamation. 
The large magnitude of difference between plant and 
equipment decisions in Table 7.2 suggests that the use of 
procedures and the public accountability of public sector 
organizations may be affecting duration. Another notable 
exception is those decisions that involve reorganization 
issues where the mean for the private sector is marginally 
higher than for the public sector. Perhaps as these are 
similarly complex issues with far reaching effects in both 
sectors (Mallory and Cray 1982), but generally not 
requiring much financial commitment, they take a similar 
length of time. Thus, whilst the Hickson et al (1986) 
conclusion that the matter for decision matters most may be 
valid for parts of process it does not appear to hold for 
process duration which is substantially lengthened by public 
ownership whatever the matter under consideration. 
Analysis of complexity and politicality variable scores 
for both sectors indicates that only two differ 
significantly. Firstly feedback time of results (mean 
202 
public = 30.5 months, mean of private = 15.5 months) is 
much longer in public organizations. On average, it takes 
twice as long for public sector decision makers in such 
organizations as hospitals, local authorities and 
educational institutions to begin to see the results of 
their decisions as it does for decision makers in the 
private sector. This may be a reflection of the 
competitiveness of the environment already discussed, which 
is supported by the differences between the two means on 
that variable (mean public = 2.4; mean private = 4.4). 
The second result is concerned with the total number 
of interest units involved in decisions in the public sector 
decision arena; on average 8.8 interest units are involved 
compared with the private sector which has an average of 6.9 
interest units. The absolute difference of almost two 
suggests that arenas in the public sector are one third 
bigger than private. More interests are likely to be 
involved in any given decision. This difference is solely 
in internal interest units, not in the numbers of externals 
involved. So here is an indication that arenas in the 
public sector are more crowded than Kenny et al (1985) 
suggest, but with internal interests rather than with 
outsiders. 
7.2.2 Autonomous or Subsidiary 
There is no relationship between autonomous and 
subsidiary and process duration either directly or across 
topic as with the public/private dichotomy presented above. 
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Even when this dichotomy is applied to process 
complexity and politicality variables few significant 
differences emerge. Most notably it does not have any 
effect at all on the politicality variables of interest 
units and balance of influence. It was pointed out earlier 
that published research suggests that subsidiaries should 
exhibit a more highly centralized decision making process 
than an autonomous organization. This is not borne out by 
this data. This variable should, via centrality, at least 
have an impact on the politicality variables. The only real 
effect, however, is on uncertainty of information needs, a 
measure of complexity. It is clearer in autonomous 
organizations what information is required to make a 
decision. Subsidiaries in contrast may be uncertain about 
what to do to satisfy head office requirements reflecting a 
psychological if not physical remoteness. 
7.3 Organization Size and Decision Making 
Neither measure of organization size, the logarithm of 
number of full time and full time equivalent employees, nor 
the logarithm of number of employees in the total group, 
displayed any significant association with the process 
variables used in previous analyses (see Table 7.3). 
Contrary to what might be supposed, decision making, at 
least at the strategic level displays similar process 
characteristics in both large and small organizations. 
Decisions in bigger organizations do not take longer. This 
gives support to the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 that 
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the effects of organizational size are mediated first 
through structuring and then through the complexity of the 
problem and the political activity that attaches to it. 
Turning to some of these variables, Table 7.3 (bottom 
left) shows several significant relationships between size 
and complexity. It appears that in large organizations, 
including those in large groups, decisions are taken with 
expected feedback only appearing a fair way into the future 
(r = 0.29 and 0.35 respectively). This suggests that large 
scale organizations have resources available to be able to 
commit them for long periods without seeing results. They 
can take bigger longer term risks. The correlation between 
net assets and logarithm of number of employees reported by 
Pugh and Hickson (1976) of r=0.78 lends support to such a 
proposition. It may also mean that large organizations 
change more slowly and so decision makers would expect to 
see the results later than their counterparts in smaller 
organizations. 
Increasing group size also varies significantly but 
negatively with confidence in the information used to make 
the decision. This may be due to decision makers in large 
groups being more remote from the sources of information 
than are their counterparts in smaller organizations. 
Turning to the correlations with the politicality group 
of variables (Table 7.3, bottom right) decision making in 
larger organizations, as expected, does involve more diverse 
interests (r = 0.26) and perhaps in consequence is more 
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contentious (r = 0.21 and 0.35, only the second, however, is 
significant). This is encouraging in that larger 
organizations were hypothesized to have a greater number of 
interests whose positions would become more solidified thus 
increasing contention and requiring more negotiation to 
resolve or remove it. 
7.4 Environment and Decision Making 
As with the variables of organizational size discussed 
in the previous section, the variables measuring perceived 
environmental threat do not display any direct association 
with either process or process duration measures (Table 
7.4). Intense competition might be thought to spur search 
as decision makers strove to keep their organizations ahead 
of or at least up with the pace, but there is no obvious 
sign of this. Perhaps in these organizations search is 
more a general intelligence gathering activity that proceeds 
independently of, but feeds into, the decision making 
process when problems are considered. 
However it would appear that the more competitive the 
environment the less is feedback time for results (r =- 
0.35). Decision makers in competitive environments do not 
commit resources very far into the future and need to know 
quite quickly whether or not decisions were right or wrong. 
This reinforces the correlations of feedback time with 
organization size discussed in the previous section since, 
in contrast to organizations in competitive situations, 
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large organizations in stable environments do commit 
resources further into the future. 
The modest but significant correlation of level of 
uncertainty with environment as represented by output or 
product variation(r = 0.25 second section table 7.4) is as 
expected since it suggests that the more products are 
specifically manufactured and designed to customer 
requirements the greater is the level of uncertainties 
faced. 
The one measure of environmental threat to have a 
really substantial impact on the politicality variables 
(shown at the foot of table 7.4) is input quantity; the 
degree to which it is difficult to deal with variations in 
input quantities. It correlates positively with pressure of 
influence (r = 0.31) and negatively with imbalance and total 
interest units (r = 0.31 and -0.27). This suggests that 
under threat decisions are shared by a relatively small 
number of powerful interests who are fairly equal in the 
amount of influence they exert. 
7.5 Conclusions 
The most significant and interesting finding presented 
in this chapter is that decision making in public sector 
organizations takes almost twice as long as it does in the 
private sector. This was found to be true across almost all 
the topics for decision, the only exceptions being 
reorganization issues which were almost identical in 
duration. 
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Further examination of the effect of public and private 
ownership suggested that decisions in the public sector took 
longer as there were more interest units involved, and that 
decisions were being taken with a longer time horizon. The 
greater time taken may also be due to public sector decision 
makers being more accountable and having to refer decisions 
through set procedures. 
Decisions with a long time horizon are also a feature 
of large organizations. Whilst decision makers in them do 
not take any longer than those in smaller ones, they do seem 
to have more slack as resources can be committed further 
into the future, there is evidence from the lower confidence 
they place in information that their decisions are therefore 
more risky. 
Decisions in large organizations involve more diverse 
rather than more interest units and this leads , not 
surprisingly, to an increase in the level of contention. 
other organization level variables particularly that 
measuring the other dimension of ownership used, autonomous 
versus subsidiary, and environment have little impact on 
process and the effects they do have are overshadowed by the 
public/private sector difference. 
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TABLE 7.1 
Intercorrelations of Organizational Variables 
















Market Position (4) 
Product Variation (5) 
Input Variation Quality (6) 
Quantity 
* p: 5.05 
-. 06 . 04 . 25* -. 06 
. 03 -. 17 -. 17 
. 16 -. 09 
. 41 * 
n= 56 
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TABLE 7.3 
Zero Order Correlations of Organizational 
and Group Sizel with Process and Complexity 
and Politically Variables 
Organization Group 
Process Variables Size Size 
Authorization 0 -. 17 
Negotiation . 05 . 18 
Coordination . 17 . 12 
Search Depth . 08 . 16 
Breadth . 09 . 11 
Gestation -. 01 -. 07 











Procedures -. 21 -. 20 Contention . 21 . 35* 
Number of Sources . 01 -. 05 Pressure -. 05 . 09 
Feedback . 29* . 35* Imbalance . 03 -. 07 
Confidence -. 16 -. 42* Closure . 14 . 09 
Uncertainty of 
Information Needed -. 03 -. 24 Time Pressure . 06 . 19 
Outcomes . 02 . 10 Total Interest Units . 08 . 06 
Level . 08 . 21 Diversity . 26* . 021 
Intervention -. 05 -. 17 
*p5 . 05 
n 56 
Logarithm of Number of Employees 
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TABLE 7.4 
Zero Order Correlations Between Environment and 
Complexity and Politicality Variables 
Environmental Threat 
Process Variables 1234 
Authorization -. 02 -. 10 0 . 12 -. 02 Negotiation . 01 . 14 . 21 -. 16 -. 13 Coordination -. 03 . 07 . 03 . 19 -. 10 Search Depth 0 . 06 . 14 . 01 -. 11 Breadth . 07 . 04 . 01 . 06 -. 10 Gestation . 14 . 23 . 01 . 16 -. 03 ProcessTime -. 10 -. 12 . 07 . 05 -. 07 
Complexity 1 2 3 4 5 
Procedures . 14 . 13 -. 11 -. 18 . 09 Number of Sources -. 13 -. 07 . 15 . 20 -. 09 Feedback -. 35* . 13 . 04 -. 06 . 06 Confidence -. 16 -. 06 -. 06 -. 11 . 04 Uncertainty of 
Information Needs -. 09 -. 05 -. 04 . 03 . 08 Outcomes -. 05 . 12 -. 08 . 06 -. 04 Level . 08 -. 08 . 25* . 16 -. 07 
Politicality 1 2 3 4 5 
Contention . 03 -. 12 . 04 -. 01 -. 07 Pressure . 04 . 04 -. 01 . 10 . 34* Imbalance -. 01 -. 16 . 21 . 16 -. 31 Closure 
. 08 . 14 -. 23 . 14 . 08 Time Pressure . 14 . 12 . 18 . 03 -. 03 Total Interest Units -. 04 . 02 . 12 . 05 -. 27* Diversity 
. 12 . 05 -. 03 . 01 -. 14 Intervention . 11 . 09 -. 01 -. 10 . 06 
Environment Threat 
(1) Competition 
(2) Market Position 
(3) Product Variation 
(4) Input Quality Variation 
(5) Input Quantity Variation 




Process Duration and Organizational Time 
In the agenda for research outlined in the introductory 
chapter the nature of time reckoning systems was discussed. 
Time reckoning systems can be based on the chronological 
measurement of elapsed time, as it has been treated thus far 
in this thesis, or they may be embodied in a pattern or 
stream of events which are given a temporal interpretation 
by participants. Using this idea, time reckoning systems 
may be hypothesized to differ between organizations, and 
indeed within them, as individual units construct meanings 
and durations around events. 
This pattern of events may be represented in a 
seasonal cycle, similar to those reported by Clark (1982) in 
the sugar beet and fashion industries. This organizational 
time may be a product of industry technology or environment 
and Clark (1982) in setting out the research agenda for this 
topic stated that we should be 
11 seeking to unveil the hidden, 
silent, sedimented way in which taken 
f or granted concepts of time provide a 
frame which encloses thought. " (p. 48) 
The role and significance of such time reckoning 
systems has been neglected at the strategic level and this 
chapter seeks to turn away from measurements based solely on 
a chronological system to one that embodies the perceptions 
I 
of decision makers as to what is fast and what is slow and 
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to examine the reasons why some decisions are thought to be 
faster than others. 
8.1 Measurement of Perceived Pace 
A variety of ideas were developed by the present 
author and examined in order to measure this concept. 
Questions that ranged from "how long is a long time in this 
organization? " through ideas such as "if someone around here 
said that something will take a long time to accomplish what 
would be your expectation of the length in months of that 
period? " The final choice (question 19, Appendix Dy was 
how did the time taken by this decision compare with the 
usual length of time taken by similar decisions? ". 
Respondents were asked to reply on a fixed five point scale 
from much longer (score 5) to much less time(score 1). This 
recognizes Clark's (1982) idea that perceived time is 
captured in events; that there is a duration attached to the 
stream of events, in this case duration of process. In a 
sequence of events there should thus be a perception of 
process duration which is not simply expressed using the 
chronological code and this should provide an indication 
of organizational time. 
So the question was phrased to focus on the decision 
process already being discussed. It asked for a comparative 
assessment of the length of time this particular process 
took compared with others. Although it appears to be a 
fairly difficult question to answer the non-response rate 
214 
was low (only 4 out of 56 failing), with a fair distribution 
of responses (see Appendix F) and a mean of 3.25. 
Correlation analysis using this variable yields 
significant relationships with both complexity and 
politicality, in that decisions perceived to be taking 
longer occurred when decision makers faced difficulties in 
evaluating possible outcomes (see Appendix I for the full 
correlation matrix), and when there was less time pressure 
and fewer total interest units. Those decisions perceived 
to be taking longer were made under less time pressure. 
Whilst this makes obvious sense in the light of the results 
presented earlier it is puzzling as time pressure was found 
to be related positively to search which in turn lengthens 
chronological duration. 
The negative relationship with total interest units is 
even more puzzling as the fewer interest units are involved, 
the longer the process is perceived to take. This is 
difficult to account for. 
Finally the relationship of intervention with perceived 
pace supports much already written in chapter 2 and 
confirmed empirically in chapter 6 on the relationship 
between duration and intervention, in that as amount of 
external influence increases so does process duration. 
However the two results referred to earlier, pace with time 
pressure and total interest units were curious enough to 
prompt further analysis to answer questions such as what did 
"longer", "average" and "shorter" decision processes look 
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like? Does the concept of perceived pace have empirical 
validity? Were there any of the non-linearities hinted at 
in chapter 6 influencing the relationships? Were there any 
underlying dimensions that could be extracted? 
8.2 Process and Pace of Decision Making 
The first question to be answered is whether or not 
there is any relationship between process duration itself 
measured in chronological time and perceived pace of 
decision making. The correlation coefficient between these 
two variables is insignificant (r = 0.13) thus firmly 
establishing the disparity between perceptions of elapsed 
time and elapsed time as measured using the chronological 
code. 
Given this relationship how could the questions posed 
at the end of the previous section be answered? One 
possible analytic strategy would be to band the responses to 
the pace question (question 19 appendix D). When three, 
groups, those that took longer than average (scale points 5 
and 4), about average (scale point 3), and less than average 
(scale points 1 and 2), were used, groups of 13,16 and 23 
cases respectively, appeared. 
Analysis of variance using the three groups yields 
mean scores for the variables of decision process for each 
group (see Table 8.1). It is immediately apparent that the 
chronological duration of those decisions perceived to be 
faster is indeed less on average such that they, the 
"faster pace" group of decisions, take only about 9 months 
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whereas the others, the medium and slower ones, both take 
longer by the clock. Both medium and slow groups take about 
13 months to make. Although gestation displays little 
variation between the groups, here again the faster group of 
cases do have a slightly lower chronological time, on 
average 2 months less. So clock time and perceived pace of 
decision making, particularly for "faster" paced decisions, 
seem to be related, and peoples' impressions of what is 
happening are not so far out of line with the clock. 
What is surprising is that the other process variables 
display no significant variation across the groups. The 
level of authorization of the slower group is marginally 
lower than the other two, which suggests that decentralized 
decisions may be seen to take longer as they are not made at 
the top, but it is only a marginal difference 
So the level of authorization, the difficulties of 
coordination and the extent of search activity have no 
bearing on decision makers' perception of pace of decision 
making. 
It is surprising that since pace does to some extent 
reflect chronological time it is totally unrelated to the 
amount of search activity. The evenness of the group means 
for both search depth and breadth suggests that people do 
not weary of search activity. Search perhaps follows 
Parkinsons law (Parkinson 1965) in that like work it fills 
the time available, whether that be short or long. 
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Perhaps the analysis of politicality and complexity 
variables across the groups will supply some further 
answers. 
8.3 Complexity, Politicality and Pace of Decision 
Making 
Table 8.2 gives the group means of both complexity and 
politicality variables for the faster, average and slow 
groups of decision processes. 
Three effects require discussion, those that are 
linearly related to pace, those that are non-linear and 
those that have no significant relationship whatsoever. 
The two interesting and significant non linear results 
(from trend tests) are with overall level of uncertainty and 
contention. Decisions which are both faster and slower 
paced are each more contentious and uncertain. 
This finding is quite remarkable as both these 
variables have been hypothesized at various points in this 
thesis to be responsible, by their linear effect on other 
process activity variables, for slowing down the 
chronological duration of process, but never for speeding it 
up. However when decision pace is separated from the 
chronological measurement of duration it appears that they 
can do both to perceptions of time. 
It seems as if when there are doubts, due to 
disagreements or to uncertainty, decision makers feel that 
they must either go slowly and carefully, or that they 
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perceive themselves to be decisive in acting quickly to 
overcome these doubts. 
The significant linear relationships, those with time 
pressure and intervention, provide interesting adjuncts to 
the arguments presented in the previous section. It would 
appear that increased time pressure does lead to the 
perception that decisions are made more rapidly. Executives 
do see themselves as moving faster when under time pressure 
to meet a deadline even though they may not actually be 
moving faster by the clock, there being no significant 
correlation between time pressure and process duration (r 
-0.11 see Appendix I). 
This result coupled with the lack of significance for 
both components of search activity (see Table 8.1) may at 
first sight seem to be in direct contradiction to one of the 
major conclusio ns in Chapter 6, namely that time pressure 
increases search which then increases duration 
notwithstanding the lack of time. It can be seen that even 
if the chronological time that it takes to reach a decision 
actually lengthens under pressure from a deadline, 
executives feel that this limit actually spurs them on. 
This contradiction between the results for chronological and 
perceived duration indicates that there are real differences 
between the two conceptualizations of time. 
The relationship with intervention indicates that 
more external influence in the decision making process slows 
things down even while time pressures speed them up. The 
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intervention of external interests was hypothesized to be a 
determinant of pace of decision making (Wilson 1980), and 
although the direction of its effect was unclear, the 
implicit assumption was that more external influence delays 
and slows things down (Schwartz 1974). The linear 
relationship of intervention with pace goes some way towards 
confirming such thoughts. Intervention also correlates 
significantly and directly with chronological duration (r 
0.31) and with search depth (r=0.30). In this case pace 
and duration vary in the same direction as that reported in 
chapter 6. So executives not only feel that time passes 
more slowly when outside interests are influential but it 
actually does. 
In summary, decisions which are felt by those 
involved to be faster display high levels of uncertainty 
and contention, high time pressure and low intervention and 
are of fairly short duration. Slow decisions also display 
high levels of uncertainty and contention, but in their case 
there is high intervention and low time pressure. They are 
less closed and decision makers are confronted with more 
difficulty in evaluating possible outcomes, and they take 
around the average duration. Medium or average pace 
decisions take about the same duration as slow paced ones 
but they are not particularly contentious nor do they pose 
any unusual uncertainties. 
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8.4 Further Analysis 
In an attempt to examine the effects reported in the 
previous section in a more systematic manner, the groups of 
decisions were subjected to discriminant analysis using the 
variables of complexity and politicality. 
This technique aims to weight and combine the 
discriminating variables into functions which differentiate 
the groups as much as possible. It has two main advantages 
for evaluating groupings such as the ones used in this 
research. Firstly it provides a more precise indication of 
the comparative importance of each variable for 
distinguishing amongst the groups. Secondly it assists in 
establishing the. substantive plausibility of the groups. 
The initial discriminant analysis generated two 
functions which correctly classified 78% of the cases. A 
holdout sample of 40% of the cases gave 80% correct 
classifications. Using the functions developed from that 
analysis to classify the remaining 60% produced 40% correct 
classification indicating that the original, functions were 
not reliant on the sample of cases used. 
This form of analysis was repeated a further six times 
to ensure that the cases, which are selected 
on a random basis, provided a stable pattern 
The percentage of correctly classified cases 
sample varied between 73.68% and 89.47% with 
The percentage of cases correctly classified 
samples varied between 37.33% and 58.60% wit] 
automatically 
of results. 
from the random 
a mean of 82.7. 
in the holdout 
ha mean of 
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48.17%. The number of variables that met the inclusion 
criterion (F= > 1.0) varied between 4 and 9 The solution 
was basically too unstable for further use. 
In an effort to achieve greater stability three 
actions were taken. Firstly the inclusion/exclusion 
parameter (the F value) was increased to a level which 
matched the significance of p <= 0.05 for discriminating 
purposes (Lachenbruch 1975, Mostafa 1981). Secondly 
interaction terms were introduced to take into account the 
non linearities of two of the major predictor variables; 
contention and overall level of uncertainty. The simplest 
way of representing this interaction is by the use of the 
quadratic form; a form of relationship which has been found 
to be adequate to capture such non linear effects. Thirdly 
the holdout sample was progressively reduced until only 20% 
of valid cases (those cases with missing data being 
excluded) were being used as a check on the classification 
functions derived. 
The net effect of this strategy was such that either 
contention (or its interaction) or level of uncertainty was 
present in successive classification tests in which cases 
were selected on a random basis for inclusion in the 
calculations. This was taken to be a valid result as the 
two are significantly and positively correlated (r = 0.55, p 
<= 0.01). 
A final analysis which included all valid cases 
correctly assigned 60% of them using level of uncertainty 
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alone. It was apparent that the major discriminating effect 
between the three groups is overall level of uncertainty. 
Therefore these two variables contention and overall 
level of uncertainty, can be taken as good predictors of 
decision pace. They loom large in the theoretical work on 
decision making processes. March and Simon (1958) and 
Thompson (1967)focus on the effects of uncertainty, whilst 
others, for example Pettigrew (1973) and Cohen et al (1972) 
argue that process is driven more by political forces than 
uncertainty. From the executives' point of view high 
uncertainty or a high level of contention pose major doubts 
as they are unsure of the consequences and may be unable to 
neutralize the potential conflict of interest. 
The preceding analysis suggests that two courses of 
action are adopted, they either let things drift along to a 
conclusion or they impose or respond to deadlines. However, 
when external interests are powerful pace will be slowed and 
chronological duration increased. 
8.5 Organization and Pace of Decision Making 
In the perception of duration are there any 
organizational effects at work? For example do publicly 
owned organizations differ in pace from those in the private 
sector, a constant refrain in the popular domain if not the 
organizational literature? 
Do decision makers facing increased levels of 
competition evoke faster paced responses? 
These issues are examined in the following section 
223 
Table 8.3 presents the data on ownership and 
independence of organization with decision making pace. 
Given the dichotomous nature of these two variables the 
count of decisions in each cell is recorded, and a Chi- 
square test applied to both sets of data, sector and 
independence. This indicates that there is no significant 
association between either of them and the pace index. Thus 
neither sector nor independence seems to effect decision 
making pace. This is a surprising finding as it confounds 
many myths if not theories of organization. Decision making 
pace is not perceived to be any slower in the public sector 
despite the findings in the previous chapter that it does 
take longer by the clock, nor are there differences between 
autonomous organization and subsidiary. 
In an attempt to explore any other organization level 
variations an analysis of variance was done for the other 
organizational level measures used in this study. Table 
8.4 presents the results. 
None of the variables display any significant 
relationship with the pace index but it appears that slower 
than average decision making looks to occu. r in large groups. 
In raw score terms faster decision making occurs in groups 
which have around 5,000 employees. Decision making is seen 
to be slower in groups of 12,000+ and also faster decision 
making appears to occur in organizations with some product 
variation and who are not market leaders. Essentially 
though perceived pace varies with the matter for decision 
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and organization has little direct effect as would perhaps 
be expected. 
8.6 Conclusions 
This chapter addressed the issue of whether or not 
organizational time as indicated by a measure of decision 
making pace can firstly be measured and if so what are the 
possible relationships with decision making process 
variables. 
To this end a measure of decision pace was constructed 
by grouping the responses from a question which asked 
decision makers if the decision they were describing had 
taken longer than other similar issues, about the same time 
or less time. Correlation analysis was not successful and 
it was therefore hoped that some group characteristics could 
be identified which would enable discrimination between 
these kind of decisions to be achieved. 
The answer to the essentially simple question, do 
decisions which are felt to be faster paced take less 
chronological time, seems to be that they do. Grouping the 
decisions into two groups instead of three for analysis 
purposes does not alter the basic finding that there is 
little in the process activity group of variables that 
varies with pace and could therefore account for it. 
For example the means of search activity, a significant 
correlate of elapsed duration, do not vary across these 
groups. 
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Turning to the complexity and politicality variables, 
both significantly linear and significantly non linear 
relationships were found with pace. Time pressure and 
intervention vary linearly, though the differences are non 
significant, with pace. Thus less intervention and more time 
pressure are associated with faster paced processes. It 
looks as if decisions which are seen to take longer than 
average drift towards conclusions, faster paced processes 
are subject to time pressure. 
The most significant findings however, concern pace and 
overall level of uncertainty and contention. Both the 
faster and the slower paced decisions are highly uncertain 
and highly contentious. 
There appear to be two strategies for dealing with such 
problems, either impose a deadline and resolve the problem 
in a fast paced process or let them drift to a conclusion. 
This conclusion seems applicable to all types of 
organizations as no differences were reported using 
organizational level measures. Neither public/private nor 
the autonomous/subsidiary dichotomies associate with pace 
differences 
There does seem to be a variable of perceived pace 
which stands for some measure of organizational time. This 
perception may parallel or contradict chronological time. 
There is the possibility that the perception of time may 
affect behaviour though there is not much evidence for such 
effects here. Further research should seek to develop this 
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idea, particularly by examining whether or not it holds 




Analysis of Variance: Duration and Process Variables by Pace 
Faster Average Slower 
Group Group Group 
Variable Mean Mean Mean F Ratio 
Duration 
Process Duration 8.8 13.1 13.7 . 876 






2.7 2.9 2.4 1.142 
2.2 1.8 2.3 1.315 
37 39 39 . 082 
3.5 3.4 3.4 . 030 




Analysis of Variance: Complexity and 











Mean F. Ratio 
Complexity 
Procedures 3.7 3.8 3.7 . 013 
Number of Sources 3.3 2.9 2.9 . 470 
Feedback 27.8 14.7 23.7 1.845 
Confidence 3.9 3.8 3.6 . 916 
Uncertainty of 
Information Needs 3.7 4.0 3.5 1.724 
Outcomes 2.9 2.8 3.4 2.843 
Level 3.5 2.6 3.6 4.598*b 
Politicality 
Contention 3.4 2.4 3.7 9.519*b 
Pressure 3.2 3.5 3.4 . 768 
Imbalance 3.1 3.0 2.9 . 079 
Closure 2.3 3.1 2.5 1.640 
Time Pressure 3.8 3.0 2.8 2.980a 
Total Interest Units 9.3 6.8 7.5 2.792 
Diversity 5.1 4.7 5.1 . 414 
Intervention 86.9 80.3 75.2 2.406a 
n 13 16 23 
*p --ý . 05 
a- significantly linear 
b- significantly deviant from linear 
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TABLE 8.3 











Public -8 5 9 22 
Private 5 11 14 30 
Chi Square = 2.87 2 d. f. Significance = 0.24 
Independence 
Autonomous 9 11 15 35 
Subsidiary 4 4, 16 
Chi Square = o. 28 2 d. f. Significance = 0.87 
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TABLE 8.4 










Mean F Ratio 
Size (Log) 3.4 3.3 3.6 1.320 
Group Size (Log) 3.7 3.6 4.1 2.418 
Competition 3.3 3.6 3.6 . 289 
Market Position 3.7 4.0 4.0 . 524 
Product Variation 4.0 3.6 3.3 1.437 
Input Quality 3.8 3.5 3.5 . 349 
Input Quantity 3.5 3.3 3.5 . 330 
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CHAPTER 9 
Review and Conclusion 
The major purpose of this study was to explain why the 
process of making strategic decisions in organizations takes 
as long as it does. Whilst some suggestions had already 
emerged in the literature, for example those of Mintzberg et 
al (1976) and Hage (1980), substantial empirical work by the 
Bradford Group (Hickson et al 1986) had failed to account 
for much variation although it did provide a starting point 
for further work (Chapters 2 and 3). 
The rationale behind the current study is that process 
duration is capable of relatively precise measurement 
(Chapter 4) and that a comparative survey method is an 
appropriate way of investigating the problem. 
Characteristics of fast, slow and average duration 
decisions and decision making were explored with some 
descriptive cases (Chapter 5j. Testing the substantive 
hypotheses, that the complexity of the problem and the 
politicality that attached to it affected the decision 
making process variables (search, negotiation, authorization 
and coordination), which in turn affected process duration, 
yielded limited but interesting results. The analysis 
presented in Chapter 6 concluded that search activity, 
particularly how hard decision makers search, had a 
significant lengthening impact on duration. Search in its 
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turn was found to be politically motivated rather than 
associated with the technical complexity of the problem. 
The sources of complexity and politicality themselves 
and the effects of organizational level variation were 
examined in Chapter 7, where it transpired that there was no 
direct effect of organization on duration, but there was an 
indirect effect from public ownership. 
An alternative approach to the use of process 
duration as the only measure of speed was developed and 
explored by using a measure which did not rely on 
chronological time but rather decision makers' perceptions 
of the pace of the action (Chapter 8). 
Each stage of the empirical analysis led to further 
clarifications. The purpose of this chapter is to draw 
those results together and, where they appear to be in 
conflict, reconcile them; to explore the strengths and 
weaknesses of the research methodology; and to review the 
findings from the literature and indicate some possible 
directions for anyone wishing to pursue the topic further. 
Before proceeding, one further piece of analysis 
remains to be presented and discussed. Early in the 
Bradford studies, whilst interviewing chief executives and 
senior administrators, one theme or question invariably 
surfaced; this was the comparison of the decisions they were 
discussing with decisions in other organizations. The one 
criterion they were interested in was not cost, size or risk 
but speed, or, as they measured it, elapsed duration. The 
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feeling transmitted to the author and to other members of 
the research team was that in some way a "good" decision, as 
well as solving the problem, to some extent was also a fast 
one. This led to the framing of a question that would 
enable the present author to test this hypothetical, almost 
intuitive relationship, in a more systematic manner. 
Question 25 on the final sheet of the questionnaire 
(Appendix D) asked decision makers for a rating of "how good 
they considered the decision to be". This scale when 
correlated with process duration produced a correlation 
coefficient of -. 27, p <= 0.0.5, which does support the idea 
that opened up this thesis that effective decision making, 
or a good decision, is synonymous with fast decision making. 
If managers are indeed so very conscious of the passage of 
time, then maybe speed is an indicator of a successful 
decision. In which case the results of this work would be 
of immediate practical value to managers. 
9.1 The Methodology 
one significant achievement of this research project, 
other than the empirical findings, lies in the area of 
method development. In adding another 56 cases of decision 
making to the now rapidly expanding bank of decision making 
data available to researchers, it demonstrated that it is 
possible to collect data on complex strategic issues and 
processes by means of a mailed questionnaire (c. f. Grinyer 
and Norburn 1975), and although problems exist with this 
approach they are not insurmountable. 
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Stein's (1981 a&b) questionnaire, which was the only 
other recent attempt to collect data in this way, yielded an 
identification of 16 modes of decision making not comparable 
with the results obtained here. However where they overlap 
the results of the research reported in this thesis do 
demonstrate a marked consistency of findings with those 
published by the Bradford Group (Hickson et al 1986). As 
reported in Chapter 5, the means, standard deviations and 
ranges of chronological duration were almost identical. The 
close correspondence of these figures is both startling and 
reassuring. It does seem possible therefore to apply what 
is seen by some to be "the weakest of all research methods" 
(Heller 1971), a mailed questionnaire, to collect data on 
decision processes. In actuality it may be the only 
possible way to collect decision making data across a wide 
range of organizations in an economical fashion. 
9.2 Explaining Duration 
The results of this study have gone some way towards 
explaining differences in process duration; why some 
strategic decisions take 4 years to make and others take 
less than 3 months. 
The reason has little or nothing to do with the amount 
of negotiation in the process, the level at which the 
decision was finally authorized or the extent of 
coordination difficulties faced. The analysis points firmly 
to search activity, particularly search depth - the deeper 
and harder that decisions makers search for information - as 
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the significant determinant of duration. A prior gestation 
period did not, as was hypothesized, reduce duration but it 
did reduce the level of search activity so that it had an 
indirect accelerating effect. 
Why then should search activity occur? What makes 
managers seek and study a greater volume of information? 
The answer should be related to the uncertainties facing 
decision makers. The more uncertainty the greater the 
search to reduce it. Multiple regression of both complexity 
and politicality sets of variables however suggests that it 
is not uncertainty but time pressure and the intervention of 
external interests, two politicality variables, that are the 
best predictors of search depth. This lead to the somewhat 
peculiar conclusion that the more deadlines are imposed the 
more search takes place, and therefore a longer process 
duration will ensue, despite the deadline. 
If this result is taken together with the effects of 
external intervention then not only does a decision have to 
be made (time pressure) but external interests have to see 
it being made (search), so setting deadlines may have an 
opposite effect to that intended by those who impose them. 
Decisions may actually take longer than if there were no 
such pressures. 
When these results are taken together with those of the 
Bradford studies some interesting similarities and 
differences occur. Although failing to account for any 
significant variation in process duration, Butler et al 
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(1983) did report that intervention was related to duration 
in the same way as in the analysis presented in this thesis. 
An analysis of a sub-sample of decisions in American and 
U. K. subsidiaries led Mallory et al (1983) to suggest that 
formality of interaction slows process, but a reanalysis of 
the complete data base by the present author also added 
informal interaction as a major predictor of 
duration. Hickson et al's (1986) review of the determinants 
of process duration pointed out that the more seriously 
process is disrupted the longer it was likely to take. They 
also identified search activity as having a prolonging 
effect on duration. 
So search has a major impact on length of process 
duration from both sets of data, and if managers want to 
reduce decision making duration they should minimize search 
activity by avoiding the imposition of deadlines and by 
diverting the influence of external interests. 
However managers do not operate in a vacuum, they 
manage in an organizational context; a context which poses 
many contingencies which were hypothesized to impact on 
process duration through the variables which characterize 
the problem to be solved, i. e. complexity and politicality. 
This generally proved to be the case, there being no direct 
effects from organizational features. This supports the 
view of Hickson et al (1986) that whilst organization may 
set the background, it is the matter for decision that 
matters most at least as far as the process of decision is 
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concerned. The one variable that displayed a direct and 
remarkable impact on process duration was ownership, 
particularly public as opposed to the private sector. Topic 
by topic, decision making appeared to take twice as long on 
average in the public sector. 
Further examination of the effects of public and 
private ownership suggested that the reasons why decisions 
in the public sector took longer are that there are more 
interest units involved and that the decisions being taken 
have a longer time horizon than in the private sector. It 
is also probable that public sector decision makers are more 
visibly accountable and have to refer decisions through more 
procedures to allow public scrutiny. 
Another contingency hypothesized to have a significant 
impact on complexity and politicality was organizational 
size. Greater size of organization has no direct effect on 
duration, but it does display a positive relationship with 
time horizon of decisions (a complexity variable which 
measures the the length of time decision makers must wait 
for feedback on the results of their decisions). This seems 
to suggest that decision makers in larger organizations 
while not taking any longer to reach a conclusion than 
decision makers in smaller organizations, do have more slack 
resources that can be committed further into the future. 
Moreover there is some evidence from the lower confidence 
they place in the information used that these decisions are 
also more risky. 
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Increasing size also means that more diverse types of 
interests, rather than a greater quantity of interest units, 
are drawn into the decision making arena. This is liable to 
lead to greater contention in the arena. 
Other organizational level variables, measuring the 
second feature of ownership used, autonomous versus 
subsidiary and also environment, have little impact on 
process and any effects are overshadowed by the 
public/private sector differences. These relationships are 
summarized in Figure 9.1 
9.3 Explaining Pace 
As decision making processes are streams of events, 
this thesis discussed their pace as perceived by 
participants in the process, as distinct from chronological 
process time. This was done because it appears that in 
organizations there are at least two time reckoning systems 
(Clark 1982), one constructed around the standardized 
chronological code, the other around a sequence of events 
which is given a durational interpretation by participants. 
Analysis at first found no significant association 
between duration, measured by chronological means, and pace, 
the decision makers' perceptions of elapsed duration, but 
when the cases were grouped into fast, medium and slow, the 
faster paced decisions did take on average 4 months less 
than the average and slower paced ones. 
Some interesting non-linearities emerged amongst the 
complexity and politicality variables when an analysis of 
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variance was performed-od-nthese thre-; "§rplýps of decisions. 
Both fast and slow groups of decisions exhibiea-higher 
level of/contention and uncertainty than the average o 
-"' ýo, 
medium/paced decisions. It appears that when there is te 
possibility of conflict and doubt, a decision is pushed I 
ahead as hastily as possible. If that fails to expedite an 
outcome, 'then it is left to drift slowly along. 
However a-further examination of the using 
:1 0, 
discriminant analysis techniques indicated that either 
contention or overall level of uncertainty best 
distinguished among the groups. These two variabl'es appear 
in much of the significant theoretical work on decision 
making, for example March and Simon (1958) and Thompson 
(1967) discuss the effects of uncertainty while others, for 
example, Pettigrew (1973), suggest that process is shaped by 
political forces. 
Thus there appear to be two ways of dealing with such 
uncertain and contentious problems: either impose a deadline 
and resolve the problem in a faster paced process, or let 
the issue drift to a conclusion over a long period. 
However, there is the complication already referred to, that 
the imposition of a deadline may actually cause decisions to 
take longer by the clock even though the participants would 
still perceive them to be fast. 
Such a conclusion seems applicable to all types of 
organizations as no differences were found when 
organizational measures were introduced. Neither the 
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public/private sector nor autonomy/subsidiary dichotomies 
are associated with pace in the way that the former is with 
duration. So it appears that. decision makers in the public 
sector organizations did not perceive themselves to be 
taking longer, even though they were doing so by the 
chronological code. Thus there does seem to be a 
distinctive variable of perceived pace, not measured by the 
clock, which stands for some measure of organizational time. 
Further work should seek to develop this idea by examining 
whether or not it holds across decisions in the same 
organizations. 
9.4 What is Duration? 
The conclusions of the preceding two sections prompt 
the question of any link between process duration as 
measured chronologically, and pace as measured by managerial 
perceptions of time in a stream of events. 
Medium and longer term pace decisions take almost the 
same amount of elapsed time; only the faster paced ones are 
faster by the clock. Why should this be, particularly as 
level of search activity, a major determinant of elapsed 
duration, does not vary across the three groups of 
decisions? Maybe it is because when managers are pressured 
for time (Mintzberg 1973, Kurke and Aldrich 1983) they react 
to those pressures by perceiving themselves to be moving at 
a faster pace and do indeed move faster against the clock. 
However if the pressure is off then the relationship between 
pace and duration no longer holds, and how long process 
9 
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seems to take may be affected by other variables not used in 
this project. 
Clearly this provokes wider questions of what other 
variables effect perceptions of the passage of time. It 
appears that thinking in elapsed time terms means different 
things to managers in different organizations. Some indeed 
seem to view a year as a long time while others clearly do 
not. Future research should seek to uncover the variables 
that account for this phenomenon. 
9.5 The Decision Making Literature in Retrospect. 
Not many authors have produced work, either theoretical 
or empirical, on the duration of decision making processes, 
although many measure and mention it almost in passing. 
There are basically only three major pieces of work to be 
reviewed in this section. These are those of the Bradford 
Group (Hickson et al 1986), Mintzberg et al (1976) and Hage 
(1980). 
According to the Bradford Group's main theoretical and 
empirical guidelines, process activity is shaped by the 
technical complexity of the problem and the politicality of 
the interests that attach to it. Issues or topics for 
decision pose problems that require a technical solution and 
therefore interests are drawn in, with or without ready made 
solutions. The analysis and results presented and 
summarized earlier confirm that search activity has an 
impact on duration (Zaltman et al 1973, Hickson et al 1986), 
but the relationship between duration and discussion or 
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negotiation which Hage (1980) predicted is not apparent, and 
may not exist. 
The analysis also supports Astley et al's (1982) view 
that complexity and politicality do have an effect on 
process, but that it is differential in that all aspects of 
process are not influenced by both complexity and 
politicality. ' Hence negotiation and search activity seem to 
be more politically motivated, whereas authorization and 
coordination are related more to problem complexity. 
Therefore the theoretical conclusions of the Bradford group, 
modified by Butler et al's (1983) findings, are to some 
extent substantiated by those of this project in that they 
found that scrutiny (search) was affected more by cleavage 
(politicality), and negotiation by topic complexity, a 
contradiction with the results presented here, but 
centrality (level of authorization) was found to be a 
function of both. The data analyzed for this thesis suggest 
that centrality (level of authorization) is positively 
associated with confidence in information but is not related 
to any of the politicality variables. 
Mintzberg et al (1976) and Hage (1980) are the only two 
substantial pieces of work outside the ambit of the Bradford 
group to offer empirical and theoretical insights on 
decision making process duration. Both of them suggest that 
the greater the number of people involved the more process 
will be prolonged. These findings are not borne out by the 
results of the present study as neither total interest units 
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nor diversity of interests has any direct effect on process 
duration. What seems to be significant is the extent to 
which time pressures were imposed and the extent to which 
external interests were influential. This latter result, 
together with the direct correlation between intervention 
and pace, lend support to the findings of Wilson's (1980) 
thesis which-argued that external influences pace the 
decision making process. 
The lack of association with the absolute numbers 
involved suggests that-some interests have more influence 
than others on the final outcome. Hage(1980) suggested that 
in the unlikely event of parity of influence occuring then, 
'tone must proceed slowly, carefully, paying attention to 
their interests", but this does not appear to be so as 
balance of influence has no impact, either directly or 
indirectly, on duration. It seems more probable that there 
will be differential influence, and that when this is so the 
most influential interests are as likely to speed the 
process as to delay it . The determining factor would 
appear to be level of contention. If the powerful or non- 
powerful agree, then the process should proceed smoothly. 
However, if there are opposing views then the process will 
probably be delayed and extended. Indeed Mintzberg et al 
(1976) suggest a positive link, between intensity of 
political activity and duration of decision making. 
Others have suggested that organization level variation 
was expected to set the background for decision making 
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activity by having an impact on process and duration through 
structuring and the uncertainties faced. Both Wilson et al 
(1982) and Kenny et al (1985) suggest that ownership, either 
public or private, or whether the organization is autonomous 
or a subsidiary of another, affects process, and therefore 
duration, through the level of control exerted. Decision 
making in the public sector was thought to be slowed by a 
high level of formalization and authorization procedures due 
to greater accountability. This is supported by the fresh 
data examined here, for decision making in public-sector 
organizations certainly took almost twice as long for all 
issues, except reorganizations, as those in the private 
sector. 
Pugh and Hickson (1976) reported consistent 
relationships between increasing organizational size and 
increasing specialization of functions. This latter should 
increase both the number and diversity of interests that are 
likely to be drawn into any arena, and therefore increase 
contention and the amount of negotiation needed to resolve 
it. Increasing size does indeed correlate with increased 
diversity of interests, but it is greater size of owning 
group rather than of organization itself that appears to 
raise the level of contention around a decision. 
Hage (1980) hypothesizes that increasing size. should 
also be associated with decentralization of decision making. 
Decentralization could increase delays as more groups would 
tend to participate, which in turn, would increase 
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negotiation and therefore duration. He further suggests 
that decentralization of decision making encourages joint 
creation (the extent to which the final'solution is a 
product of many and varied interest groups), discussion, 
negotiation, delegation and routinization. The first three 
then increase and the second two then reduce duration. If 
he is right, the lack of overt relationships between level 
of authorization and duration could be because these 
variables are canceling each other out. 
Hage (1980) further suggests that centralization speeds 
decision making. As stable interest groups emerge at the 
highest levels, fewer people are involved and less search 
activity takes place. Only the latter relationship, that 
between search and duration, is confirmed by this present 
study. It appears that level of authorization, which is 
related to confidence in information, is more a function of 
group size than of any other organizational level variable. 
In Chapter 2 organizational environment was 
hypothesized to affect decision making because of its 
variability. The more variability decision makers face, the 
more lateral communication as opposed to vertical 
communication there will be. This creates more potential 
for interests to be drawn in, which in turn may mean more 
negotiation and more coordination problems. However, the 
results reported here do not confirm this; although one 
variable of problem complexity, uncertainty of outcomes, 
does correlate with coordination delay, it is itself 
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unrelated to any of the environmental variables used in this 
study. 
Most theories using organizational level variables do 
not deal directly with their effects on process duration. 
Any effect of the organizational framework is via the 
complexity and politicality of the problem. These two have 
their roots in the contingencies of organization size, 
technology and environment, which make up the backcloth to 
the stage (problem) on which the game (process) of decision 
making is played. 
9.6 The Future in Prospect 
The research reported in this thesis raises several 
issues for future efforts to study both decision making 
process and speed of process. Four issues are discussed in 
turn, firstly-two surprising non-findings, then the utility 
of both the conceptions and measures of speed used in this 
research, and then the relationship between search activity 
and newly developing information systems technology. 
Finally, the possible future uses in other national settings 
of the survey instrument developed for this project are 
commented on. 
First the non-associations. Closure (the extent to 
which some alternatives are forclosed) was a variable that 
was hypothesized to have a major impact on process. Bass 
(1983) suggests that when options are precluded search is 
restricted and thus according to the results of both the 
current study and those of the Bradford Group (Hickson et al 
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1986), duration should be reduced. The idea of a non- 
decision (Bacharach and Baratz, 1962) would also be 
dependent on some measure of closure. Yet although there 
appeared to be a reasonable distribution of responses in the 
sample used in this research no significant correlations 
were obtained between it and any other variable used, be 
that organization, problem complexity, politicality or 
process. It would be tempting to conclude that the degree to 
which alternatives are closed off has no impact on process. 
Even if options are restricted decision makers still go 
about their discussions and evaluations in much the same 
way. In these circumstances are they trying to rationalize 
a foregone conclusion, or are they playing the game through 
for some future benefit rather in the manner of the only 
racehorse left in a race after the overnight declarations 
having to gallop alone over the course to claim the prize? 
If this analogy were followed to the bitter end, it could be 
argued that shutting off options can even lengthen the 
process since managers may feel obliged to canter over the 
full length of the course in much the same way as the one 
horse racer does. On the other hand, perhaps the time is 
spent legitimately in trying to find less obvious 
alternatives, working through a decision makers morphology 
on a problem in order to be able to have a choice to make. 
This crucial aspect of decision making would need further 
development and more careful operationalization in any 
future studies of decision making. 
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Of the complexity group of variables, the number of 
sources to the problem has little impact on process 
activity. In other words even if a problem arose from a 
wide series of internal and external sources this would not 
raise the level of complexity. While on the face of it more 
sources should stimulate more search, perhaps decision 
makers just deal sequentially with problems (Cyert and March 
1963, Lindblom 1959) and do not struggle to find more 
information to combine into an all embracing solution. 
While the utility of both measures of speed was 
reviewed earlier, the implication that they may have for 
future research was not. There is clearly something which 
structures managers perceptions of the passage of 
chronological time. This may be one part of an 
organization's culture, in which case the way or ways by 
which this time reckoning system is constructed, recreated 
and transmitted could be a significant element in the 
development of research into this currently popular area of 
organization theory. That thought suggests that strategic 
decision making processes, by providing anchorage points in 
ongoing streams of events within organizations, may be 
appropriate empirical vehicles for an analysis of 
organizational culture. 
Turning to information technology, with the advent of 
improved and expanded data storage and retrieval systems 
allied to the growing use of decision support systems, 
general intelligence gathering and data base interrogation 
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may become a surrogate for problem prompted search activity 
in the future. If so this would mean that search will 
become routinized, and when major decisions are required a 
greater proportion of the necessary information may already 
be available, on tap as it were. Early evidence for this is 
the results in Chapter 7 which found that organizations in 
competitive environments may collect intelligence as a 
normal part of operations, and thus do not have to engage 
too actively in specific problem oriented search when making 
particular strategic decisions. What they want to know is 
already in their systems. As the role and perhaps the 
pervasiveness of search activity may alter, such 
developments will need careful thought by those engaged in 
future research into strategic decision making processes. 
Finally, although this research project was conducted 
in Britain only, by developing a questionnaire which 
captures decision making process, it may have helped to 
expand the opportunities for cross-national studies of 
decision making (cf. DIO Team, 1981) beyond the suggestions 
derived by Mallory et al (1983) by making it easier to 
collect data. For example, the use of this research 
instrument would have avoided the considerable interviewing 
efforts put in by Runo Axelsson for Axelsson et al (1986). 
For although the convergence view of organizational 
structure (Hickson and McMillan, 1981) may be true, the 
evidence suggests that processes of decision making differ 
markedly since the matter for decision appears to matter 
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most, and what is decided and by whom is likely to differ , 
from society to society. Although this study has reflected 
on and compared its findings with those of the previous 
Bradford Studies, it has gone beyond them both in its 
conceptualization of process duration and in its method of 
data collection in a way that may prompt yet further 
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APPENDIX A Organizations in the Sample 
Public Sector (25 Organizations) 
organization Name. Product/Service 
Crown Agents 
Avon and Somerset Police 
open University 
Camden Borough Council 
Anglian Water Authority 
Bradford Met. Council 
The Post Office 












Wessex Regional Health 
Authority 
Shropshire Area Health 
British Gas 
Electricity Council 









Water Supply and Disposal 
Metropolitan Authority 
Mail and Communications 
Local Authority 
Energy utility 
Local Authority (County) 





Health Care Region 







Maps and Publications 

















Plant and Equipment (Gases) 
Bankers 
Plant and Equipment 
Chemicals 
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Airwork Airport operations and support 
Atkins Group Consulting Engineers 
Baker Perkins Plant and Equipment (food) 
Associated Dairies Retail Stores 
British Vita Foam and Rubber 
Brooks Motors Electric Motors 
Avon Cosmetics Cosmetics 
Milk Marketing Board Producer Monopoly 
Anderson plc Mining Equipment 
Allied Foods Food processing 
Dan Air Airline 
Amalgamated Metals Traders and Reclaimers 
Pennine Insurance Motor Insurance 
British Oxygen Gases 
British Tissues Paper 
HP Bulmer cider 
Crabtree Electrical Wiring Accessories 
Burgess Products Filters 
Britannia Airlines Airline 
Black and Decker Small Tools 
Collins Publishers 
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APPENDIX B lst. ACCESS LETTER 
UNIVERSIW OF BMDFORD 
641 MANAGEMENT CENTRE EMM LANE BRADFORD WEST YORKSHIRE BD9 4,11- TELEPHONE 42299 
Director and Professor of management Sciences: JCHIGGINSBSCMAMSc PhD CEng NEE C131M 
Dear I 
I-am writing to ask for your help in some management research. 
in collaboration with colleagues at Bradford Management Centre and overseas I am 
looking at how strategic decisions are made in organizations such as yours (what I 
mean by strategic decisions is explained below). Our work has taken us into thirty 
diverse organizations, large and small, in both the public and private sectors, and 
covered a wide range of strategic decisions such as major new product ventures, 
fundamental reorganizations, takeovers and mergers, and building revolutionary 
new plants. In each organization we have obtained senior management's 
perspectives on why and how particular strategic decisions are made. We are now 
looking more closely at one or two significant aspects on these crucial processes 
and for this we need to include an example from the experience of management in 
an organization such as yours. 
if you are willing to help, please would you: 
1. Identify your most recent strategic decision, i. e. one which reflects any one 
or more of the following characteristics: 
a) it was a substantial financial commitment 
b) it affected the whole organization 
0 it had wide-ranging consequences for the direction that the 
organization may take in the future. 
2. Choose two people who were centrally involved in the making of this 
decision (one of whom may, of course, be yourself). 
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Ask them to complete the enclosed questionnaires about how it was made 
(and return them in the enclosed pre-paid envelope). This should only take 
twenty minutes. 
No financial data of any kind is required and all responses will be treated in the 
strictest confidence, the names of participating organizations being known only to 
myself. 
The specific aim of this research is to produce some practical answers as to how 
decision making can be improved. Its results will be used in management education 
in the future and will be published in readily accessible management journals such 
as "Management Today". If, however, you would like to receive a personal 
summary of the initial results, please circle the appropriate space on the 
completed questionnaires. Executives who have participated in our work have 
indicated that the retrospective analysis of decisions has proved useful to them in 
assessing the effectiveness of their own strategic decision making procedures. 
Finally, may I thank you and your colleagues in advance for your assistance. 
Yours sincerely, 
G. R. Mallory, 
Research Fellow, 
organizational Analysis Research Unit. 
encls. 
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APPENDIX C FOLLOW UP LETTER 
UNIVERSITY OF BRADFORD 
MANAGEMENT CENTRE EMM LANE BRADFORD WEST YORKSHIRE BD9 4.11- TELEPHONE 42299 
Director and Professor of Management Sciences: JCHIGGINSBScMAMSc PhD CEng FIEE CBIM 
Dear 
Approximately a month ago I wrote seeking your assistance with 
some research into strategic decision making in contemporary 
organizations. The purpose of this letter is to reiterate that 
request which was to identify your most recent strategic decision 
and choose two people who were centrally involved and ask them to 
complete a short questionnaire about it. 
Whilst fully appreciating that acceding to such requests cannot 
be high on a busy person's schedule, I firmly believe that both 
management thinking and practice will utimately benefit. Our 
early work has already produced ideas which are being passed on 
to our current generation of management students and we need to 
build on our knowledge of this crucial managerial activity. 
I look forward to hearing from you. 
Yours sincerely 
GR Mallory 
Research Fellow - Organizational Analysis Research Unit 
APPENDIX D QUESTIONNAIRE 
NAME POSI-HON 
What was the problem? 
What was the final decision? 
To what extent did it arise: 
(Please circle) As a response to competiton 
As a response to legislation 
From an initiative within the organization 
Due to implementation of strategy 
As a regular event 
Other (please specify) 
When was the first move made towards a decision? 
I 
-7 
Was the matter aired before that? If so, when? 
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ORC. ANIZATION 
Mainly Partly Hardly 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
MONTH YEAR 
Please describe in the space below in chronological order the main sequence of events in the 
decision making process beginning with the earliest date you have just given, and noting the 
main depart ments/divisions involved and the sequence of committees/working parties used. 
Give main dates and indicate any significant periods of inactivity. PLEASE ADD FURTHER 
SHEETS AS NECESSARY. 
WHAT HAPPENED 
When was the final decision taken 
MONTH YEAR 





Plear, e circle appropriate zin-, wcr 
To what extent was this decision 
handled by existing and accustomed 
procedures and routines? 
How clearly could the information 
needed to make this decision be 
identified? 
How difficult was it to evaluate 
the possible outcomes? 
What level of uncertainty did the 
problem pose for the organization? 
Approximately when would the 
ef f ects of the decision be known? 
How contentious was this decision 
. 
'Initially? 
What was contentious? 
To what extent was there a feeling 
initally that the decision had 
already been made? 
To what extent was the decision 
made against deadlines or time 
pressures? 
What was the source of the 
pressures? 
All of it 5 
-Most of it 4 
Some of it 3 
Very little of it 2 
None of it I 
Very clearly 5 
Quite clearly 4 
Fairly clearly 3 
Not clearly 2 
Not at all I 
Extremely difficult 5 
Very dif f icult 4 
Moderately so 3 
Quite easy 2 
Very easy I 
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A very great deal 5 
A great deal 4 
Quite a lot 3 
Some 2 
Hardly any I 













Not at all 
A very great deal 
A great deal 
Quite a lot 
A little 
Not at all 
How did the time taken by this Much longer 
decision compare with the usual Quite a bit longer 














Pleac-c list belo\. k- the naines of tllc How actively were they What WC-Is il le influclice internal depar ti nent s/di visions and involved in the process? each had on the final 
external organizations whose views Please circle for each. choice? Please circle 
were taken into account during the I Not at all f or each. decision making procýss (Please 2 Occasionally I Little 
treat Chief Executive as a3 Sometimes 2 Some 
separate unit) 4 Frequently 3 Quite a lot 
5 Continually 4A great deal 




1 2 3 li 5 1 2 3 4 5 
______________ 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 '. ' 5 
______________ 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 1, 5 
______________ 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
- 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
_______________ 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
_______________ 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
_______________ 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
___________________________ 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
-I-______________ I 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
EXTERNAL 
1 2 3 1& 5 1 2 3, I& 5 
1 2 3 14 5 1 2 " "5 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 I 5 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5. 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
To what extent were the following sources of inf ormation- used? (Please circle for each) 
Not at all a little somewhat a great deal a very great dea 
Experience 12345 
Material already available 12345 
(From files, etc. ) 
Material specially collated 12345 
from internal sources 
External research by own staff 12345 









Overall %hat level of confidence was put 
on the information used? 
(Please circle) 
How much discussion, negotiation or 
argument did this decision generate? 
To what extent was the decision making process 
delayed by difficulties in getting the right 
people together? 
Looking back was the decision: 
How many full time or full time equivalent 
employees are there in: 
What is the organization's position in relation 
to its market/ sector? 
Is it: 
Does the organization face much competition? 
To what extent are the products/services of the 
organization tailored to customer/client 
requirements? 
A ., cry great deal 
A great deal 
Quite a lot 
Some 
Not much 
" very great deal 
" great deal 
Quite a lot 
Hardly any 
None at all 
A very great deal 
A great deal 
Somewhat 
Hardly 
Not at all 
An extremely good one 
A very good one 
Moderately good 




Any group/organization of which 
it is part 1 71 
A leader - others follow 
A major force - there is no leader 
A strong presence 
A minor participant 
Of negligible significance 
A very great deal 
A great deal 
Quite a lot 
Some 
Hardly any 
Totally to their requirements 
Variations specified by clients 
Many standard variations 














3 How difficult is it to deal with any variation 
in the quality and quantity of critical inputs? 
Would you like a feedback report? 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR CO-OPERATION 
Very dif f icult 55 
Difficult 44 
Not too difficult 33 
Easy 22 
Very easy II 
YESMO 
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APPENDIX E SHORTENED ACCESS LETTER 
UNIVERSIW OF BRADFORD 
MANAGEMENT CENTRE EMM LANE BRADFORD WEST YORKSHIRE BD9 4JL TELEPHONE 42299 
Director and Professor of management Sciences: JCHIGGINSBScMAMSc PhD CEng FIEE CBIM 
Dear I 
Whilst fully appreciating that 'time is money' could we beg 15 minutes of your 
organization's resources. 
Over the past few years in collaboration with colleagues here and overseas we have 
been investigating how strategic decisions are made. We now wish to broaden the 
scope of organizations covered and to save time have developed and tested the 
-very short questionnaire enclosed. Would you or one of your colleagues help us by 
completing one? 
if you are willing to help could you begin by identifying a recent Istrategic' 
decision; one that has had or will have a major impact on your organization, and 
complete the questionnaire using it as a focus. A pre-paid envelope is enclosed for 
you to return it to us. 
Please be assured that no financial or quantitative data of any kind is required and 
the strictest confidentiality will be maintained. 
To be perfectly frank the immediate return to you of this small investment of time 
is not greatp although some executives who have assisted us in the past have 
indicated that the retrospective analysis of a decision is a useful learning 
experience. If you wish however, a summary of results will be sent to you (please 
tick the appropriate box at the end of the questionnaire). Otherwise the major 
pay-off will be for future generations of management students who will be given 
better insights into this crucial managerial activity. 
Thank you for considering our request. 
Yours sincerely, 
D. J. Hickson 
Professor of Organizational Analaysis 







Distribution Scores for Variables 
Variable Mean Standard Min. Max. 
Deviation 
Activity Duration 
Gestation 12.5 18.3 0 96 
Process 12.4 10.9 2 48 
Process Activity 
Authorization 2.6 0.9 1 4 
Negotiation 3.9 1 2 5 
Coordination 2.1 0.9 1 5 
Search Depth 39 14.9 8 66 
Breadth 3.4 1 1 5 
Complexity 
Procedures 3.7 1.1 1 5 
Number of Sources 3 1.3 1 7 
Feedback 22.6 19.4 1 90 
Confidence 3.7 0.7 2 5 
Uncertainty 
Information Needs 3.7 0.9 1 5 
Outcomes 3.1 0.9 1 5 
Overall level 3.3 1.1 1 5 
Politicality 
Contention 3.2 1.09 1 5 
Pressure 3.4 0.7 2 5 
Imbalance 3 1.2 0 4 
Closure 2.7 1.3 1 5 
Time Pressure 3.2 1.2 1 5 
Total Interest Units 7.8 3.0 3 15 
Diversity 5 1.5 2 9 
Intervention 21.3 16 0 57 
organization 
size (log. ) 3.5 0.6 2.2 5.3 
Group Size (log. ) 3.9 0.8 2.2 5.9 
Competition 3.6 1.5 1 5 
Market Position 3.9 1 1 5 
Product Variation 3.6 1.2 2 5 
Input Variation 
Quality 3.6 0.7 2 5 
Quantity 3.5 0.9 2 5 
Time frame (Pace) 3.3 1.1 1 5 
Goodness 4.1 0.8 2 5 
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Appendix G 
Classification of Interests (following Hickson et al 1986) 
Primary Interest in Example of interest units 
the Organization 
internal 
Transformation Production Department(equipment) 
Haulage Dept. (transport company) 
Nursing Staff (hospital) 
Stability Engineering(motor manufacturer) 
Maintenance(energy utility) 
Conformity Accounts Dept(ceramics distributor) 
Quality Control(brewery) 
Ajudication Liason Section (local authority) 
Claims Section (insurance co. ) 
Innovation Research and Development(gases) 
Aquisition Procurment (airline) 
Purchasing (mining equipment) 












Suppliers of Material or Finance 










Operationalization of Level of Authorization. Question 8 
Appendix D. 
Scale Point Description and Example Frequency 
4 outside Agency 7 
(EEC Commission) 
3 Top Governing Body 28 
(Board of Directors) 
2 Other Group 10 
(Policy Committee) 
1 Chief Executive 8 
(Managing Director) 
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